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Abstract 
Coordinated Management and Emergency Response Assemblages (CMaERAs) are 
complex, multi-faceted, institutionalised networks of emergency response agencies, 
people, processes, technologies, histories, geographies and cultures which shape the 
strength of inter-agency coordination and emergency response. This thesis explores 
how a variety of actors, actants and technologies involved in emergency 
management assemble and organise. The methodology adopted is qualitative and 
uses two case studies to evaluate how CMaERA oscillate from their organised shape 
as dictated by policy to a new shape emanating from the needs of a response call. 
The case studies were: the Irish Emergency Management Assemblages (IEMA) 
response to the winter storms of 2015/2016 and the United States Emergency 
Management Assemblages (USEMA) response to the Boston Marathon Bombing in 
2013.  Fifty-one semi-structured interviews of key stakeholders and emergency 
response agents were conducted and supported by an interpretive analysis of key 
policy documents. By adopting assemblage theory and applying it to the empirical 
findings of the IEMA and USEMA, conceptualised within Foucauldian and 
Agambien understanding of power and sovereignty, this thesis offers a theoretical 
and philosophical framework to study emergency services,  their interactions and 
power dynamics while keeping in sight their histories, cultures and current 
situations. This resulted in recognising that CMaERAs re-shape and oscillate 
position regularly to ensure that response is adequate and efficient. These 
movements are influenced both by the situation, inter-agency trust, and previous 
working relationships, but also from external factors, such as the institutionalisation 
and siloed manner of agencies, (in)formalisation, their relationship with the 
government, technological advancements, data analytics but also human nature. 
These broad factors affect inter-agency coordination and collaboration by creating 
barriers preventing the development of a true Coordinated Management and 
Emergency Response Assemblage. Finally, it provides three wider contributions to 
knowledge: expansion of the term ‘vulnerability’, development of embodied 
assemblages, and the identification of three urban factors which affect assemblage 
oscillation.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
“Want of foresight, unwillingness to act when action would be simple 
and effective, lack of clear thinking, confusion of counsel until the 
the emergency comes, until self-preservation strikes its jarring gong – 
these are the features which constitute the endless repetition of history.” 
 
Sir Winston Churchill (British Politician and former Prime Minister of Great Britain 
and Northern Ireland 1874-1965), speech, House of Commons, May 2, 1935. 
1.1 Introduction 
Geographers study hazards and their transformation into disasters 
as a bridge between the physical and human schools of thought. They examine the 
risks and social vulnerabilities that lead to devastating disasters but refrain from 
studying the effects of a weak or strong emergency management system. This raises 
the question as to whether emergency management efficiency or inefficiency 
contribute to the vulnerabilities of a space during a disaster? By only focusing on the 
socio-economic contributions to vulnerability production there is a lack of insight 
into how vulnerability is re-enforced within emergency management systems which 
directly affects the effectiveness of recovery processes. Therefore, this thesis takes 
the first step in the evolution of disaster geographies by recognising that there is an 
abundance of literature on risk and vulnerability but, in light of recent global 
changes, we need to start exploring the policy and response networks involved in 
disasters and possibly expand our definition of vulnerability. We need to begin 
asking questions regarding the plans that will protect us and the processes and 
decision-making efforts that develop and hinder response resulting in the creation of 
new vulnerabilities both during and after an event.  
1.2 Emergency Management 
Emergency Management is both theoretical and operational. The 
theory supports the tactical application of emergency management through 
prediction, mitigation and management, but the operational aspect also informs the 
future theory. The theory of emergency management endures continual change, 
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adaptation and development due to its rapid evolution to meet the needs of modern 
society.  
However, the underlying principle of modern emergency 
management is the all-hazards approach. This approach is the leading structure used 
worldwide when designing and implementing emergency response protocol. This 
approach is deemed the most efficient way to deal with hazards as it encourages the 
view that many aspects of preparation and response such as, policy formation, 
training and activation, are similar regardless of the type of event (MEM, 2006; 
O’Riordan, 1992; Gregory, 2015; and Adini et al, 2012; Waugh, 2005; Marietta, 
2012; Rogers, 2011 and Ayub et al, 2007). Of course, emergency response plans do 
differ from place to place depending upon the risks identified (Canton, 2013) but 
through the all-hazards approach most have a basic hierarchy of generic steps. It is 
these generic steps which allow for a quicker, better coordinated and a more 
effective response, as plans are tailored to provide general information regarding 
who should respond when and who has ultimate responsibility.  As with any 
underlying structure, the all-hazards approach, has its advantages and disadvantages 
which affect how emergency management systems are shaped and coordinated.  
1.2.1 Advantages of the All Hazard Approach 
The all hazard approach is cost effective with regard to money and 
time (Waugh, 2005 and Gregory, 2015). This is because the all-hazard approach 
inherently calls for a coordinated response from all response agencies and governing 
institutions. Thus, the all-hazard approach promotes the development of agency-
specific plans contextualised within broader local, regional and national plans. These 
plans should incorporate all agencies and their resources to avoid wasting time and 
effort (Hammond, 2005). This allows  agencies to understand their role and level of 
resources within their own agency, but also within the broader emergency response 
system and reduces the duplication of efforts. 
The all-hazard approach promotes the development of a single 
response plan. This plan allows for the consolidation of resources and the 
combination of coordinated efforts across agencies supported by one institution, 
usually the government (Gregory, 2015). The all-hazards plan creates a system of 
response which, regardless of its inefficiencies, is needed when responding to an 
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event. There has to be plans even if they are not perfect, there needs to be a lead 
agency and all of that should be decided beforehand. This assures knowledge of who 
the lead agencies are, availability of resources and decisions regarding 
communication and incident command teams are all available before a crisis occurs. 
This reduces conflict and the use of technical jargon between agencies (Gregory, 
2015).  Finally, the all-hazard approach can work against the institutionalised and 
siloed nature of some agencies as it gives them time to prepare and train with other 
agencies and establish formal networks prior to an event.  
1.2.2 Disadvantages of the All-Hazard Approach 
Due to its all-encompassing nature, the all-hazard approach 
attempts to mitigate and manage disasters of different natures (Gregory, 2015) 
because they deem “the principles of disaster resilience to be [are] the same” 
(Godschalk, 2003:139) regardless of their categorisation as natural, technological, 
terrorist, biological, chemical, war, UFOs (as in space trash and asteroids not extra-
terrestrials) etc. As a result, the all-hazard approach is quite simplistic and ignores 
contextual factors that shape events and the potential movement away from original 
policy in light of different events.  
The response to this critique of the all-hazard approach is often that 
the procedures, staff, response mechanisms and resources after an event are the same 
or similar, but as Gregory (2015:1) points out “the same cannot be said of processes 
used to mitigate initial damages prior to events belonging to the different 
categories”. For example, natural events can be more widespread and incur more 
structural damage as well as high levels of fatalities while human-made events tend 
to be more localised with less structural damage, but often have high levels of 
fatalities too. Thus, they require different mitigation procedures (Fremont, 2004) that 
do not fit neatly within all-hazard based emergency plans.  
In creating an all-hazards plan there is always the  temptation that 
emergency planners choose the hazards most likely to affect their state (Waugh, 
2005). This creates the inability for communities and states to respond effectively to 
rare events due to a lack of detail and instruction resulting in emergency plans 
becoming ambiguous and unclear (Gregory, 2015). This view supports the argument 
presented by McEntire (2004) that one single principle such as the all-hazards 
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approach may provide direction within the discipline and within practice but 
operationally, it may also become too broad and ambiguous to actually be effective 
(Gregory, 2015).  
 Drabek (1985) argues against the technocratic nature of 
emergency management which the all-hazards approach encourages and instead 
proposes a need to work with communities, voluntaries and other agencies who may 
have different forms of knowledge to that of emergency planners, government and 
the emergency services. This means that although the all-hazard approach ensures 
that emergency planners are prepared for a range of disasters, they often neglect to 
study or understand the role that broader factors such as weak governance and strong 
institutionalisation have in the creation of disasters and for the efficacy of response.  
The all-hazard approach allows for better, quicker and more 
efficient responses to a range of disasters. This approach is not without its 
limitations, but it provides opportunities for increased coordination, knowledge 
sharing, the establishing of networks and relations and an understanding of each 
agency’s role and relationship with one another during a crisis. It would be 
impossible to develop specific plans for every possible event; thus, this approach 
gives a community its best possible chance to mitigate the event, minimise damage 
and loss of life. However, emergency management as a discipline and practice is not 
as straightforward as illustrated above. Instead, there are three observations which 
need to be made in order to understand how the emergency management systems are 
shaped and operate.  
Firstly, society relies on the emergency management systems in 
times of great need and yet, the restrictions which emergency response agencies 
operate under, are rarely acknowledged in any meaningful way. For instance,  
emergency response agencies are constantly fighting against their own and other 
agencies institutional cultures which affects inter-agency collaboration. Emergency 
response agencies also operate under restrictive power dynamics that often change 
and influence them in unpredictable ways based on a range of circumstances and 
they are often excluded from the development of national and local policy. This 
results in policy being written by policymakers with no operational experience often 
resulting in ineffective policy which does not meet the requirements or contradicts 
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emergency response processes.  Therefore, the thesis explores the spaces and 
organisation of emergency management and how human-made and natural disasters 
are being planned for and tackled via policy, training, infrastructure and investment, 
within the context of a growth in new urban technologies and data analytics designed 
to improve the efficient response to any event. This is revealed through an 
examination of the intricate networks that sustain emergency management agencies 
in light of cultural, historical and power-driven factors which affect these emergency 
response agencies in terms of their growth and their ability or desire to collaborate 
with other response agencies.  
Secondly, how can we make sense of managing emergency 
response? Emergency response is a collaborative process involving a range of 
agencies and institutions including first responders, voluntaries, government 
departments and communities. Thus, there is usually a policy in place which sets out 
clear pre-determined structures and hierarchies in an attempt to ensure response does 
not devolve into chaos when multiple response agencies, with different purposes, 
respond to the same event. However, there is evidence offered throughout this 
dissertation, which illustrates that emergency response, when overly structured 
becomes messy and uncontrolled. This can result in an increased risk of safety to 
those involved, the development of new vulnerabilities and a weakly coordinated 
response. On the other hand, when emergency response is overly informal and 
unstructured, decision making and responsibility become more complex, chaotic and 
difficult to attain. Therefore, this thesis proposes a need to examine the differences 
between formal and informal emergency management structures and the role of the 
middle ground between these structured and unstructured systems. These issues of 
(in)formality arise out of a conflict between policy-based response and activated 
response which results in a need to conceptualise the changing shapes of emergency 
management.  
Thirdly, the discipline of emergency management only emerged in 
the 1970s (Marietta, 2012) and cannot be considered a discipline in the same way as 
Geography or Sociology. Instead, key thinkers in the field argue that the theoretical 
foundations of emergency management are limited with the discipline relying on 
multiple concepts such as risk, vulnerability, coordination etc. from a range of 
disciplines (McEntire, 2004 and Drabek, 2004). Due to this, Drabek (2004:4) argues 
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that there are different types of theory informing emergency management including 
“normative” theories, principles such as all-hazards, philosophical approaches such 
as social construction and the adoption of conceptual ideas such as social 
vulnerability. McEntire extends this argument by proposing that before the discipline 
of emergency management can develop its own set of theoretical frameworks, there 
are a number of conceptual barriers which must be overcome including the creation 
of accepted definitions for key terms such as ‘disaster’ and ‘hazard’.  
Therefore, with regard to emergency management, its evolution 
and lineage actually provides more information (Chapters 4 and 5) than a 
comparison of different approaches because the emergency management discipline is 
immersed in other disciplines perspectives and histories. This void of meta-level 
theory is recognised within the discipline and there are attempts to work towards 
creating a more defined theoretical framework. However, presently, emergency 
management is still very much written for its practitioners with the key literature 
presenting more empirically based ideas. Thus, by recognising the need for theory to 
help conceptualise and situate emergency management as a discipline, this 
dissertation applies assemblage theory to reveal how emergency management 
systems are structured and operate.  
1.3 Assemblage Theory - An Ontological Question 
 An assemblage is a way of understanding society by recognizing 
that various actors and elements are bound and work together to produce outcomes, 
but that an assemblages constitution is not fixed, and different elements of the 
assemblage can be moved, replaced and exchanged (Castree et al, 2013). This 
presents society and its parts as fluid entities with unique forms of connections 
which ensure that infrastructures and agencies are organised in particular ways, 
usually in relation to the power dynamics involved within the assemblage. But why 
use assemblage theory and why apply it now to explore emergency management? 
This theoretical framing is derived from a need to conceptualise 
emergency management systems as networks of agencies, institutions, jurisdictions, 
technologies, processes, policies, power dynamics, histories and geographies. 
However, assemblage theory, as it is currently discussed in the literature, is bounded 
and employed via specific ontological positions which attempt to explain how the 
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world is structured (see Table 1.1). Therefore, I study assemblage theory in line with 
Foucauldian and Agambien theories of power and governance in order to 
demonstrate the microcosms of power, the power dynamics of inter-agency 
coordination and to reveal the power regimes and sovereign authorities that allow 
these assemblages to work in the way they do. It is this framing that results in two of 
the key contributions of this work to wider knowledge.  
Firstly, it illustrates that assemblages are fluid structures which 
change shape in response to outside stimuli such as power dynamics, cultures, goals, 
histories and geographies. However, to fully understand the oscillating nature of 
assemblages the research does not call on any of the stipulated ontological positions 
of assemblage theory. Instead, it argues for a middle-based ontology which offers a 
more contextual discussion of assemblages while, recognising that each ontological 
position has value. However, in the empirical sense, hierarchical and flat ontologies 
do not offer anything to our understanding of how emergency management 
assemblages are actually shaped via policy and re-shaped via activation. Therefore, I 
suggest that there is a need to limit the ontology question within the research in order 
to highlight that assemblages oscillate under different circumstances and cannot be 
fully understood via one ontological understanding. In doing so, I take a pragmatic 
approach proposing that assemblages oscillate between hierarchical (Labowitz, 
2009; Barbour, 2012; Agamben 1991; 1998; 2003) and flat positions (McFarlane, 
2011a/b) often occupying a middle position for a time. This raises questions 
regarding under what contexts (political, cultural, historical and geographical) do 
assemblages metamorphize in different ways?  
Secondly, acknowledging that these ontologies exist and are 
legitimized and useful for understanding the world on a theoretical level paves the 
way for a sanitized and specific understanding of society and institutions based upon 
one’s axiological and ontological beliefs. This results in very different readings of 
how society and institutions actually operate and are governed often presenting one 
perspective based on structure (as argued by theorists such as Marx, Harvey, Brenner 
and Agamben) and one based on fluid decentralised unstructured relationships (as 
argued by Foucault and Latour) (see Table 1.1). 
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However, by removing the ontological boundaries within 
assemblage theory and acknowledging that structures exist but are more fluid and 
oscillating than currently accepted by some authors, this research seeks to understand 
how assemblages actually operate and are governed. This is done by recognising 
governance more broadly and that the alignment of institutions and the notion of 
sovereign power is given away in liberal economies to governmentality. Yet, the 
consequences of this process on emergency management systems has not been as 
explicitly researched as it has been in other urban studies on housing, health and 
education. Thus, in an era of (perceived) increasing natural and human-made crises 
the effects of governmentality on the operation of emergency management 
assemblages is an interesting addition to assemblage theory and urban governance. 
Table 1.1: Philosophical positions 
Ontological 
belief 
Philosopher/theorist Definition 
Tendency to 
lean towards 
hierarchical 
structures 
Marxist (Marx, 1983) Believes that the state is set up as a 
structure to defend private property. 
Power remains with the wealthy 
bourgeoise who retain ultimate control 
so that the proletariat cannot obtain 
power in order to actively create 
structural change. It is a highly top-
down society with little or no space for 
bottom-up change or power dispersion 
from wealth centres  
Moderate to 
mild hierarchy 
Agamben (1998; 2005; 
2011) 
Harvey (2005; 2012) 
Brenner (2011) 
Argue that assemblages are a bit more 
fluid and dispersed than Marx 
portrays. However, Agamben 
acknowledges that assemblages still 
retain a sovereign authority with 
ultimate control who can take over at 
any time, but the normal daily 
assemblage is built of a diverse 
number of agencies working together. 
Moderate to 
mild flat 
Foucault (1972; 1977; 
1978; 1979; 1991) 
Argues that assemblages are structured 
via discourses with no one puppet 
master or sovereign power. However, 
he argues that society and assemblages 
are far from unstructured. There are 
still clear dispositifs in how society 
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shapes itself but that the power 
between them is more unstructured 
and movable. He demonstrates this 
through his observation of how prisons 
are run. There is a very clear hierarchy 
in a prison between the guards and the 
prisoners but even within those 
groups, there are more hierarchies. 
Thus, power is constantly moving and 
re-shaping so there is no one sovereign 
but multiple embodied sovereigns. 
Tendency to 
lean towards 
flatter 
structures 
Latour (1996; 2014) Argues that dispositifs are far more 
loosely organised as there is no 
authority figure. Thus, power remains 
fully unstructured and moveable and 
that no one person or agency will or 
has full control over society or the 
assemblage. 
Source: Author 
1.4 Aim of Study 
The theoretical framework contributes to and shapes the purpose of 
this research in two ways. Firstly, its purpose is to explore how the structures and 
operations of emergency management systems are included, excluded and 
reactionary to changes in urban governance, particularly, in light of recent 
technological and data developments in urban spaces through smart city agendas.  
There are an abundance of angles through which the influence of 
the ‘smart city’ agenda can be explored in the context of emergency services. This 
includes resource availability and efficiency, information of things, wearable 
technology and innovative technologies for search and rescue amongst others. 
However, the role of urban governance, inter-agency and inter-jurisdictional 
coordination and collaboration and the historical cultures of these agencies were 
cited, early in the research, as key factors facing emergency management as cities re-
develop and modernise their technology use and data analytics. Thus, this research 
proposes that the "smart city" agenda is influencing another evolutionary node of 
urban governance with the use of algorithms, data analytics, artificial intelligence 
and machine learning to manage the urban. This, in turn, has the potential to change 
how emergency management systems and agencies respond to crises.  
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Secondly, the purpose of the theoretical framework is to re-think 
emergency management systems as assemblages which oscillate and change shape 
depending on the event they are responding too. This often results in emergency 
response differing from the established directions of policy. This argument 
contributes to a new agenda within assemblage theory which posits that assemblages, 
in reality, are not wholly flat or hierarchical but shift positions based on external 
factors such as trust, culture and inter-agency relationships. By conceptualizing these 
factors, this research proposes three new concepts; ‘splintering power’ which is 
derived from the work of Graham and Marvin (2001), ‘bouncing power’ and 
‘imagined assemblages’. These emerged as a way of thinking about and supporting 
the hypothesis that assemblages are moveable and oscillating structures (see table 
1.2).  
Table 1.2: Empirical concepts 
 
Concept 
Definition 
Imagined assemblage Imagined assemblages form when 
responsibility and dominance are re-
imagined as someone else's based on 
perceived power and hierarchy. 
Splintering Power The episodic nature of power creates 
networks that reposition assemblages 
and agencies from flat to middle to 
vertical as the power splinters between 
different people and agencies.  
Bouncing Power Coordinated Management and 
Emergency Response Assemblage 
(CMaERA) policy creates epicentres of 
power in the form of coordination and 
control centres, but as the power is 
decentralised across agencies and away 
from the epicentre it dissolves and re-
emerges in local spaces with new 
regimes of power supported by local 
knowledge and informal networks. 
Source: Author 
Power splintering and bouncing refers to the division and sharing 
of responsibilities during an event, while imagined assemblages emanate, 
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irrespective of the policy, with regard to how people understand their power. Often, 
this imagined assemblage can be more important than the actual assemblage as it is a 
negotiated, symbolic and fabricated assemblage created due to particular positions of 
hierarchy rather than experience. Thus, those with experience often re-imagine their 
positioning in relation to those with more power but less expertise resulting in the 
creation of imagined assemblages. 
Further, oscillation within an assemblage becomes particularly 
apparent when the nuances and intricate power networks of assemblages are 
analysed in terms of external urban and state factors and internal factors such as 
institutional tensions, the temporary/permanent dichotomy of policy, and the effects 
of urban governance. The broad aims outlined here are explored via an asymmetrical 
case study split between three locations and two events. 
1.5 Scales of Study and Cases 
This research uses an asymmetrical case study approach with the 
Irish Emergency Management Assemblage (IEMA) rather than a comparative 
approach. The primary case study is Dublin, which is supported by Cork and 
contextualised around the United States Emergency Management Assemblage 
(USEMA), specifically, Massachusetts. These assemblages are encompassed under 
the overarching conceptual term of CMaERA (Coordinated Management and 
Emergency Response Assemblage) as it envelopes several of the factors and 
concepts which shape these assemblages under one umbrella term.  
 A CMaERA, firstly, goes beyond first responders, to include all 
the relevant agencies of a city, including, but not limited to, Emergency Services, 
Local Authorities, Insurance Firms, Communities, Charities, the Defence Forces, 
Engineers, Civil Defence and the Government. Secondly, it acknowledges and 
explores the governance networks which influence the informal/formal dichotomy 
and institutionalisation of emergency management which affect the efficiency of 
inter-agency relationships deemed key for coordination. Thirdly, it requires a 
reflection on the geographical aspects of such a system and recognises emergency 
response as a local level initiative which acts within the context of regional and 
national response systems. 
12 
 
The concept of a CMaERA extends upon Calloway and Keen’s 
(1996) understanding that Emergency Management Systems are “multi-disciplinary” 
in nature (adapted by Shen and Shaw, 2004; 2110). Therefore, to illuminate how 
they develop and work in practice it is imperative to explore them by cross-cutting 
different disciplines, in order to understand their geography, their innovative 
technology and organisational value. Kapucu (2012) explores this organisational 
value by inquiring into the inter-agency relationships that are created for the mutual 
benefit of agencies and communities at the local level through the lens of governance 
networks. Kapucu (2005) argues that these relationships allow for inter-agency 
networks to be adequately maintained in the face of major emergencies (Salaman, 
2002; Kapucu, 2012). This results in benefits, such as increased collaboration, 
decentralisation and a better sharing of knowledge and resources between response 
agencies which in turn, positively impacts the affected area as the response is quicker 
and more efficient (Kapucu, 2005).  
Further, CMaERA account for urban emergency management 
within technologically innovative spaces as they acknowledge the complex nature of 
emergency management in an era of increased technological solutionism and a 
culturally constructed risk society. A risk society forms when risk is perceived to be 
higher than it actually is due to increased media coverage, the ubiquitous nature of 
social media and political motives, amongst others (Gleeson, 2014 and Beck, 1992, 
2009).  
On a more focused scale, the use of CMaERA allows for an 
understanding of how the IEMA and USEMA are governed and organised. This is 
critical as governance is not just fractured by the institutional and legacy issues of 
the agencies but also by a misalignment between CMaERA and national or local 
policies such as smart city initiatives, data analytics and new implementations of 
urban technologies. 
1.5.1 Primary Case Study: Irish Emergency Management Assemblage 
In Ireland, most emergency response agencies are national, such as 
An Garda Síochána (AGS) and the National Ambulance Service (NAS). Thus, the 
research could not be contained within one county or city and instead, it became a 
national evaluation, with focus placed on Dublin with Cork as a reference points. 
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Due to the national scale of the IEMA and the small number of people actually 
operating in that space, it is asserted that any findings from the Irish case study are 
representative of the entire IEMA and not just those based in Dublin and Cork. 
However, there are local inflections which cannot be adequately captured in this 
research.  
1.5.2 Secondary Case Study: The United State Emergency Management 
Assemblage 
The United States has more jurisdictional scales than Ireland: 
federal, regional, state, local, tribal and territorial, and there are also clear protocols 
as to when each scale should be activated. Thus, most police services are locally 
based, such as Boston Police Department and Cambridge Police Department, but 
then there are state police departments, such as Massachusetts State Police, and 
federal police, such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The Fire Service is 
normally city based only, while some cities have a public ambulance service, such as 
Boston Emergency Medical Services,  others have a private ambulance service such 
as Quincy, Massachusetts. The findings from the US case study are not 
representative of the entire United States as a result of the complex structural 
differences between states.  
1.5.3 Case Study Events 
The two case study events are the 2015/2016 storms and floods 
across Ireland and the Boston Marathon Bombing of April 2013. This research is 
making a distinction between natural and human-made events for simplicity as the 
research is not interested in the process that led to these events, but how the relevant 
CMaERA responded and re-shaped during them in relation to pre-conceived policy.  
1.5.4 Key Definitions 
Finally, in this chapter, I have been casual with how I refer to post-
hazard categorization as there are issues around semantics stemming from policy 
literature and colloquial uses. Thus, there are a range of concepts to describe the 
moment a hazard evolves into something which requires an immediate emergency 
response. These include ‘emergency', ‘crisis', ‘disaster' and ‘incident' but all signify a 
transgression from the norm. However, each has a particular definition and should 
not be used interchangeably for all situations. ‘Crises' and ‘disasters' are understood 
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as "catastrophic" occurrences (Castree et al, 2013: 109; Anderson, 2017; Blanchard, 
2006) which are protracted and result in long-term consequences. They are also 
usually characterised by a high numbers of fatalities, structural damage and 
economic turmoil. An example is Hurricane Katrina.  
‘Incident’ represents an episode in time where a situation occurs 
(Blanchard, 2006) and I assert that there is a sense that ‘incident' is a less value-laden 
term than ‘emergency' which primarily offers a sense of situational seriousness. 
However, the use of ‘incident’ does not actually qualify the seriousness of the event 
and is used to represent most events. Thus, both terms are used to represent the 
short-term everyday event while still being defined as situations which are “time-
limited and linked to an immediate future” (Anderson, 2017: 464) rather than 
prolonged as with ‘crises’ and ‘disasters’.  
This becomes confusing when studying emergency management 
policy and working with local first responders as ‘emergency’ is the predominant 
term used in Irish policy and ‘incident' is the predominant term used in US policy. 
These are predetermined decisions to ensure that policy is connected, and 
terminology is the same across agencies and scales of governance, which is 
highlighted as essential for inter-agency knowledge sharing and response planning 
by the Major Emergency Management Team in Ireland (MEM, 2006). Further, 
complicating the choice of language is that both Irish and US emergency 
management policymakers still refer to other terms minimally while some 
participants used different language altogether representing that the distinctions are 
blurred and based on cultural understandings. However, by not explaining their 
choice of language and the use of concepts haphazardly, there is an omission of 
situational severity which is overcome by a more colloquial evolution of the re-
naming of major events. For instance, in the US, major situations are referred to as 
incidents in policy, but when discussing potential terrorist situations, the language 
shifts between incident and attack while major terrorist attacks which have already 
occurred, are provided with their own descriptive name to illustrate the severity of 
the situation, i.e., ‘9/11’ or the ‘Boston Marathon Bombing’. In Ireland, situations 
are referred to as emergencies in policy, but major weather events are often named 
from the storm naming list of Met Éireann and the Met Office, or from colloquial 
plays on the situation such as the ‘Beast from the East’ and the ‘Son of the Beast’. 
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However, in policy and via media discussion they are referred to as ‘weather 
emergencies’ or ‘national emergencies’, etc.  
Due to this linguistic confusion this research is imposing the 
standard term of ‘event’ to refer to broad examples and references. However, this is 
done with four caveats. Firstly, I am not using it as a noun but as an adjective to 
capture what is being done rather than what it is. Secondly, the choice to use ‘event’ 
does not attempt to undercut the scale or consequences or remove the descriptors 
which acknowledge the severity of the event. Thirdly, it is recognized that within a 
Deleuzian framing, ‘event’ is a slice of time where a coherent number of actions take 
place. This is appropriate in relation to the theoretical framing of this research. Thus, 
‘event’ as a poststructural term provides a loose and broad way of referring to a 
multitude of situations with ranges of severity without becoming lost in the linguistic 
choices of such. Fourthly, the use of ‘event’ is only used in the broadest sense. When 
a situation has already occurred, the colloquial or global name and the assigned 
descriptor i.e incident or emergency etc. will be used. These choices have been made 
not to develop or evolve the existing categorisation of hazard response, but to 
remove the complex linguistic jargon which encapsulates this discipline, so the 
writing is focused on the problem, rather than overly value-laden linguistic choices.  
1.6 Thesis Structure 
The dissertation is divided into eight chapters. Chapter 2 begins 
with an introduction to the first major body of literature on the lineage of hazard 
studies and the use of the term ‘vulnerability’. The discussion then moves on to the 
organisation of emergency services as assemblages within hazard studies and 
proceeds to offer the theoretical framework for this research. Assemblage theory 
contextualised through a combined Foucauldian and Agambien perspective is the 
second major body of literature. These two works of literature are then cross cut by 
three other bodies of literature; urbanisation, neoliberalisation and smartification. 
These literatures offer context as to how assemblages, particularly CMaERA, are 
organised and may re-shape under different circumstances and at different times.  
Chapter 3 outlines the research methodology and techniques that 
were used to generate the empirical data used in this study. A qualitative 
methodology was chosen because it provides a more in-depth analysis of the social 
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world (Brikci and Green, 2007), in this case, the organisation and operationality of a 
CMaERA in relation to urban practices. An asymmetrical case study approach was 
used with Dublin acting as the primary case study and Boston and Cork acting as 
contributory case studies to provide a broader and deeper understanding of Dublin 
and the IEMA. Interviews with key emergency response participants and city 
management teams across Ireland and Boston were the main method used to explore 
the city and event. To understand regional, state and national/federal policy an 
interpretive discourse analysis was undertaken on key policy pieces provided by 
participants. 
Chapters 4 and 5 examine the policy organisation of the CMaERA 
and how they transform in shape during a major emergency, i.e. once the assemblage 
is activated. The policy sections are highly descriptive empirical chapters drawing 
off both desk and field research to portray the shape of the assemblages based on 
policy and protocol. Chapter 4 offers a detailed description of the Irish Emergency 
Management Assemblage (IEMA) using two key policy documents the Framework 
for Major Emergency Management and the Strategic Emergency Management 
National Structure and Framework Document. Chapter 5 offers a detailed description 
of the United States Emergency Management Assemblage (USEMA) from mainly 
federal documents such as the National Response Framework and state plans such as 
the Massachusetts Comprehensive Plan. However, this chapter also refers to several 
US interviews in order to clarify certain points due to difficulties in attaining enough 
relevant policy documents. Both chapters finish with an exploration of the two case 
events from the three case study locations. From Ireland, it explores the 2015/2016 
winter storms and flooding and from Boston, it explores the Boston Marathon 
Bombing. These examples are used to illustrate that assemblages oscillate and to 
uncover the reasons and circumstances as to why they do.  
Chapter 6 is interested in the broader external factors that affect the 
organisation and shaping of the IEMA and USEMA. It explores three key factors in 
detail: Political will and governance, institutionalisation and agency 
(in)formalisation drawing upon examples primarily from the IEMA due to the 
availability of individual agency knowledge, histories and policies. These, in turn, 
contribute to an understanding of how agencies work as silos and how this affects 
how they actually coordinate.  
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Chapter 7 questions whether the introduction of urban technologies 
and data analytics will change how CMaERA operate and are shaped. It deepens the 
discussion on institutionalisation by examining the benefits of smartification and 
whether technology is a solution or just a band-aid. However, emanating from the 
ERC funded ‘Programmable City Project, which aimed to “investigate the 
relationship between networked digital technologies and infrastructures and urban 
management and governance and city life” (The Programmable City, 2018), I 
examine the smartification of CMaERA. This is conducted by tracing the evolution 
of urban governance from one based on discipline to one governing via data. This is 
empirically studied through the IEMA by examining the role of algorithmic 
governance and illuminating disconnections between where the technology is and 
how these agencies are adopting and adapting to it. This is particularly interesting as 
the infiltration of big data into CMaERA may re-shape how they are organised and 
oscillate between policy and activation. This chapter primarily focuses on Dublin 
with Cork and Boston used to shed light on Dublin’s development and evolution of 
data driven processes.  
The conclusions are presented in Chapter 8. This provides a 
synthesis of the case-study findings positing that assemblages do re-shape in 
response to different events. In addition, it examines the contribution of this project 
to key stakeholders and the wider field of Geography. It also provides a series of 
recommendations for emergency management officials. 
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Chapter 2: Disruption: Re-shaping Assemblages, Interrupting 
‘Smartification’ and Changing Urban Governance  
 
2.1 Introduction 
Globally, hazards escalating into disasters are a significant issue 
due to the increasing impact of humankind on the planet over the last two centuries. 
This has re-shaped natural environments to facilitate growing cities, towns, 
populations, industries and growing capitalist material expectations. White (1945:2) 
explains this through his simple assertion that “floods are acts of God, but flood 
losses are largely acts of man”(sic), meaning that the processes of flooding or any 
natural hazard are acts beyond humans, natural events, that we cannot stop. 
However, our choices in changing landscapes without due regard to natural 
processes, increase vulnerabilities and turn a hazard into a disaster. White’s 
perspective changed how we study hazards and their relationship with society 
determining that it is the combination of a hazard, a risk and a vulnerability which 
results in a disaster (MacDonald et al, 2011). This argument still influences how we 
predict, prepare for and mitigate against disasters today. An example is Lloyds City 
Risk Index in collaboration with the Centre for Risk Studies in Cambridge 
University (2018:2) who assert that the world is facing exponential growth in natural 
and human-made disasters due to three key reasons. Firstly, it highlights that by 
“2050 an estimated 66% of the global population will be urban residents” resulting 
in more risk due to more compact populations and infrastructure. Secondly, the top 
ten cities1 at highest risk, all have sects of populations which face higher 
vulnerabilities due to socio-economic factors such as low income, education, health 
and language barriers. Thirdly, the top ten threats facing the globe between 2015 and 
20252 range between natural disasters, such as flood and earthquakes, and human-
made disasters, such as market crashes and inter-state conflicts. These are all 
expected to be more catastrophic due to the consequences of urbanisation and 
increased vulnerabilities. 
                                                          
1 Top ten cities at risk in order of highest to lowest risk: Tokyo, New York, Manila, Taipei, Istanbul, 
Osaka, Los Angeles, London, Shanghai and Baghdad.  
2 Top Ten Threats in order of highest to lowest: Market crash, interstate conflict, tropical windstorm, 
human pandemic, flood, civil conflict, cyber-attack, earthquake, commodity price shock and 
sovereign default. 
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This potential exponential growth in urban risk and vulnerability is the inspiration 
behind this research as it raises questions regarding the ability for Coordinated 
Management and Emergency Response Assemblages (CMaERAs) to adequately 
respond to these threats in a coordinated and efficient manner while minimising the 
creation of vulnerabilities post-event. To try and make sense of CMaERAs, 
assemblage theory in combination with a discussion on power, is pursued throughout 
this chapter. However, I refrain from discussing specific CMaERAs (Coordinated 
Management and Emergency Response Assemblages) in order to offer a broad 
overview of the theoretical frameworks and essential literature for this research. 
Therefore, this chapter has four distinct sections. Firstly, the positioning of this 
research within hazard studies is briefly evaluated followed by a broad discussion on 
assemblage theory, particularly its adoption within urban studies. This is a carefully 
curated section to offer the reader the key arguments needed for understanding how 
CMaERAs are shaped in future chapters. The role of power and sovereignty are also 
considered in this section as key catalysts in how assemblages are shaped and 
operate. This is followed by a succinct discussion on relevant facets of urban and 
neoliberal literature and a deeper conversation on processes of urban smartification. 
In particular, these cross-cutting themes of literature support the anchor literature of 
hazard studies and assemblage theory by exploring different modes of governance 
which contribute to the shaping and operation of urban assemblages through socio-
economic, cultural, political and technological influences. This conversation includes 
an analysis of algorithmic governance which is substantially changing how 
assemblages and their entities are shaped and operate. The use of algorithmic 
governance is explored through two key examples; control rooms and ubiquitous 
technology. The chapter then concludes by discussing the idea that assemblages, 
especially CMaERAs, oscillate in numerous ways due to the dynamic interaction of 
their moving parts. Thus, it provides reasons as to why it is important to 
acknowledge that assemblages are fluid and are mobilised via their flexible 
networks.  
2.2 Governing Hazards 
Trying to predict and prepare for both natural and human disasters 
is a cornerstone of hazard studies with particular focus placed on White’s assertion 
that “there is nothing natural about natural disasters” as they occur due to “Risk = 
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Exposure x Vulnerability” (Boyle, 2015: 270). This equation refers to the idea that 
risk is not created just because of a high rate of hazards in a particular location 
(exposure) but are also compounded by societal, cultural and political processes 
which increase the vulnerability of populations exposed to natural hazards (Boyle, 
2015). This assertion was advanced within Geography by the work of Hewitt 
(1983;1997), Smith and Petley (1991) and Blaike et al, (1994) by arguing that the 
causes of vulnerability and risk need to be fully understood before more structural 
and deep-seated processes of mitigation can occur. This set-in play the primary 
approach for how to study hazard studies as geographers’ today.  
However, there is more to hazard studies than just White’s 
assertion and his lineage as Smith and Petley (1991), Boyle (2015) and Castree et al, 
(2013) recognise four approaches which have helped to shape the discipline over the 
last century and are still active research avenues. For instance, prior to 1950, the 
engineering approach asserted, that it was the nature of nature which caused disasters 
and that the only fix was via “technological and engineering solutions” (Boyle, 2015: 
271). Based on this, White’s early argument that disasters were more than just 
natural was an exceptional outlier but a clear advancement within the field during 
this time.  
The engineering approach still exists in a morphed form, as 
solutions to natures wrath are still ‘solved/mitigated’ through engineering and 
technological processes as demonstrated during Hurricane Katrina. New Orleans 
approached hazard mitigation by building levees and re-zoning hazardous land for 
residential spaces, particularly for lower socio-economic classes. This engineering 
solution lulled and encouraged people to move into hazardous areas which were 
deemed ‘safe’. Thus, when Katrina hit, the levees failed! This engineering failure, 
combined with deeply entrenched socio-cultural inequalities and vulnerabilities, 
were the key contributing factors to the utterly devastating consequences. (Boyle, 
2015; GAO, 2006). Further, post-Katrina, the pervasiveness of engineering solutions 
such as dredging, levees, seawalls and barriers etc are still associated with most 
mitigation processes today (Charlton, 2007; Castree et al, 2013). 
The second approach emerged between 1950 and 1970 with a 
focus on urban hazards as cities began to grow and became more populous. In 
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response to this growth, city’s began re-zoning land that was known to be hazardous 
such as floodplains, and hazard studies focused and still does on how to make these 
spaces safe. This was advanced during the 1980s when hazard studies began 
applying a political economic perspective which began to re-examine White’s earlier 
assertions. The evaluation of vulnerability and its causes pushed the field into a new 
era of research with a focus “ on how age class, race and gender were implicated 
with vulnerability” (Castree et al, 2013: 209).  
The third approach is interested in the idea of a ‘risk society’. The 
term was coined by Beck (1992) as a way of conceptualising an increased awareness 
around risks faced at the national, regional, local and individual scale. Beck (1992) 
argued that the increasing awareness around hazards and risk was due to four key 
developments. Firstly, the promotion of risks emanating from global hazards 
associated with climate change. Secondly, the fear that these events are only 
predictable in broad ways with local risks being harder to “approximate”. Thirdly, 
risks were seen as so great that they were “uninsurable” and finally, “media” 
exposure “heightened” the scale of risk (Beck, 1992; Castree et al, 2013: 441). From 
this, a "sub-politics" (Beck, 1992; Castree et al, 2013:441) developed which 
critiqued state-led approaches to natural hazards and resulted in the emergence of an 
"environmental movement" (Castree et al, 2013: 441). At present, this environmental 
movement is helping to shape how we study hazards and disasters through politically 
motivated practices such as academic research, media portrayals and anarchist 
groupings as opposed to state-led methods.  
The fourth approach, ‘resiliency’ emerged in the 1990s. Originally, 
within the natural sciences, resilience refers to how an ecosystem’s stasis and 
equilibrium fares in the face of interference (Simmie & Martin, 2010 and 
MacKinnon & Driscoll Derickson, 2012) i.e. how does an ecosystem withstand and 
recover post-intrusion. The idea of having the structures in place to withstand and 
rebound quickly post a disaster attracted social scientists. Thus, resilience became an 
adopted term to explore how society can respond and recover from extraordinary 
events and shocks, such as 9/11(Gleeson, 2014 and Simmie & Martin, 2010). This 
approach argues that there is a need to recognise the inequalities of society, the 
markers of vulnerability and to then work towards decreasing these risks and 
creating more resilient communities. At its essence, it argues that these actions 
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should be done between disasters as resilience is "what we build between crises" 
(Rodin, 2013) and not about solving the last or future disasters. It recognises that as a 
society, preventing disasters is highly improbable but that the infrastructure and 
societal structure can be put in place before disaster strikes to limit the vulnerabilities 
and thus, consequences.  
These approaches are well documented within a rich body of 
literature across Geography and multiple other disciplines. However, there is a 
notable gap with regards to the institutional and inter-agency dynamics of how 
hazards and disasters are planned for and responded to by emergency management 
services. Thus, this thesis argues that to fully understand hazards in society and their 
potential impact, we need to first contextualise the political, legal and cultural 
elements of the response and mitigation network as this directly affects how events 
form, germinate, (de)escalate, and endure. Therefore, the next section explains and 
evaluates assemblage theory and its applicability to CMaERA to examine how these 
networks are shaped.  
2.3 What is Assemblage Theory?  
Assemblage theory is an insightful theoretical framework for 
understanding how hazards are governed via networks of agencies, jurisdiction, 
scales, processes and policies. The origin of the concept ‘assemblage’ was first 
described in the book ‘A Thousand Plateaus' (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980), as a 
bottom-up approach for understanding society in which individual parts can be 
moved, replaced and exchanged presenting ideas of fluidity and connection. 
However, these parts are not the focus of assemblage theory instead it prioritises the 
relationship, connections and differences between the separate parts. Deleuze and 
Guattari adopted the term ‘assemblage’ as a derivative of ‘agencement’, meaning 
‘arrangement’. Philosophically ‘agencement’ means that certain arrangements 
between agencies, concepts, processes and scales, result in particular meanings and 
connotations of what that structure is, its goals, its power and its priorities (Philips, 
2006 and Buchanan, 2015). 
Deleuze and Guattari (1987:406) unpacked the idea of 
‘agencement’ by describing an assemblage as a “constellation” of different societal 
elements and powerful networks brought together within a formalised structure. 
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They argue that understanding the arrangement of the different entities should be 
contextualised in terms of their connections to fully reveal the meaning and role of 
that assemblage (Philips, 2006 and Buchanan, 2015). This is critical as the separate 
entities of the assemblage are “contingent” and “non-necessary” and can be moved 
around and replaced both within and between an assemblage (Castree et al, 2013, 
Legg, 2011, McFarlane, 2011a/b, Anderson and McFarlane, 2011, Brenner et al, 
2011, Dewsbury, 2011, DeLanda, 2006). Thus, the aim of the assemblage regularly 
changes due to elements re-positioning to deal with different priorities. The 
movement and replacement of different elements within the assemblage are 
conceptualised in terms of territorialization, deterritorialization (when elements 
move out and/or are replaced/exchanged) and reterritorialization (when elements 
move in and/or are replaced/exchanged for others) (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987).  
The concept of territorialization allows for multiple ontological 
frameworks to be used to frame assemblage theory. One intellectual tradition within 
assemblage theory suggests assemblages are vertical in structure and argues that 
there is a sovereign power that is ultimately providential in design, setting in place 
governmentalities to make people work in a predetermined way. In terms of 
territorialization and the coding of an assemblage (which Deleuze and Guattari 
present as how the assemblage is ordered) the hierarchical framework suggests that 
the actors and actants3 are carefully positioned in relation to the sovereign and their 
scale of power, and that the deterritorialization and reterritorialization of the 
assemblage is ultimately controlled by the sovereign but with elements of 
providential will4 for actors to internalize information and to self-organize when 
necessary.  
                                                          
3 The term ‘actant’ is related to Latour’s ‘Actor Network Theory’ (ANT) to describe non-human 
actors in a network or assemblage. Supporters of ANT often use it as replacement of ‘actor’ due to 
their perceived connotations with the term.  I use ‘actant’ in combination with ‘actor’ to illustrate 
specific elements of assemblages and I support the idea that when an assemblage changes so do the 
‘actants’ and ‘actors’. Therefore, I define ‘actant’ as the institutions, agencies, steering groups etc. 
which have set roles in the conception, evolution and activation of emergency management 
assemblages but are made up of both ‘actors’, technologies, processes and ideas. It is an all-
encompassing term for describing the systems which allow the ‘actors’ to operate and oscillate.  
 
 
4 Providential will is a theological concept which refers to the idea of free will for people. Agamben 
(1998) uses it to describe how people began using their conscience to make choices as they 
internalised the will and expectations of God rather, than fearing his wrath on earth.  
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An alternative intellectual tradition within assemblage theory 
suggests that assemblages are flat in structure arguing that they are an anarchic 
chaotic assemblage of actors that are all vying against each other which then, 
somehow, become coherent to meet the needs of a task. Issues can be addressed 
more effectively and precisely because a flat structure is decentralized, rhizomatic,5 
adaptable and flexible. This allows for an understanding of how different elements 
are connected to each other and the consequences of such relationships. This 
framework undergoes regular deterritorialization and reterritorialization ensuring 
that the assemblage is coded in an efficient manner for each task. It is less bounded 
than the vertical position and relies more on the fluid nature of assemblages.  
Due to these two foremost ontological positions, assemblage 
theory is highly debated and heavily critiqued across disciplines, for example, 
Haggerty and Ericson (2003) explore state surveillance while Patil and Purkayastha 
(2017) discuss India’s culture of rape through the lens of assemblage theory. 
Similarly, within Geography, its application has been wide with scholars using it to 
explore state power (Allen and Cochrane, 2010), Foucault’s apparatus (Li, 2007 and 
Legg, 2011) and the ontological shift of Human Geography (Dewsbury, 2011). 
2.3.1 Assemblage Theory and Urban Studies 
Thinking in terms of assemblage theory has become a growing 
research perspective over the last fifteen years, particularly in Geography and Urban 
Studies. Its popularity is due to its effectiveness as a theoretical framework for 
revealing and unravelling the complex networks of cities by "emphasising the 
relations between sociality and spatiality of different scales" (Kamalipour and 
Peimani, 2015: 402). It is able to be used in this way because of three reasons. 
Firstly, its Deleuzian origins allow for a multitude of ontologies to be used which 
supports research with different philosophical assumptions. Secondly, it focuses on 
how the urban is continually produced and re-shaped under different circumstances 
(Kamalipour and Peimani, 2015). Thirdly, it promotes thinking in a multi-scalar 
way. It is essential to study different urban scales to reveal their influences on and 
roles within assemblages. By understanding how each scale operates, any scalar mis-
                                                          
5 The use of ‘rhizomatic' is done so in line with Deleuze and Guattari's philosophical use of it in their 
‘Capital and Schizophrenia Project' between 1978 and 1980. They use it to describe multiple entries 
and exit points within research which they deem as non-structured.  
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alignments or repetitive work and significant differences in procedure and processes 
can be identified and interventions put in place (Kamalipour and Peimani, 2015). 
Even so, within Critical Urban Studies, assemblage theory is 
highly contested as evident from the debate between Brenner et al, (2011) and 
McFarlane (2011a/b) in ‘Cities’. This debate illuminated the differing and contested 
ontological approaches of the theory and how they influence our understanding of 
urban spaces, networks and institutions. McFarlane used assemblage theory as a 
conceptual framework to observe the relationships between actors and actants as a 
processual and emergent mechanism emanating from historical processes and the 
consequences of capitalism (Kamalipour and Peimani, 2015). This assertion that 
urban relations and networks are continually transitioning and changing under 
numerous influences, such as decentralized power networks, situates McFarlane's 
ontological position as structurally flat. However, his use of assemblage theory is to 
“deepen” rather than “limit” our thinking and application of critical urbanism and to 
avoid critiquing the many accepted and more hierarchical assumptions and theories 
of Urban Studies such as “urban political economy, capital accumulation and 
inequality”. 
Brenner et al, (2011) approaches assemblage theory through a 
political economic perspective arguing that it is more of a methodological process 
than an ontological process or theoretical framework (Kamalipour and Peimani, 
2015). To defend this assertion, Brenner et al, (2011) offer five critiques of 
McFarlane. Firstly, assemblages are hierarchical and cannot be removed from the 
contextualizing and state-led factors that shape them such as history, geography, 
social vulnerabilities and the processes of capital accumulation.  
Secondly, McFarlane observes the city as multiple relations, but 
Brenner et al, (2011:230) argue that this “displaces or supersedes the intellectual 
project of urban political economy” (McFarlane, 2011b; 376). Thirdly, Brenner et al, 
(2011) argue that McFarlane's work on urban assemblages does not extend the urban 
question but rather presents it as an alternative ontological method for studying the 
city (Dewsbury, 2011 and Farías, 2010) which does not adequately represent current 
urban systems and their assemblages. Fourthly, McFarlane (2011b:376) argues that 
assemblage theory is an "all-or-nothing urban theory that actively displaces the 
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critical traditions of the past in favour of a renewing of urban theory in general". 
Brenner et al, (2011) argue that this places urban theory in a subordinated position or 
subsumes urban theory into assemblage thinking rather than acknowledging that 
assemblages develop as part of the urban through antecedent processes, policies and 
city goals. Fifthly, Brenner et al, (2011) critique McFarlane’s approach by arguing 
that a wholly flat approach to urban assemblages ignores structures such as 
“sociospatial, political-economic and institutional contexts” (p.233) and power 
relations in which urban spaces are developed and maintained.  
McFarlane (2011b:381) refutes this by articulating that 
“assemblages are structured” and suggests that using assemblage theory does not 
remove these structures from the conversation or ignore the fact that at certain times 
within separate assemblages, different agencies are more prominent. Instead, he 
argues that assemblage theory does not decide beforehand who the most important 
actors are. This relates back to Deleuze and Guattaris idea of territorialization and 
coding. The use of these concepts is to ensure that the correct ordering of actors and 
actants are in place for different tasks by understanding the history, geography, 
societal, cultural and economic contexts that the assemblage operates within. 
However, with the ability for deterritorialization and reterritorialization, McFarlane 
makes a valid argument that actors and actants can shift quickly when required, thus 
it is not always necessary to have decided who the important actors and actants are 
beforehand. 
To make sense of these different perspectives of urban 
assemblages, Brenner et al, (2011:231) provides a synthetic typology to illustrate 
different analytical approaches for urban assemblages. I have adapted that table into 
bullet points to pinpoint the key characteristics of each level. 
• Level one is described as “empirical” where an assemblage is a single entity 
which can be studied within a “political-economic framework” and 
understood in relation to its geographies and histories. This converges with 
the beliefs of Brenner et al, (2011) 
• Level two recognizes a messy middle ground described as "methodological" 
and sees the use of assemblages as a way of extending our understanding of 
the "urban political economy".  
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• Level three is described as "ontological" and understands assemblages as a 
different way to study and understand the city. This converges with the work 
of McFarlane (2011a/b).  
I contend that there is a need for a closer analysis of assemblages at 
level two that encompass characteristics of both level one and three. This assertion is 
supported by the work and critiques presented by Scott and Storper (2015), Dovey et 
al, (2017) and Kamalipour and Peimani (2015) who argue that assemblage theory is 
a jargoned term which lacks agency and power. Further, they re-iterate McFarlane 
and Andersons (2011) argument that actor-network theory and assemblage theory 
should be infused in a more nuanced way within geographical studies because it is 
used by geographers as a way of understanding space. However, others assert that 
understanding the urban scale requires assemblage thinking to be more hierarchical. 
This ontology is seen in Allen and Cochranes (2007, 2010) work on regions and state 
power, while Legg (2009) promotes the need for a conversation on scale and 
assemblage theory.  
However, more interesting are the authors who refer back to the 
original Deleuzian and Guattarian conceptualization and begin to resist taking an 
ontological stance and instead are applying the theory in a very grounded way. This 
results in innovative arguments around a messy middle suggesting that assemblage 
theory can be used to position ideas and concepts which are not wholly flat or 
hierarchical. For instance, Allen and Cochrane (2010) research state power framed 
around a hierarchical ontological perspective but they recognize that this is 
complicated by the decentralization of state power at the local scale which is 
structurally flatter. Dovey et al, (2017) argues that assemblage theory and 
agglomeration theory are complementary as they encourage understanding the city in 
multiples rather than as one entity.  
Based on these key arguments of assemblage theory, this thesis 
builds upon the idea that urban assemblages are messy and nuanced and cannot 
wholly be understood through an ontological commitment of either verticality or 
flatness. Thus, I push the ideas of Allen and Cochrane, Dovey et al, (2017) and 
Brenner et al, (2011) further by suggesting that, assemblage entities can be situated 
in the middle, but that it is not a resting and defined position. Instead, assemblages 
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actually oscillate between the hierarchical and flat positions, sometimes occupying 
the middle not just ontologically, but because of political and societal influences. I 
recognise that there are multiple ontologies which are appropriate for studying the 
urban and its infrastructures but that these all produce particularly framed findings 
and observations. Thus, I am refraining from positioning this research within just 
one ontology and instead, I am going to apply assemblage theory in a post-
ontological manner. By post-ontological, I am not referring to the idea of ignoring 
the accepted ontological positions within assemblage theory, but I am arguing for the 
ontological position to be determined by empirics rather than theory. I propose this 
as assemblages are embodied and can never wholly be removed from reality. They 
are not just theoretical imaginaries but actual live, fluid and flexible arrangements 
which, under certain circumstances, oscillate between hierarchical and flat shapes 
while also often occupying a middle position. However, to understand how these 
assemblages are organised and can oscillate in formation, discussing the role of 
power and sovereignty in cities is imperative.  
2.4 Power and Sovereignty 
Power is a critically important conceptual tool that can be used to 
highlight the organisation of urban assemblages, but it is interwoven with 
sovereignty which is a long-contested but accepted act of power and authority over a 
given space/territory (Agnew, 2005). This assertion is supported by the work of 
Stuart Elden, who raises conceptual issues in how we understand these terms 
(2009;2013;2014). Elden presents territory as both an ideological concept and active 
state practice. However, he argues that if sovereignty is traced not to the Westphalian 
system of nation-states, but to classical thought, as evident through his engagement 
with Foucault and Lefebvre, then the relationship between territory and sovereignty 
should be understood as a political technology of power (Elden, 2014) with territory 
providing the “spatial extent of sovereignty” (Elden, 2009: 232). However, this 
creates the assumption that sovereignty is restricted to the boundaries of “territory” 
(Elden, 2009:173) which during political turmoil and war is not necessarily true. The 
relationship between territory and sovereignty is problematic because to save 
sovereignty often territory is violated, and to save territory often sovereign powers 
are damaged. Providing this brief overview of the complex relationship between 
territory and sovereignty is required before assemblages can be adequately analysed. 
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As it is critical to understand the microcosms of power, the power relations between 
agencies and in agencies, and the more overt power regimes or sovereign authorities 
that allow these assemblages to work in the way they do. 
Understanding these power dynamics within social institutions and 
their arrangements between different agencies, groups, genders, wealth and health is 
a key theme in Foucault’s work. Foucault described the effects of power through 
innovative conceptual tools, such as biopower, pastoral power, panopticon and 
governmentalities to understand sex, mental health, state institutions, body, 
discipline, free will and subjugation. However, critically he traced the history of 
power arguing that due to the shift from monarchy towards democracy, the model of 
power changed from a “sovereign or juridical form to a disciplinary one” 
(Andrejevic, 2008:608, Clarke, 2007 and Barou and Periot, 1976).  
A disciplinary form of power takes “minimum investment and 
maximum return” (Clarke, 2007:6) and no longer operates at a territorial level 
(Sennellart et al, 2007), but instead is related to the nexus of nature and humans and 
where they collide (Gordon, 1980). Thus, it operates within society rather than 
outside or above it (Brochier, 1977 and Dean, 2012). Foucault argues that this shift 
requires a changing definition of sovereignty and a move away from close up power 
and domination to discipline and control from a distance. However, Clarke (2007) 
and Agamben (1991; 1998; 2003) argue that both forms of power (sovereign and 
disciplinary) are "integral and interrelated components of the general mechanism of 
power in modern society" (Clarke, 2007:6) and by discussing the eradication of 
sovereign power and "top-down strategies of control" (Andrejevic, 2008: 609), 
Foucault does not suggest that power is no longer operationalised at the highest level 
of society but rather operationalised through “micro-relations of power” (Foucault, 
1972; 199 and cited in Andrejevic, 2008: 609). These micro-powers are part of the 
web-like system of assemblages which are made up of a number of institutions 
without there being a clear hierarchical focus (Editors of the Journal of Hérodote, 
1977:71).  
Yet, simultaneously, the state retains control over many of the 
institutions of the assemblage while remaining out of sight in the management of 
these until they begin to rally against the discourse and truths which the government 
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proclaims. Thus, Foucault argues that sovereign power brings with it acts of coercion 
and enforced rules, resulting in power being more scattered, dispersed and pervasive. 
Therefore, it cannot be enforced by one individual or separate groups. Instead, 
“power is everywhere” and “comes from everywhere” (Foucault 1998: 63) and it 
should not be understood as a thing but seen more as a relation that is productive and 
dispersed throughout society (Foucault, 1972; O'Farrell, 2007; Clarke, 2007). A 
theory of power would suggest that power must emanate or move from one point and 
concentrate in another but Foucault, as illustrated by Grosrichard et al, 
(1980:198/199), says that "in reality power means relations, a more-or-less 
organised, hierarchical, co-ordinated cluster of relations" and this is the site at which 
political power operates (Bal Sokhi, 2014).  
Thus, Foucault adopts Clausewitz’s idea that power is politics 
continued by other means and in addition argues that “power is war continued by 
other means” (Foucault, 1982:222: Clarke, 2007). This statement illuminates “that 
the role of political power . . . is perpetually to re-inscribe this relation through a 
form of unspoken warfare; to re-inscribe it in social institutions, in economic 
inequalities, in language, in the bodies themselves of each and every one of us” 
(Gordon, 1980:90 and Clarke, 2007:3). Thus, Foucault imagines society as web-like 
in which power is directed by the elite but in a messy manner and used to establish 
and "maintain the status quo" (Clarke, 2007:2 and Grosrichard et al, 1980). Thus, we 
see power move in many directions, in complicated forms of different strengths. It is 
these movements or power relations that create and maintain ‘social institutions’, 
‘economic inequalities’, ‘language’ and even the ‘body’ as discussed by Foucault 
and illustrated in Gordon, (1980) and Clarke, (2007).  
This idea can be applied to urban assemblages by understanding 
that the different agencies within the assemblage are maintained by networks of 
power that emanate from a sovereign authority but are also dispersed through the 
agencies themselves when they choose to follow the formal structure or engage in a 
more informal organisation. This becomes particularly important when exploring 
how changing techniques of governance affect how power is dispersed as it will 
influence how the assemblage organises and re-shapes. Foucault discusses specific 
ways in which the state operationalizes control and power. For example, pastoral 
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power and via panopticons but two critical ways are biopower and governmentality. 
These are particularly important when understanding how assemblages operate.  
Biopower refers to the management of populations or the art of 
power (Foucault,1979, O’Farrell, 2007 and Utopia or Bust, 2012, Gordon, 1980). It 
is a political strategy for governing both people and phenomena that affect the 
population, such as terrorism, flood events and protests (Bal Sokhi, 2014). Foucault 
suggests that biopower is the opposite of normally accepted modes of power as it is a 
positive form that attempts to protect life as opposed to being a repressive tool 
wielded by the powerful and oppressing the weak. If one was to understand power as 
only repressive and oppressive, then the state apparatus would mean that “the Army 
[i]s a power of death, police and justice as punitive instances, etc.” (Fontana and 
Pasquino, 1976: 122).  
However, this investment in the protection of life of the population 
means that when life is on the line then the state can produce its own discourse of 
truth and knowledge and justify its actions. One memorable example is the search for 
weapons of mass destruction. The strength of biopower and how it is used to manage 
populations is related to how society is governed and the power that the government 
has to manage the population in terms of governmentality. This encourages the 
“governing of the self” towards “the governing of others” (Lemke, 2000) and stems 
from the same idea as biopower rather than being a distinct idea. 
A literal definition of governmentality is that ‘govern’ refers to the 
process of governing and ‘mentality’ refers to the thinking of a government and the 
ideas they wish to instil in the population (Bal Sokhi, 2014 and Lemke, 2000). Thus, 
governmentality can be understood as a thought process and a practice of governing 
and can be characterised as a web-like, complex form of power (Bal Sokhi, 2014; 
Sennellart, 2007) that acts upon certain parts of the population in different ways 
through an assemblage of institutions and through practices of policy, reflection and 
discourse (Sennellart, 2007:108).  
Foucault uses governmentality to explore how the individual acts 
with self-control within the context of “political rule and economic exploitation” 
(Lemke, 2000 and O’Farrell, 2007) and argues that governing is different to 
sovereign power as it is about balance between processes of “coercion” and spaces 
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for the “self” to be “constructed”. Conversely, sovereign power is the ultimate power 
which forces people to do what the “governor wants” (Lemke, 2000). In this use, the 
government no longer refers to power over a territory but an amalgamation of people 
and phenomena (Senellart et al, 2007). Thus, governmentality is the ‘art’ and how of 
governing (Foucault, 1991 and Gordon, 1991) as it directs its subjects on how to 
behave, encourages self-discipline and homogenisation. By accepting Foucault’s 
understanding of power as an unstable, flexible and a fluid mechanism governed by 
numerous empowered ‘sovereign’ authorities who influence providential will and 
self-discipline via the coercion of societal acceptance, we need to ask, what does this 
mean for assemblage theory and how we contextualize it around functioning 
assemblages? 
2.5 Contextualizing Assemblages 
There are many philosophical approaches which could be used to 
answer this question but the two that are most applicable and deal with the idea of 
power at their core are Foucault’s ‘dispositif’ and Agamben’s ‘oikonomia’. Applying 
these two approaches to assemblage theory allows for reflection on both ontologies 
with ‘dispositif’ accounting for the flat post-structuralist ideals and ‘oikonomia’ 
accounting for a more hierarchical and sovereign-led formation. By bringing these 
into conversation with one another and applying it to urban assemblages, it is 
possible to begin to pull apart the different networks of power. 
‘Dispositif’ is an aspect of governmentality which Foucault uses to 
conceptualise how power is exercised through various institutions influencing wider 
society. As power is distributed and networked, Foucault argues that there is no one 
sovereign power but multiples. Therefore, society no longer requires a sovereign 
leader to enforce control and discipline on a wider scale. Instead, we can ‘cut the 
kings head off’ (Gordon, 1972, Sennellart et al, 2007, Rider, 1999 and Dean, 2012a) 
and create a new ‘art of governing’. When applied to assemblage theory, this 
argument supports the formation of flat assemblages in which power is networked.  
Radical flat ontologists further this argument by saying that it is 
mundane to think that the state or powerful agencies can control any part of the 
assemblage because they are random developments that are hybridized, complex 
amalgamations of different ideas with no top-down determination (Dovey et al, 
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2017). Therefore, assemblages contain no sovereign power and have limited, if any, 
broader state influence 
Alternatively, Agamben is interested in sovereign power and its 
visibility demonstrating this through his work on camps and spaces of exception 
(Agamben, 2005, Bussolini, 2010 and Virtanen, 2003) where he suggests that state’s 
infer their power through their ability to corral people and determine their fate in 
concentration and refugee camps. This is the highest demonstration of sovereign 
power and ruling from a distance.  
This is particularly interesting because his work complements 
Foucault’s, especially throughout his Homo Sacer project. For instance, the first 
Homo Sacer book primarily explored sovereign power (Agamben, 1998, Dean, 
2012a and Bussolini, 2010) but his later books especially ‘Kingdom and Glory’ 
(Agamben, 2011, Dean 2012a and Bussolini, 2010), delve deeper into the 
relationship between sovereign power, biopower and governmentality.  
Although Agamben's work complements and furthers Foucaults 
work, he does critique Foucault arguing that the division between sovereign power, 
biopower and governmentality did not occur in the 16th or 17th century but during 
early Christianity (Gordon, 1972, Dean 2012a, Sokhi, 2014 and Lemke, 2000). He 
implores the importance of the holy trinity in understanding this division and thus, 
goes back to Trinitarian and Augustine theology to suggest that it is during these 
times, those notions of sovereign power and governmentality were first developed 
(Agamben, 2011 and Bussolini, 2010).  
The transformation in sovereign power during these theological 
periods occurred as the governance of people by God fundamentally changed. 
Initially, God was deemed a sovereign and absolute leader who had the power to 
destroy the earth if his word and guidance was not followed. Fears of a plague of 
locusts or a great flood enforced the idea that God had the ultimate power and used it 
to govern the earth. However, from Augustine onwards, the role of God and the 
teachers of theology transformed how God’s governance and sovereignty was 
perceived. Instead, of following the word of God, uncritically, people were now 
encouraged to use their conscience to make decisions (Bussolini, 2010 and Dean 
2012a) entrusting the governance of society to humans who had to internalise what 
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they thought God wanted. So, God moved from governing up close to governing 
from a distance. 
 This is not detached from Foucault’s argument that the state (in 
Agamben’s case God) places structures that make people self-discipline (Gordon, 
1972, Sennellart et al, 2007, Dean, 2012a and Andrejevic, 2008). Thus, by following 
Agamben’s lineage, the origins of governmentality and biopower are much deeper 
into history and more pervasive. This lineage means that Foucault’s formulae of 
‘let’s cut the Kings head off’, is incorrect (dispersed sovereign power). Instead, 
Agamben suggests that sovereignty and governance from a distance results in the 
King ruling but he does not govern (Dean, 2012a). The King remains behind the 
scenes and he rules by dispersing his power to his subjects to manage everyday 
occurrences. He uses the term ‘oikonomia', a theological concept to describe this. 
Further, ‘oikonomia' is an interesting concept to apply to assemblage theory as it 
helps to explain why there is a messy middle ground between flat and vertical 
positioning for assemblages as the world is no longer governed wholly by a 
sovereign power but governed through third parties in order to create the outcomes 
the state wants from a distance rather than up close by creating subjects (Bussolini, 
2010 and Dean, 2012b).  
Although ‘dispositif’ captures the gap between vertical and flat 
(O’Farrell, 2007) it does not accept that there is any sovereign power shaping the 
assemblage and instead it argues that power is rhizomatic or undistributed and 
without leadership (Gordon, 1972 and Sennellart et al, 2007). Whereas Agamben’s 
notion of ‘oikonomia’ is more vertical and hierarchical and it recognises the 
hegemonic power that is at the head of an assemblage. It accepts that assemblages 
have a human component, with natural instincts to push boundaries resulting in 
subjects not internalising providential will but instead following their own paths. 
However, that does not remove the ultimate sovereign who can discipline us (Dean, 
2012a/b); sovereign power is always there (Bussolini, 2010). God tries to rule the 
world by not interceding directly but by having subjects disciplining their own 
behaviour by sending the Bible down to determine how we are meant to live and 
condition us to adhere to whatever the Bible suggests is the right way to live. So, 
God does not have to send a plague of locusts because we are all internalising the 
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values set out in the Bible and doing what God wants. Today, we internalise what the 
state and society want.  
2.5.1 Urban Governance 
Both ‘dispositif’ and ‘oikonomia’ are philosophical frameworks 
which help to contextualize assemblages and pull apart the different influences 
which determine how assemblages may oscillate. However, to fully understand how 
different factors shape assemblages we need to look at the spaces in which they 
operate, how these spaces are governed and how this impacts the shape of 
assemblages. 
Changing modes of urban governance are well documented, 
ranging in research from the impact of the welfare state and its dismantling, towards 
a more neoliberal focused form of urban entrepreneurialism (Harvey. 1989; Kelly, 
2008). To deploy Harvey’s phrase, the urban managerial approach was preoccupied 
with simply managing the city through providing a provision of services and 
facilities (Harvey, 1989). While urban entrepreneurialism refers to the processes that 
were undertaken in cities to regenerate deindustrialised spaces6 in order to attract 
foreign investment through more “business-like approaches” (Kelly, 2008:36, 
Harvey, 1989; Maclaren & McGuirk, 2001; Punch, 2005 and O’Callaghan & 
Linehan, 2007).  
Urban entrepreneurialism came about after cities, which had 
become reliant on manufacturing and other industrial sectors, began to feel the 
effects of deindustrialisation and the shift from a Fordist to a Post-Fordist regime 
(Harvey, 1989, Kelly, 2008). Post-Fordism is characterised by its flexible 
specialisation and was facilitated through globalisation, as it resulted in an easier 
flow of money and people across borders, making transactions and hiring much 
quicker. At the same time, technological advancements improved communications 
between different places (Byrne, 2001). This resulted in an increased spread of 
multinational corporations (MNCs) situating different parts of their companies in 
numerous locations worldwide. Thus, deindustrialisation and globalisation resulted 
                                                          
6 Deindustrialisation was caused by an increase in technological processes and the decline in urban 
managerial techniques of public services and citizen welfare towards privatisation amongst a medley 
of other issues. 
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in an urban crisis and the shift from urban managerialism towards urban 
entrepreneurialism occurred as cities responded to the urban crisis (Harvey, 1989 and 
Moore, 2002). In order for cities to remain competitive, they revamped their image 
as a method to encourage investment within their urban space (Moore, 2002; Hogan, 
2006, O'Callaghan &Linehan, 2007 and Lawton & Punch, 2014). 
At the same time as the urban crisis, the 1970s saw a fiscal crisis 
occur across the US and the UK resulting in a shift from welfarism towards 
neoliberalism (Harvey, 2005). Thus, the shift in urban governance was a 
manifestation of urban neoliberalism, which influenced how urban areas were 
redeveloped. In theory, the neoliberal state should encourage free markets and free 
trade (Harvey, 2005; Peck, 2010;2013; England & Ward, 2007) facilitated through 
the privatisation of public services and deregulation. However, neoliberalism never 
operates in “pure” form (Harvey, 2005; Peck, 2005). So, rather than the state staying 
out of the market, it intervenes in different ways in what Brenner & Theodore (2002) 
call “actually existing neoliberalism”.  
The re-branding and marketing of cities, the focus on foreign 
investment and capital attraction changed state relationships with both public 
services and citizens. Meanwhile,  the reduction in the welfare state and public 
service protections to foster  privatisation and innovative but neoliberal modes of 
urban governance resulted in new dynamics between state departments and public 
services. The impact of urban entrepreneurialism and urban neoliberalism on public 
services was reduced resources, increased competition, target driven quotas, 
deregulation, and decentralisation coupled with increasing bureaucracy. These 
factors created inter-agency tensions, contributed to already siloed institutions, re-
positioned priorities to meet certain targets without providing adequate resources or 
funding, and created disconnected policy resulting in fluid assemblages which are 
one shape in policy but wholly different when activated.  
Combining the arguments presented by Foucault regarding fluid 
and networked power and Agamben’s assertion that there is one key sovereign, in 
relation to, the effects of urban governance on assemblages, portrays issues with 
current approaches to assemblage theory when only understood via one ontological 
position. As such, ontologically the segregated uses of assemblage theory exclude a 
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whole space of messy power dynamics, inter-agency and inter-scalar relationships 
and overlooks the fluid borderless characteristics of active urban assemblages. 
Therefore, I argue for a more holistic approach when using assemblage theory, 
acknowledging that assemblages do not only fit neatly within a vertical or a flat 
ontological position but instead oscillate based on the needs of the assemblage.  
2.5.2 The Disruptive Smart City  
The shape of urban assemblages are further disrupted and changed 
as new forms of city management and governance are invoked. For instance, the 
development of the smart city rhetoric has resulted in significant changes to urban 
governance. These changes include the use of real-time information, control rooms, 
data analytics and CCTV amongst a range of other technologies (Kitchin et al, 
2017). This is evident in cities which are increasingly being fitted with technological 
solutions and monitoring systems that increasingly act in "automated, automatic and 
autonomous" ways (Kitchin and Dodge, 2011) in a race to become "smart". 
The smart city imaginary emerged out of the grid planning 
approach of the “high modernist era” (Kitchin, 2014a:2 and Greenfield, 2013) of the 
1970s and was influenced by urban cybernetics (Kitchin; 2014a; Townsend, 2013 
and Komninos, 2002). But in particular, the smart city is rooted in the shift from 
urban managerialism to urban entrepreneurialism (Harvey, 1989) and the 
relationship between new urbanism and the intelligent city (Kitchin, 2014a; 
Sӧderstrӧm et al, 2014; Hollands, 2008; Vanolo, 2013).  
Shelton et al, (2015) adapts Brenner and Theodore's (2002) notion 
of actually existing neoliberalism and use it to highlight the actual policy 
implications and effects of smart city implementation as an alternative to literature 
which focuses on extraordinary examples, such as Songdo (a smart city development 
in South Korea). They explore the subtle and ubiquitous impacts that these policies 
have on cities, especially with regard to how data is used within the city and they 
emphasise a move away from neoliberal practices towards the role of data and the 
community. Shelton et al, (2015:22)  suggest that data can be inclusive rather than 
"uncritical, ahistorical, and aspatial, which are often the understandings promoted 
within smart city imaginaries". However, they also highlight how certain smart city 
implementations have failed to be socially inclusive and instead they illuminate the 
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relationship between the smart city and entrepreneurialism (Shelton et al, 2016). This 
supports the view of Monfaredzadeh and Beradi (2015) who propose that effective 
urban governance can really only promote one stream of policy and yet, most smart 
cities have multiple goals such as economic growth but also the creation of social 
cohesion, resilience, liveable and safe cities.  
Thus, one manifestation of the smart city is that it is "the corporate 
vision of smartness, in conjunction with an entrepreneurial form of urban 
governance” (Hollands, 2014; Harvey, 1989). This idea combined with neoliberal 
austerity has been used to promote the need for smarter technological solutions 
funded by corporations to solve urban issues (Pollio, 2016). However, the 
corporatisation of the smart city has only solved issues in certain spaces and led to 
the exclusion of ordinary citizens. Heaphy (2017) argues that the gentrification 
promoted by smart districts such as the Dublin Docklands is a key example of the 
dichotomy between the corporate solving of urban issues versus who is excluded.  
The smart city, if situated within a political discourse, could 
encourage urban developments that benefit as many as possible and allow for 
debates about what the city should be (Hollands, 2008). But, in its essence, the smart 
city frames the reality of a city in a particular way excluding the complex political, 
cultural and societal foundations of cities by simply placing technology as the only 
solution (Hollands, 2014 and Harvey, 2012). Further, just as the early conceptions of 
the smart city can be traced to the shift in urban governance in the 1970s, the 
technological adoptions and innovations that cities are now using are creating a new 
shift in urban governance from disciplinary, as illustrated through many of 
Foucault's essays (Foucault, 1977, 1978, 1991 and Gordon, 1980), towards one of 
control through "algorithmic governance" (Kitchin, 2014b, 179).  
2.6 Changing Governance: Algorithmic Governance 
The use of big data and the development of algorithmic governance 
to manage populations, particularly urban populations, is shifting “the governmental 
logic from surveillance and discipline to capture and control” (Kitchin et al, 2017:1). 
The efficiency of algorithmic governance relies on big data which has its origins in 
the 1990s but since 2013 it  has become a popular concept (Kitchin, 2014b). 
However, the definition of big data is contested with Kitchin (2014a; 2014b: 68) 
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stating that big data are "huge in volume [...], high in velocity [...], diverse in 
variety" - the 3 V's of big data (Boyd & Crawford, 2012 and Kitchin, 2014a/b, 
2016).  Kitchin (2014b) extends this argument by adding in "exhaustivity[...], fine-
grained in resolution [...], relational [...], flexible" (p.68), "indexicality, 
extensionality, and scalability (Kitchin and McArdle (2016:1). Simply, big data are 
"enormous, dynamic, interconnected digital data sets" (Castree et al, 2013) that 
attempt to "capture n=all" and differ from traditional small data sets (Kitchin and 
McArdle, 2016: 8). The advent of big data emerges out of an increasingly 
technologically dependent society, where streams of data emanate from our phones, 
laptops, tvs, fridges, social media accounts and watches (Greenfield, 2006). 
Therefore, every day people are freely sharing their data because they do not 
understand that they are, and they do not know how not to (Kitchin, 2016). 
It is this division between the collectors and users of big data and 
citizens freely sharing it which changes how urban spaces can be governed. This is 
linked to the debate on sovereignty illustrated between Foucault and Agamben and 
highlighted by Kitchin et al, (2017:1) because “just as disciplinary power never fully 
supplanted sovereign power, control supplements rather than replaces discipline”. 
This new form of urban governance enhances control of the population in a more 
decentralised manner than disciplinary power which links to Foucault’s idea that 
power is everywhere and Agamben’s understanding of sovereignty. Thus, urban 
governance has morphed into a form of covert permission operationalized by the 
many not just those traditionally in power, as described in Figures 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3.  
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Figure 2.1:Foucault’s system of Power 
 
Source: Author  
 
Figure 2.2: Agamben’s system of Power 
   
Source: Author 
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Figure 2.3: The modern power system 
 
Source: Author 
 
It is this shift in urban governance towards algorithmic governance 
which becomes disruptive for public agencies operating in the city, as the traditional 
modalities of governing are uprooted, modernised and changed. They become more 
reliant on data, ‘outsiders’ expertise and the race for ‘smartification’ is either forced 
upon them, happily accepted or they are ignored entirely. However, it is natural for 
forms of governmentality to change over time (Kitchin et al, 2017; Meijer and 
Rodríguez Bolíver, 2016; Kitchin et al, 2017; Ong, 2006) when it is contextualised 
by neoliberalism as various forms of governance are created and applied to different 
spaces in different ways as a result of varying cultures, societal values, standards and 
policies. For instance, algorithmic governance is less about subjugation and more 
about implementing control by analysing personal data and as a result "modulating 
[their] effects, desires and opinions" (Kitchin et al, 2017:3). This extends Foucault's 
(1977, 1978, 1991) understanding of governmentality as an act of creating subjects 
towards one of controlling subjects (Kitchin et al, 2017) as algorithmic governance 
shapes people through technological processes and software. This transforms how 
we interact with our city and are controlled and disciplined by it. Two examples of 
such are control rooms and general ubiquitous technology.  
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2.6.1 Control Rooms  
Control rooms pre-date the smart city by decades “utilising 
SCADA (Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition)” (Kitchin et al, 2017: 8 and 
Lucque-Ayala and Marvin, 2016) since the 1950s. The SCADA system is a single 
system with no cross-system capabilities. They usually have a narrow remit of 
monitoring and responding in real time in what Kitchin et al, (2017: 9) calls a 
“closed system”. However, as control rooms have modernised they have become 
capable of watching “ more open spaces” (Kitchin et al, 2017:9). Thus, control 
rooms are now able to exert more control by micro-managing urban systems, 
coordination and the deployment of resources (Kitchin et al, 2017; Luque-Ayala and 
Marvin, 2016). For instance, smart city ideas, integrated urban sensors and big data 
are creating integrated control rooms where all agencies, feeds and systems are 
managed via one control room (Kitchin et al, 2017; Luque-Ayala and Marvin, 2016). 
This type of integrated system is critical for inter-agency coordination as it allows 
for the collaboration of human and technological networks that are essential to the 
mitigation and management of urban spaces (Bennett, 2005 in Anderson and 
Gordon, 2016), especially due to the intense and complex inter-related and multi-
faceted systems that maintain the urban (Kapucu and Comfort, 2006 and Kapucu, 
2012). Leading examples are the two control centres in Rio De Janeiro; Centro 
Integrado de Comando e Controle (CICC) and Centro das Operações do Rio (CRO) 
(Kitchin, 2014c). 
These centres were designed to support the FIFA World Cup and 
the Olympics while tackling population and infrastructure issues (Gaffney and 
Robertson, 2016 and Brit Lab, 2016) and are deemed as smart city centres with CRO 
being part of IBM's Intelligent Operation Centres project (Gaffney and Robertson, 
2016). They are described as the epitome of smart city control centres, with ceiling 
to floor computer screens depicting every aspect of the city supported by desks of 
people watching and analysing every movement in the city (Gaffney and Robertson, 
2016 and Brit Lab, 2016). These centres were not implemented without resistance 
and conflict, for instance, they really only support the centre and affluent spaces of 
Rio De Janeiro (Gaffney and Robertson, 2016). Even so, they are the first of their 
kind and are examples for other cities to learn from while taking into account 
antecedent legacies and social, cultural and political influences.  
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2.6.2 Ubiquitous Technology 
Connected to control rooms and a key component of actually 
existing smart cities (Shelton et al, 2015) is the infiltration of ubiquitous technology 
within the urban infrastructure to track and manage different aspects of the city 
(Gabrys, 2014; Wiig, 2015). An all-encompassing term of which ubiquitous 
technology fits within is “everyware” (Greenfield, 2006) which is essentially 
omnipresent computing sewn into the urban fabric which connects different systems 
of the city (Kitchin, 2014a; Graham & Marvin, 2001). It is often unseen but working 
to make the lives of individuals easier. Greenfield (2006) and Kitchin & Dodge 
(2011) discuss the practice, ethics and future of ubiquitous computing and how it not 
only shapes space but also affects the individual by changing how we conduct 
certain tasks, how we self-discipline and portray ourselves to the world, socialise and 
learn. This is a new form of governmentality which allows for easier en masse 
control by agencies and corporations which aligns with both Foucault and 
Agamben's understandings of governance. In a Foucauldian sense, one might 
develop the provocation that it forms a new age panopticon in which society is the 
‘prisoner’ and control rooms, CCTV and sensors amongst others are the ‘guards’ 
who may or may not be observing them resulting in a Foucauldian self-discipline but 
in response to an acknowledgement of sovereign authorities. However, with the 
removal of the citizen and the use/experimentation of ubiquitous technology under 
the control of corporations, questions need to be raised regarding the purpose of this 
data, what it informs, who has access and how it is manipulated to possibly create a 
false truth (Gabrys, 2014).  
This is supported by a Philadelphia case study on an IBM supported workforce 
training app which aimed “to train up to 500,000 low-literacy residents for jobs in 
the information and knowledge economy(Wiig, 2015:535) […] by connecting low-
literacy residents with workforce education lessons and through that to employment 
opportunities in the city” (Wiig, 2015: 536) Essentially, the app was developed as 
part of Philadelphia’s smart city plan as a method to garner a larger educated 
workforce to meet the demands of the “globalised economy” (Wiig, 2015: 536) 
which Philadelphia needed to be competitive within. The app was marketed as a tool 
to help “marginalised” (Wiig, 2015: 536) citizens to enter the workforce but due to 
the underlying aim it also was a method of boosterism to international business 
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(Wiig, 2015).  Although, the app was heralded a success,  Wiig argues that this is 
simply untrue as it did not fulfil its purpose of helping people access the job market. 
Instead, it ended up being “more useful as a promotional vehicle to highlight the 
city’s global competitiveness than to provide jobs for the people who might have 
participated in the program” (Wigg, 2015: 547). This case study illuminated how the 
"smart" city is a mechanism of branding to position the city in the global market and 
is not a mechanism of positive urban change. Meanwhile, it represents and dismisses 
the “smart” city rhetoric of it being for citizens when often it is really about profit, 
data collection and analysis and new forms of urban control. 
Thus, the introduction of ubiquitous technology creates a new 
process of governmentality; we see the dispersion of power between government and 
corporation in a form of actually existing neoliberalism (Brenner and Theodore, 
2002) with the data used to internalise the perceived and actual issues of the city. 
Solutions are sought by the government from corporations with little evidence of a 
bottom-up approach, citizen engagement or one that integrates with different 
agencies. Thus, rather than governing subjects through processes of discipline, 
society is governed by the analysis and what happens to data, i.e. whether it is sold 
on to a data broker or altered, as these processes and changes may then create new 
forms of control and discipline mechanisms.  
Both examples masquerade as a solution to urban issues ranging 
from poverty, traffic congestion to severe weather events (Hollands, 2014; 
Wiig,2015). However, if we understand the smart city as a "technology-led urban 
utopia" (Hollands, 2014;1) borne out of multinational corporation support, then one 
may develop the provocation that the smart city is nothing more than a mechanism of 
neoliberal policy, not social policy. This neoliberal urbanisation provides the 
conditions for exploitation under capitalism (Holborow, 2012; Harvey, 2012). 
Harvey's discussion on accumulation by dispossession as a concept to explain 
neoliberal capitalist policies from the 1970s onwards is an excellent way of 
understanding how smart city policy is operationalised. Harvey (2005) argues that 
the achievement of neoliberalism has been to redistribute and centralise power and 
wealth for the minority or societal elites rather than the generation of wealth. This 
has resulted in acts of dispossession against the majority, i.e. the dispossessing of 
land, public services and environmental degradation or in terms of the smart city, the 
45 
 
covert collection of personal data (Kitchin, 2014c). It is this action that makes the 
retaining of public services and their assemblages so important. By remaining public 
it remains under the sovereign and is obliged to coordinate and collaborate with 
other agencies creating stronger inter-agency networks. 
2.7 Conclusion-Oscillating Assemblages 
So, why is it so important to understand assemblages as fluid 
entities that can oscillate positions based on need and experience? And, what does 
this mean for a CMaERAs? Firstly, it illuminates the ‘real' power networks that 
shape assemblages. This is imagined in the same way as Moore-Cherry et al, (2014) 
suggests that the power of visual methods can entice and be digestible for the key 
players of the state. Following on from this idea, assemblage theory is adapted as 
both a visual and narrative reading of assemblages to complement its theoretical and 
philosophical foundations. Thus, it accounts for both the formal networks, as 
implemented through policy, and the informal networks that develop over time and 
through agency experience, training and processes. However, most importantly, it 
allows inter-agency conflict to be minimized while trust evolves because its fostered 
through formal hierarchical structures but matured in the informal and flatter spaces. 
Secondly, the oscillation of assemblages and the power dynamics 
involved help to protect or at least manage the assemblage in light of a series of 
complicated aspects of agency institutionalisation and complex reforming of urban 
governance methods. As urban governance adapts there can be a misalignment of 
priorities between the national and urban scale and the institutions and agencies 
operating locally. Further, fractious urban governance can encourage the assemblage 
to re-shape.7/8  
Thirdly, the ability for assemblages to oscillate allows for them to 
adapt easier to changing methods of governance that affect how they operate or the 
procedures and resources they engage with. This has become particularly evident as 
cities have become increasingly occupied with techniques of ‘smartification’ 
(Vanolo, 2016), resulting in cities increasingly being fitted with technological 
                                                          
7 For example, Dublin is governed by four Local Authorities and Boston is co-located alongside 
several other independent cities.  
8 A connecting note for future reference- the governance of emergency management agencies is also 
problematic as the different agencies that sit within the assemblage are scaled differently, i.e. An 
Garda Síochána is national but fire is local. 
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solutions. These new techniques of urban governance will not only further disrupt 
the shape of assemblages and the operations of individual agencies but also have the 
potential of encouraging "process(es) of institutional change" as agencies adapt to a 
more technologically controlled society (Meijer and Rodríguez Bolívar, 2016: 392). 
Finally, why does the oscillation of assemblage’s matter to how we 
study a CMaERA? Emergency management systems seek to be a permanent and 
satisfactory response to normal everyday events such as fire, illness and crime. These 
are temporary disruptions to the normal running of a city, town or community. Yet, 
the responding agencies are contextualised within their own persistent cultures and 
between ephemeral politics, policies and techniques of governance9. Further, 
emergency management theories, at their core, call for policy which is flexible and 
adaptable. They acknowledge that most emergencies are localized and that first 
responders have their own informal procedures and hierarchies in which they can 
self-govern as trust is built in the informal and flatter spaces rather than in the 
hierarchical spaces. Thus, CMaERAs are normally formal networks that move and 
blur providing space for informal networks to develop.  
This dichotomy between formal policy and informal procedure, 
between the sovereign authority (policy writers/enforcers) and the providential will 
of on-the-ground actors within a system of ephemeral political will and changing 
tactics of governance, create a more fluid and flexible organization of agencies 
which do not neatly fit into ontological levels 1 or 3 in Brenner et als (2011) 
schematic for analyzing assemblages. Therefore, within the context of CMaERAs, it 
is Brenner et als methodological level 2, a messy middle ground, in which we see the 
assemblage oscillating its position between flat (more informal procedure) and 
hierarchical positions (formal policy). This freedom of movement which assemblage 
theory offers is essential for understanding how CMaERAs operate in line with 
policy and state mandates and how they also re-shape when necessary often going 
against policy. By framing the research within this perspective, I am able to dissect 
the agencies, their relationships and processes to begin exploring why as an 
                                                          
9 The choice to use ‘persistent' and ‘ephemeral' over concepts such as ‘permanent' and temporary' is to 
recognise that even the most stubborn agency cultures eventually mutate due to wider societal change, 
new generations, technologies, resources, policy and political effects. 
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assemblage they may re-shape and morph based on the particular circumstances of 
an event. The reasons why oscillation and re-shaping occurs will be described in 
greater detail over the subsequent chapters with the next chapter exploring the 
methods undertaken to conduct the research.  
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Chapter 3-Methodology  
 
3.1 Introduction  
This chapter outlines the investigative methods used to conduct the 
empirical research and introduces the different case study cities and events. The 
body of the chapter is divided into five sections; research design, methodology, 
methods, ethics and research limitations. Section 3.2 Research Design - outlines the 
aim, objectives and research question. Section 3.3 Methodology - discusses why a 
qualitative, case study-based project was undertaken and introduces the two case 
study events and three case study cities used within this research. This is followed by 
a discussion of my philosophical assumptions and theoretical framework, which 
informed the research approach and choice of methods. Section 3.4 Methods - 
outlines the range of qualitative methods used to answer the research objectives and 
research question and how the data was analysed. Section 3.5 Ethics - the ethical 
requirements and considerations related to the research are explored with close 
attention to my relationship with An Garda Síochána due to difficulty of access and 
strict legal frameworks. Section 3.6 Research Limitations - discusses the limitation 
of access, confidential information, slow policy change, and obtaining (full) consent, 
which affected aspects of the research in different ways.  
3.2 Research Design  
The aim of the research was to understand how CMaERA organise, 
re-shape and are influenced by broader factors such as urban and state governance, 
history, geography and institutionalisation and whether these are affected when the 
CMaERA begins engaging with data analytics and governing via algorithms. This 
aim was broken down into four workable objectives, which led to a more focused 
research question.  
Objective 1: Describe the emergency management systems of Ireland (Dublin and 
Cork) and the United States (Boston, Massachusetts) in terms of their policy 
(Chapters 4-5). 
Objective 2: Evaluate why CMaERA agencies may oscillate away from the 
designated policy shape into different real-time response shapes, as a reaction to the 
type of the event, (in)formal relations and power dynamics (Chapters 4-6)  
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Objective 3: Explore some of the cultural and political reasons these systems can 
fail, such as inter-agency tensions, formalisation, weak governance, geographical 
exclusion, institutional resistance, training and funding (Chapter 6-7). 
Objective 4: Assess the relationship between CMaERAs and technology, data 
analytics and algorithmic governance to better understand the impact of them on the 
evolution of CMaERAs (Chapter 7).  
The aim and objectives developed into a more specific research 
question as a result of the broad literature and theoretical review outlined in Chapter 
2 and from themes identified during early interviews. However, this question was 
continually re-shaped as the research progressed and became more focused. The 
main research question was: 
How do the variety of actors, actants and technologies involved in emergency 
management, contextualised within their particular histories, cultures and 
geographies, assemble and organise? 
3.3 Methodology 
The methodology adopted was qualitative in nature and consisted 
of case studies aimed at uncovering the assemblage of a CMaERA. A qualitative 
methodology was chosen because it provides a more in-depth analysis of an aspect 
or phenomena of the social world (Brikci and Green, 2007). Kitchin and Tate (2000: 
231/233) refer to this as ‘thick’ data as it can include an array of emotional, 
subjective and contextual information, as opposed to more factual and ‘thin’ data 
that would be acquired through quantitative methods. This was important in order to 
be able to understand how the structures and organisation of a CMaERA change over 
time, due to new forms of governance or city management which could not be 
adequately traced through quantitative methods. However, this was vetoed due to the 
difficulties in getting the participants to provide the same level of information in a 
questionnaire as they would in an interview.  
To provide structure, a case study approach was used. This 
approach investigates a subject or issue within “bounded” structures (Creswell, 
2007:73) which can be geographical, scales, objects, processes, themes, or through 
any other form of categorisation, exploring them in depth with multiple types of 
50 
 
information at a longitudinal scale. However, it is debatable as to whether case 
studies are a methodology per se or just a framing device for bounding the research 
(Stake, 2005; Creswell, 2007; Denzin and Lincoln, 2005). My personal view 
matches Creswell’s; the case study approach embraces elements of both. It is a 
methodological approach, but while the case study sites can be choices outside of the 
research design, they can also be very important decisions that affect the 
methodological process in terms of influencing how a case is investigated. 
Further, the type of case study deployed influences the research 
design as discussed by Creswell (2007:73) who proposes three case study types: 
single, collective and intrinsic (Creswell, 2007:73). Single refers to a focus on a 
single issue within a single bounded study; for example, ambulance coordination in 
Cork City. Collective refers to one issue explored across multiple case studies, 
allowing for the illumination of various perspectives and reduces the possibility of 
overgeneralizing a phenomenon, for example, a comparison of ambulance 
coordination in Cork City and Dublin City. Intrinsic refers to a study of the entire 
case, for example, the study of the National Ambulance Service coordination across 
Ireland. This research takes the collective approach, exploring the consequences of 
oscillation and external factors such as political will, governance, institutionalisation 
and (in)formalisation on CMaERAs (the issue) during major emergencies, such as 
flooding and terrorist events (multiple case studies) across Dublin and Cork Cities, 
Ireland and Boston, Massachusetts, USA.  
3.3.1 Case Studies of Events  
There are multiple reasons why urban flooding and terrorism were 
chosen as the event-based case studies. Firstly, urban flooding was my primary and 
only case study at the beginning of the research because it met four major criteria. 
Those were:  
• It occurs regularly in each of my case cities;  
• It is easily accessed, i.e., there appeared to exist no major hurdles in regard to 
confidentiality issues or sensitive aspects; 
• All major agencies should respond to this type of event, so inter-agency 
coordination can be revealed;  
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• It can be scaled from local to regional, as the event can cross jurisdictional 
boundaries.  
My secondary case study on terrorism arose when I conducted my 
fieldwork research. It does not meet all the criteria especially criteria 1 and 2. 
However, as the research progressed it became apparent that neither of these criteria 
was exclusively essential. During my first set of fieldwork interviews in Boston in 
April 2016 leading up to the marathon on April 18th, I noted that my participants 
were unsure or unconcerned about the possibility of flooding in Boston, although it 
was a priority within the city’s Climate Action Plan. Instead, their concern was 
mitigating and managing another ‘Boston Marathon’ type event. After this trip, I 
chose to still focus on flooding and to use the Boston interviews to discuss the all-
hazards approach and how it’s not applicable to every event. I was also aware that 
the time of year when I interviewed respondents could have influenced what they 
decided to focus on in the interviews. However, after the spate of terrorist events in 
Europe, I noticed a change in how the Irish participants discussed emergency 
management. I interviewed members of An Garda Síochána (AGS) a week after the 
Manchester concert bombing in May 2017. There was a notable shift in what was 
deemed most important, with AGS being preoccupied with planning for a terrorist 
event on Irish soil while acknowledging that flooding was still an issue, just not a 
priority as it had been previous to 2017. This re-focus of priorities within AGS 
encouraged me to reflect on my decision not to include terrorism as a case study. 
After researching how other people explore it as a theme in a respectful and safe 
manner, I chose to use it as a smaller secondary case study building the story around 
my participant's information rather than through media sources. This decision was 
made to ensure that victims were respected and that participants experiences were 
discussed in a caring manner. Both event-based case studies are used as examples to 
illustrate how CMaERA operate and respond in line with policy and oscillate 
positions based on the circumstances of activation.  
3.3.2 Case Studies of Cities 
My principal case study was Dublin supported by Cork, with 
Boston being the second case study. Boston is an asymmetric case study which is not 
comparative but is still a significant empirical study that helped provide benchmarks 
in order to understand what is actually happening in Dublin. Cork acted as a 
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reflexive case study that contextualised the system outside of Dublin. It was only by 
studying the differences of the three cities, that I could begin to make substantial 
claims regarding how assemblages are shaped. I chose these three cities because: 
• All three cities have a recent history of major flooding.  
• They are all adopting smart city tactics for the development and governance 
of their city, with evidence of flooding being a key part of their smart 
development programmes.  
• Ireland is predominately ruled by a centralised government with the local 
government accountable to the national scale. Whereas the United States has 
a highly decentralised government, with the federal government dealing with 
more significant issues. This creates interesting outcomes for how they are 
both governed and how their emergency services can respond to events that 
cross jurisdictional boundaries.  
• All three cities function under Liberal Market Economies (LMEs) and its 
associated characteristics and functions. A LME is characterised by 
competitive market arrangements, competition, a precarious workforce, 
formal high-level education, low rate of unionisation, deregulation, tax 
breaks and innovation (Hall and Soskice, 2001; Soskice, 1990a/b). The 
opposite of an LME is a Coordinated Market Economy (CME) which is 
characterised by weak market relations, collaboration as opposed to 
competition, secure work, high rate of unionization, different scales of 
education for a more diverse industry, encourages knowledge sharing and 
inter-agency coordination (Hall and Soskice, 2001; Soskice, 1990a/b). The 
difference between these two forms of capitalist economies is important to 
note for the case studies which all function under LME’s meaning that issues 
are solved via the market. This has direct consequences for public services 
such as CMaERAs. For instance, Regan, (2011: 465) discusses the role of 
“institutional embeddedness” in Ireland and how this and the Irish LME 
affected the political choices that were made during the crash. This 
“institutional embeddedness” is a key characteristic of the IEMA and the 
USEMA in terms of inter-agency coordination, however, these CMaERAs 
are further affected by a LME through the privatisation of services, removal 
of the state, lack of coordination between agencies due to institutional 
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siloing, direct market influence on wages and resources and the dismantling 
of the welfare state removing or curtailing public services. This creates 
tensions between CMaERA agencies, state departments and citizens as they 
must function as a public service without the support of welfare state 
structures and under the auspice of privatisation and market forces.  Although 
the case studies in this research do not operate under a CME, it is important 
to recognise that CMaERAs would behave and operate differently in 
countries such as Germany, France and Sweden as a CME offers a greater 
scale of inter-institutional coordination and active problem-solving at 
different geographical scales and agencies rather than allowing the global 
market to determine the solution.  
• Both have a form of a CMaERA in place, however, the organisation and 
effectiveness of the CMaERA differ due to different threats, denser 
populations, resources, cultures and societal needs.  
Cork City, Ireland, was added to the study because of the national 
scale of An Garda Síochána (AGS) and the National Ambulance Service (NAS). It 
was inappropriate to only meet with members of AGS and the NAS in Dublin, as 
that reinforces the centralised view of emergency services in Ireland. Thus, the 
addition of Cork City offers new perspectives and ensures that the findings were not 
over-generalized but were representative of the entire system, as much as they could 
be. The choice of Cork as opposed to any other Irish city was because it has the only 
inter-agency office in the country which proved to be a great opportunity to unravel 
the governance issues with a centralised government. In the US, I attempted to 
replicate this with Quincy or Chelsea City in Massachusetts. Both cities are on the 
boundary of Boston but are wholly independent with their own emergency services 
and own modes of urban governance in place. However, after several attempts by 
myself and colleagues gaining access proved impossible.  
Having a qualitative and collective case study research design 
allowed for the collection of very detailed and extensive data to emerge. It included 
thematic, historical, geographical, jurisdictional, legal and emotional knowledge that 
has and will be shared between myself and the participants but also between the 
three cities through dissemination and conversation. The next section will explore 
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the philosophical and theoretical foundations shaping the research questions and 
directions.  
3.3.3 Philosophical and Theoretical Foundations  
My research design and methodological choices are based upon 
specific ontological and epistemological assumptions, as well as my own personal 
values and politics. My ontological positioning helped to establish the 
epistemological assumptions of this research by guiding me to view CMaERAs as 
live social constructions which morph, shift and re-shape in numerous ways. To 
capture the aliveness and fluidity of a CMaERA, assemblage theory was considered 
an appropriate theoretical framework as it captures the establishment of different 
emergency management agencies, institutions, scales of governance, processes and 
policies which form as a “stable bundle of relationships and capacities” (Castree et 
al, 2013:24). However, what really captured the practicality of this theory for this 
research, was the clear ontological divisions of flatness and hierarchy within Urban 
Geography, as detailed within the Brenner et al, (2011) and McFarlane (2011a/b) 
debate.  
Further, this combined well with Foucault’s theory of power, and a 
pragmatic understanding of CMaERA through early conversations with participants, 
illustrated four more points as to why it was an interesting way to frame the research. 
Firstly, CMaERAs, even when weakly coordinated, still come together as 
assemblages which morph shape depending on the goal, the power dynamics and the 
(in)formality of those represented. Secondly, by reading assemblage theory through a 
Foucauldian and Agambien perspective, the idea of sovereign power and 
institutional power networks demonstrated that society and its inherent assemblages 
are messy and cannot fit easily within one ontological position. Instead, they are 
influenced by many external factors such as the role of the sovereign, whether 
sovereignty is single or characterised by multiple embodied sovereigns and the 
consequential scales of power as well as their history, geography and cultural 
contexts. Thirdly, in the case of CMaERA and other assemblages, I am dealing with 
real people who have natural instincts, memories and positional self-awareness 
which further encourages CMaERA to re-shape in different and often unforeseen 
ways. Therefore, assemblage theory contextualised within theories of power 
provides an interesting perspective for exploring the messy, chaotic and often 
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disorganised CMaERA by ensuring that the reality of these agencies and their 
relationship are examined and not just positioned within one school of thought. 
Instead, I am interested in using assemblage theory in a post-ontological manner.  
Finally, the ‘Cities’ Brenner versus McFarlane (2011) debate, 
illustrated the complexities of understanding urban assemblages. This provided an 
interesting stepping-stone for beginning to think about the relationship of CMaERAs 
agencies/institutions and their position and role in urban spaces. Of course, 
CMaERA are not confined to urban boundaries as they operate everywhere, but the 
power and influence that acts upon them tend to emanate from urban centres, hence 
the focus on cities within this research. 
All of this is shaped by an epistemological approach from a social 
assembly perspective. Social assembly is particularly pertinent to the theoretical 
framework and philosophical assumptions of this thesis as it accepts the social 
constructionist argument against one ‘truth’, one ontological understanding of 
CMaERA and instead highlights that knowledge tends to only be the ‘truth’ for the 
person who disseminated it (Castree et al, 2013). While, for others, their own social 
reality, circumstances, histories, cultures, genders, power etc. re-create these ‘truths’ 
within their own perspectives.  
However, I move away from social constructionism towards social 
assembly by understanding society in the same way that Chapter 2 described 
assemblages. Society and thus, the assemblage which make up society, are chaotic, 
with various realities and knowledges which represent all actors and actants 
(Whatmore, 1999; Castree et al, 2013). Thus, in the context of CMaERA and the use 
of assemblage theory, examining these through a social assembly approach allows 
for an understanding of how experiences are rationalized, knowledge/policies are 
interpreted, and emergency response is managed through a model of active social 
reality. This allows for an exploration into the different ways that power, hierarchies, 
responsibility, processes, plans and responses are legally written and then how they 
translate during an actual event.  Further, I use it as a reflective mechanism to 
critically analyse literature, policy, transcripts and case studies which allows me to 
apply assemblage theory in a more pragmatic manner exploring the embodied nature 
of assemblages rather than their theoretical foundations. 
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3.4 Methods 
As a result of the philosophical foundations and theoretical 
framework, this research is interpretive. This helped to inform the type of methods I 
used, keeping in mind, my epistemological approach revealing the social and 
institutional world of CMaERA based on participants’ knowledge (Pizam and 
Mansfield, 2009). To conduct research in this manner it was important that my 
methodological choices allowed me to: 
1. Build relationships and trust with my participants so knowledge shared was 
insightful, beyond the party line, and determined how they viewed their 
agencies and themselves within their CMaERA.  
2. Facilitate a snowball technique to reach more participants as the agencies of a 
CMaERA are often closed off. Thus, snowballing was critical for access.  
3. Provide thick data so that an in-depth exploration of how CMaERAs actually 
operate and are shaped prevailed.  
3.4.1 Methods of Data Collection - Interviews 
The key method for this research were semi-structured interviews 
which were conducted across all sites with a variety of participants and stakeholders. 
The Dublin fieldwork began in October 2015 and the Boston fieldwork was initially 
conducted in April 2016. Irish fieldwork continued up until May 2018 and Boston 
fieldwork resumed in August 2017 until December 2017. The addition of other 
Massachusetts based cities was sought during this period. The addition of Cork 
began and was completed in June 2017. However, due to time constraints, no direct 
pilot study was conducted; yet meetings and informal discussions were organised 
with four key gatekeepers - a member of Dublin City Council, a representative of an 
NGO, an insurance agent, and an emergency services manager. The possibility of 
accessing relevant people was discussed in the early stages, alongside consultation 
with my supervisors and other experts in the field. These discussions informed the 
direction of the research, illuminating the avenues that would be significant and 
highlighting the agencies which may be difficult to access i.e AGS. Thus, in the first 
year the research changed dramatically as more key players became involved and 
helped the project to grow. 
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Semi-structured interviews, as opposed to structured interviews, 
were chosen for four reasons. Firstly, the interviews are still characterised as a 
formal interview with a set of questions and themes prepared beforehand to guide the 
conversation, but this technique allowed the conversation to follow any relevant 
trajectories which the participant initiates (Cohen & Crabtree, 2006). Research of 
this nature heavily relies on the opinions and experiences of key informants and thus, 
the interview questions could not be rigid and enforced as participants needed the 
space to explore issues in different ways and to provide insights that either diverge 
from original assumptions or introduces new themes and at times new directions for 
the research. Providing the participants, the space to lead the conversation opened up 
a number of opportunities for the researcher to really understand the often conflicting 
and sometimes similar opinions and experiences of urban emergency management. 
Secondly, according to Bernard (1988), semi-structured interviews 
are useful when the researcher only has one chance of interviewing the participant 
during the research process. This was a concern due to the time pressures the 
participants were under but also due to the high turnover in emergency management 
positions.  
Thirdly, semi-structured interviews provide trustworthy, 
comparable and subjective qualitative data that is informed by the participants own 
social reality and belief system rather than the researchers. Although I acknowledge 
that the researcher’s own ontological and axiological position influences the themes 
and questions used as a guide and thus, can influence how the participant responds 
also. Finally, semi-structured interviews are normally combined with other methods 
to allow the researcher to further develop an understanding of the topic, and in the 
case of this research, a discourse analysis was conducted (Cohen & Crabtree, 2006). 
Fifty-one interviews were conducted during the research process; 
thirty-six across Ireland and fifteen in Boston. However, one of the Boston 
interviews needed to be retracted due to difficulties in obtaining consent from the 
participant. As a result, this interview was never transcribed or analysed.  
All but three interviews were conducted face to face with the 
others via telephone and Google Hangouts at the participant's request. Any follow up 
questions or interviews were mainly conducted via email or Google Hangouts with 
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the exception of one. This particular participant requested that I meet up with them 
again to further advance the research and ensure it was as up to date as possible 
before submission.  
Due to the nature of the interviews, there were normally between 
ten to twenty set themes, while each interview lasted between forty-five and sixty 
minutes with three exceeding that time limit as organised prior to the interview. All 
follow up interviews were kept to a maximum of 30 minutes. The participants were 
formally approached due to their involvement in a CMaERA and/or the smart city 
project for Dublin, Cork and Boston. Initial contact with key interviewees was made 
via email and with follow up phone calls participants were invited to take part. 
Subsequent participants were recruited through snowball sampling, based on 
recommendations and introductions made by initial interviewees. Further, the 
contacts within the wider Programmable City project and those of my supervisors 
were also beneficial in gaining access to participants. My own personal connections 
also ensured access to two vital agencies. 
There were no major socio-economic divisions to the participants 
in either Ireland or the US, but racial and ethnic participants were under-represented, 
with the US fairing slightly better. However, the gender divide is interesting due to 
the emergency services traditionally being male dominated, but across all the 
interviews, females represented 29.4% of the participants. This is even more 
revealing when it is broken down by country. In Ireland, only 17% of the participants 
were female compared to 60% in the US. Although this research does not focus on 
gender, acknowledging the gender divide and how it may influence the findings of 
the research is important, as it represents the progress of these agencies. It will be 
seen in future chapters that Ireland remains resistant to change while Boston is 
progressive, and these figures tangentially confirm a change in the hiring practices of 
emergency response agencies. 
Further, as my participants were accessed primarily through a 
snowball technique, it is interesting to note that my first Irish contact was male, and 
he provided the majority of my access while my first Boston contact was female, 
who also provided the majority of my access. Therefore, it could be crudely stated 
that the relationships within the two CMaERA still have a slight gender divide in 
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that informal and trustworthy relationships are still mainly with those of the same 
gender, particularly in such a male-dominated space. Of course, it can be argued that 
population size, as well as the difference in participant numbers, inflate/conflates 
these percentages and I accept these critiques but my interviewees are proportionally 
representative of the emergency services in both countries and thus, significant in 
relation to how my data was collected and analysed as it supports the social assembly 
approach that each person, due to different contexts, will view their ‘truth’ in 
different ways and gender is a key catalyst in that. Thus, this shaped my findings in 
relation to how the participants interacted with me, how they viewed their position in 
the assemblage and how inter-personnel or inter-agency power dynamics were 
actually shaped in reality. In Ireland, the participants were divided into three groups 
(see Table 3.1): 
Table 3.1: CDA Policy Documents 
First 
Responders/Auxiliary 
(All are CMaERAs) 
City, Government 
bureaucracies and 
private enterprise 
(Some are CMaERAs) 
Voluntary and others 
(Some are CMaERA) 
An Garda Síochána (AGS) Smart Dublin Red Cross 
National Ambulance 
Service 
Health Service Executive Insurance Groups 
Dublin Fire Brigade Intel Civil Defence 
Irish Defence Forces Dublin City Council-
various departments 
Met Éireann 
Cork Fire Brigade National Directorate of 
Fire and Emergency 
Management 
 
 Office of Emergency 
Management  
 
 Cork Inter-agency Office  
Source: Author 
The key participants in Boston were selected before travelling 
through reading literature specifically on Boston and I relied on a snowball method 
during the first period of fieldwork in April 2016. During the second trip, between 
July and December 2017, I had extra university resources that helped me to reach 
more participants. In Boston, they were divided into the same groups as in Ireland 
(see Table 3.2).  
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Table 3.2: Key participants in Boston, Massachusetts, USA 
First 
responders/auxiliary (All 
are CMaERAs) 
City, Government 
bureaucracies and 
private enterprise 
(Some are CMaERAs) 
Voluntary and others 
(Some are CMaERAs) 
Boston Police Department 
(BPD) 
A representative of City 
Hall 
Boston Cares 
Boston Emergency 
Medical Service 
Department of the 
Environment 
Boston Harbour Now 
Association 
 MassDOT NOAH 
 Office of Emergency 
Management 
EPREP 
Source: Author 
  
In both Ireland and Boston, a major agency was missed due to 
various reasons. In Ireland, the Coastguard were approached a number of times. 
Eventually, the researcher was close to scheduling an interview when the tragic loss 
of Rescue 116 occurred. Out of respect, contact was ceased in the immediate 
aftermath. However, contact was never re-established by them. Boston Fire 
Department was contacted on numerous occasions by both the researcher, several 
other gatekeepers and academic staff of the University of Massachusetts, Boston. 
Eventually, in conversations with colleagues, it was postulated that they are not open 
to researchers and I decided to write around them.  
The issues explored in the interviews differed between participants; 
representatives of the CMaERA were asked about their role in the group, the overall 
aims and objectives of the CMaERA, how data is shared between agencies, funding 
for CMaERA, how CMaERA are activated, the procedure for responding to crises, 
how CMaERA are influenced by public policy and whether they are aware of any 
smart city solutions or changes in governance which are affecting/influencing the 
effectiveness of CMaERA (Appendix 1: Sample interview questions). Other 
interviewees were asked generally about the smart city, the role of CMaERA in the 
city, flooding, the role of communities, and the use of data and structures of 
governance.  
All participants in the body of the thesis will be referred to as 
either their ID number where anonymity cannot be assured. In Ireland, ID numbers 
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look like ID01 and for the US they are IDA. If the pool was large enough and the 
quote did not provide any information which could be used to identify the participant 
then a slightly more detailed reference was provided i.e. ‘Representative of an 
emergency service’.  
3.4.2 Data Analysis of the interviews 
The interviews were transcribed externally, and I started coding 
through MaxQDA. However, I found that MaxQDA was hindering my analysis as 
rather than deeply reading the transcript, I appeared to only be scanning for 
keywords. This resulted in the development of too many codes and sub-codes which 
were often too narrow. Thus, I ceased using MaxQDA and used Microsoft Word and 
colour and number codes instead. I recognise that I could have modified how I coded 
in MaxQDA, but as I was reading the hard copies I was able to limit the codes and 
pull out detailed key information. I acknowledge that both these reasons are due to 
personal preference as I find reading and editing on hard copies much easier thus, 
there is no real methodological reason behind choosing to use Microsoft Word and 
colour and number codes over MaxQDA.  
Coding of Interviews 
 The coding of the interviews was split into two sections; pre and 
post-interviews. Pre-interview codes consisted of creating thematic questions for the 
interview and then translating these into codes for analysis. However, as the 
interviews progressed questions changed, and potential codes were updated. 
Post-interview coding consisted of a code system of eleven colour 
and number coded themes (see Appendix 5) related to the research questions. These 
were then extracted and categorised into similar groups bringing the data together. 
When each theme had been extracted from all the transcripts, each new group was 
re-read and edited. Then, more specific codes were applied to pull out the required 
information. Further, remarkable similarities and contradictions were noted 
particularly if it was in reference to one of the policy documents. Each transcript was 
read, and relevant points were number coded. As a result, coding proved to be an 
excellent method as it emphasised new lines of enquiry and created the building 
blocks for answering the research questions. After the coding process, interesting 
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findings were cross-referenced with the literature review and a general interpretive 
analysis was conducted on relevant policy documents. 
3.4.3 Interpretive Discourse Analysis 
The interviews were supported by an interpretive discourse 
analysis on two types of data, primary (transcripts) and secondary (archival and 
active policy). The secondary data was accessed following participant guidance 
towards relevant policies/documentations. The extent of the analysis varied from 
general impressions i.e. the policy says x, y and z, towards a more in-depth critical 
discourse analysis where appropriate. This created a narrative-driven methodology 
where at one level there is a descriptive, story-telling approach (beginning of 
Chapters 4 and 5) to a deeper level where critical discourse analysis (CDA) allowed 
for a more detailed examination of the discourse produced at both the policy and 
empirical scales (end of Chapters 4 and 5 and Chapter 7). Further, taking an 
interpretive approach rather than solely relying on CDA meant that any gaps in 
knowledge or any events that occurred, during the duration of the fieldwork but after 
an interview had taken place, could be discussed and analysed through various media 
formats, i.e., newspapers, televised news and social media posts and, if necessary, 
could then be followed up with participants via email or during follow-up interviews. 
Although the interpretive analysis on a narrative scale was important for situating the 
research and providing critical information, it did not result in any major findings. 
Instead, it set the scene, shaping the interviews and CDA, to focus on what is 
actually occurring within CMaERA.  
CDA is a method of deconstructing language in order to 
understand the power and different relationships involved in a city and more 
specifically, within a CMaERA. Kitchin and Tate (2000) propose that the structures 
of our society, the development of hierarchies, power, alternatives and boundaries 
can all be understood and are represented through discourse. Therefore, it is their 
belief that the only way to fully understand these processes is to decrypt the language 
or "multiple messages" (Kitchin & Tate, 2000: 17) that we are exposed to in our 
daily lives which further enforce and reinforce our society's values and structures. 
CDA is a branch of discourse analysis that was developed in the 
1980s (Blommaert & Bulcaen, 2000:447) and it extends upon discourse analysis by 
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exploring themes of "power and inequality in language" (Blommaert & Bulcaen, 
2000:447 and Gee, 2004). It is popular within the social sciences as a method to 
explore, unravel, contemplate and challenge how language is used within certain 
social contexts and examines the implications language may have on the 
construction of societal, political and cultural ideologies (Blommaert & Bulcaen, 
2000 and Gee, 2004). Discourse analysis is used to reveal how meanings are 
established, utilised, challenged and changed as language supports social, political 
and cultural formation. Thus, by analysing discourse we begin to understand the 
social world and how language is used to portray certain meanings and world views, 
and in turn, this influences how we understand our position within society or within 
an institution or assemblage.  
CDA takes discourse analysis a step further by attempting to 
analyse and explicate how different realities favouring dominant forces are 
constructed within society, resulting in the illumination of societal issues 
(Blommaert & Bulcaen, 2000 and Van Dijk, 1993). Therefore, CDA explores 
discourse in relation to issues that are created and reinforced by dominant powers, 
such as identity, technology, processes, roles and position. Undertaking a critical 
discourse analysis allowed me to deconstruct language to uncover practices within 
institutions through the lens of power. This allows language to be understood as a 
social practice that illustrates how it can be shaped and changed to suit certain 
circumstances, spaces, institutions, or forms of dissemination. By grappling with 
this, it is easier to reveal how institutional cultures develop and in turn how they 
affect inter-agency coordination. A critical discourse analysis also links with the 
Foucauldian and Agambian research design as both are concerned with power, with 
Foucault being particularly interested in discourse as a form of power. By 
considering power as a discourse and critically exploring this, it is easier to reveal 
how society, institutions and assemblages are shaped and organised especially in 
terms of their history, geography and culture and that social construction is linked to 
actions that are connected by language (Burr, 1995). 
The dichotomy of language and power is particularly interesting 
because language is not neutral. It represents the nuances and realities of societal 
power by purveying certain intentionalities, authorities, meanings and beliefs. It also 
acknowledges that language can change truths or present alternative truths based on 
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word choice and meanings (Burr,1995). Thus, connections are made between 
language and the actioning of power which reveal how dominant agencies create a 
reality or story that reflects their truths. However, language is borne of a person, 
thus, the power lies with the person not with the language itself, but with how the 
language is used, understood, twisted or ignored. Language is then the vehicle that 
drives social reality with humans as the drivers.  
This understanding of language and power influenced how CDA 
was conducted within this research and on the choice of documents analysed. 
Initially, the CDA began by analysing publicly available documents originating from 
emergency management agencies and the smart city. However, it became apparent 
that not all were necessary and not all could be accurately analysed and explored 
within the thesis as there was an abundance of archival and active policy of which 
some was outdated, inaccessible, and irrelevant. The CDA then evolved into a study 
of policy documents that were given to me by participants or were mentioned on 
numerous occasions across several interviews. In Ireland, most policy documents are 
publicly available, and the participants were eager to share them with me. In Boston, 
it was the opposite. The participants did not provide any documents apart from the 
‘Climate Action Plan’. I also struggled to find any policy online, instead general but 
limited information is shared on various sections of government websites. I spoke to 
one of the key participants about this and they agreed that these policies are not 
publicly available and that I would be best to use available website resources if any. 
However, through library searches and university access in the US, I was able to 
obtain key policy documents as listed in Table 3.3. Yet the choice to not have the 
documents in the public domain, and also the choice of what information is shared, 
is in itself an interesting finding in a CDA project. CDA was applied to the following 
documents:  
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Table 3.3: CDA Policy Documents 
Irish Documents US Documents 
Framework for Major Emergency 
Management 
Climate Action Boston 
Dublin City Council Flood Emergency 
Plan 
FEMA website and online policy 
The Planning System and Flood Risk 
Management 
Massachusetts Government 
A guide to Flood Emergencies July 
2013 
Boston City Government 
A guide to Local Co-ordination Centres MEMA website and online policy 
A guide to Planning and Staging 
Exercises 
Stafford Act 1978 
A guide to Preparing a Major 
Emergency Plan 
National Response Plan (2008), 
National Response Framework 
(2009/2013) 
Inter-agency Public Communication 
Plan Media Liaison 
Massachusetts Comprehensive 
Emergency Management Plan 2017 
A guide to Severe Weather 
Emergencies 
Disaster Relief Act (1974, 2000 and 
2006 
A guide to Host Nation Support for the 
Principal Response Agencies 
GOA 2006 
A protocol for multi-agency response to 
Flood Emergencies.  
 
An Garda Síochána Policy  
Source: Author 
Certain questions were asked of these documents. These were 
developed with help from Moriarty's lecture slides for Discourse and Analysis at the 
University of Limerick Winter School (2015) and include but were not limited to the 
examples provided in  Table 3.4. 
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Table 3.4: Sample questions used in CDA 
 Questions 
1. How do the policy documents relate to their current situation and 
institutional culture? 
2. Are these documents a method of social practice/expectation? 
3. Do these documents reveal the thinking or beliefs in these agencies? 
4. Do they represent any aspects of power or hierarchy?  
5. Does the chosen language have any implications or particular consequences? 
linguistically? 
6. What traits, characteristics, qualities and features are attributed to agencies, 
objects or processes mentioned in the policies? 
7. If exclusion and inclusion are present, how are these justified? What are the 
contexts that surround this? Are they mitigated or increased? 
8. Is there a manipulation of agency transparency? Does this create a view of 
power, responsibilities and blame? 
9. Does the policy rely on or challenge any common ideologies?  
10. Does the policy reinforce or challenge how society works in terms of urban 
governance and temporary political systems? 
11. How does the language present the intention of the policy? 
12. Do the documents rely on a particular level of shared knowledge? 
13. Do the words chosen have a power? Could alternative less politically hot or 
power drenched words have been chosen? Would this have altered the 
intentions of the policy? 
14. How are words co-located? 
15. Are any euphemisms used?  
16. Are words formal or informal or mix-matched? 
17. Are metaphors used? 
18. Are words chosen with an ideology or position in mind? 
19. Is agency clear? 
20. What pronouns are used? Is it us versus them or is it us collectively? 
21. Are sentences passive or aggressive and positive or negative? 
Source: Moriarty (2015) 
Further, there is particular attention placed on the societal and 
institutional contexts of how these policies are written. The societal refers to the 
historical, geographical, political and cultural contexts of these agencies. The 
institutional refers to how the specific agency involved and how that affects the 
discourse.  
Finally, CDA has two major criticisms. Firstly, is language really 
reflective of power dynamics? The choice of language can often create inclusiveness 
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and exclusiveness. For instance, if technical jargon is used then it excludes those not 
familiar with that language. Further, language choice can reflect hierarchies, biases 
and prejudices. Whether language can truly capture power dynamics is beyond this 
dissertation, but I believe it can and I argue that the use of jargon, the blacking out of 
language and the choice of metaphors, pronouns and passiveness ensures that the 
reader internalises the document in relation to their knowledge and position. 
Therefore, the choices in how the language is executed have the power to both 
inform and segregate. To try and minimise any issues with how I internalise the 
documents, I qualify the CDA with data from interviews and literature.  
Secondly, the researcher can apply the CDA in a certain direction 
by carefully choosing the policies that are chosen (Breeze, 2011). To overcome this 
issue, I allowed my participants to inadvertently choose my policies thus, adding a 
random variable to the method and one that removes any bias on my part, but I 
accept that my own perceptions and beliefs will still influence my interpretations and 
I contend that this is an acknowledged aspect of all qualitative research. 
3.5 Ethics 
Ethical clearance was granted on the 22nd September 2015 by the 
social research ethics subcommittee of Maynooth University Research Ethics 
Committee (Appendix 2) and extended on June 15th, 2017. All participants in this 
research were required to read and sign an informed consent form (Appendix 3) 
along with an information sheet (Appendix 4). I provided three opportunities for my 
participants to read through, consider and accept or decline consent. Firstly, the 
documents were sent to them via an invite email. Secondly, during the confirmation 
email which was sent 2 days prior to the interview. Thirdly, I brought them along on 
the day to ensure that the participant was aware of the study and the potential 
outcomes. This proved especially important in cases where confidentiality could not 
be ensured as senior-level emergency management is quite small, and I found on 
numerous occasions that a participant would say “Oh, you interviewed x,y,z last 
week”. 
Thus, during initial contact and at the beginning of the interview, it 
was explained to all participants the purpose and nature of the research, why they 
were chosen, any risks that might be involved in terms of confidentiality and the 
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coding, analysis, storage and sharing of information. They were offered the 
opportunity to ask questions and have such questions answered both before and after 
interviews. In addition, they were advised that they may withdraw from the process 
up until May 2016 initially and then until May 2018 to allow the write-up of the 
research to commence. Further, permission was sought to record all interviews. In 
regard to the CDA, most documents used were already in the public domain, but 
permission was sought for the use of any private documents prior to inclusion.  
This research was not directly working with any vulnerable group; 
however, the researcher was aware that members of the CMaERA, especially first 
responders, could all be deemed vulnerable while discussing emergencies as the 
researcher was unaware of any past traumatic incidents they may have experienced. 
Thus, all participants were provided with four assurances before the interview: 
• The interview would cease if requested; 
• The participants may be accompanied to the interview; 
• The researcher will follow up with the participants to ensure their well-being; 
• The participants can nominate a secondary person to read and edit their 
transcript if they so wish. 
All data was anonymised even though the majority of participants 
were happy to be named. A spreadsheet of participant names was kept on a separate 
encrypted hard drive from the transcripts. Thus, only the researcher knew which 
interview belongs to which participant. Due to time constraints transcribing was 
conducted by an outside source that was vetted by the University and signed non-
disclosure agreements. All audio sent to the transcriber was edited and anonymised 
beforehand. All analysis was done solely by the researcher. 
Identifiers were removed at the first possible instance - that of 
audio editing. After transcribing, all files used ID codes and pseudonyms. The 
spreadsheet containing identifiable information will be retained by the researcher for 
administrative and legal purposes. It will not be shared beyond co-researchers, and it 
is encrypted and stored separately to the data. In the case that confidentiality cannot 
be ensured, i.e., due to the weight of a job title or easily made connections due to the 
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information revealed, this was clearly discussed with the participant and all measures 
were taken to ensure the participant was comfortable and happy to continue.  
Collected data, in the form of audio files, transcripts, photographic 
material and data analytics are being stored on an encrypted laptop with backups 
stored on encrypted drives archived within the department during the period of 
research. As with the overall Programmable City Project, it is intended, with the 
written permission of those interviewed, that the data will be made available to the 
Irish Qualitative Research Archive (IQDA) as it is the central access point for 
qualitative social science data generated in or about Ireland. Any data made available 
to the IQDA will only be stored with the consent of the participant. The data will be 
archived in the Irish Qualitative Data Archive and follow the archiving procedure set 
out by the IQDA/DRI (Digital Repository of Ireland), with appropriate levels of 
access set by the participants of the study. This archiving will not include the 
spreadsheet containing the identifiers. Consent for archiving and re-use of data was 
part of the consent process. The majority of participants agreed, and it complies with 
my guarantee of anonymity as all identifiers were removed. The length of time to be 
housed in the archive is indefinite.  
Where consent for submission to the IQDA was not given, the data 
is being retained securely by the researcher for a minimum of ten years as stipulated 
in the Maynooth University Research Integrity Policy. The data pertaining to such 
interviews, including electronic notes and metadata is being stored on an encrypted 
hard drive for that period. The key containing the codes matching the data to the 
relevant participant is also being stored on a different encrypted hard drive located 
elsewhere. Any hard copies of the transcripts or notes will be destroyed immediately 
after completion of the VIVA and termination of the project, using confidential 
shredding as approved by the University. After the ten years, all the transcripts, 
electronic notes and metadata in my possession will be destroyed using appropriate 
tools to delete and overwrite the content. This will be overseen by the projects 
Principal Investigator and executed by the technical support team within the 
Maynooth University Social Sciences Institute. All consent forms are confidentially 
stored within the University.  
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3.5.1 An Garda Síochána Research Requirement 
To undertake research with An Garda Síochána, I had to undergo 
their research approval process. This involved filling in three detailed forms 
regarding: my research, who I wished to interview, the types of questions and how 
all data will be used, stored and destroyed. I also had to agree to share all findings 
with An Garda Síochána and be willing to provide a lecture or presentation on my 
findings, if requested. The forms also had to be co-signed by my supervisors and the 
Maynooth University legal team were advised of the situation before submission to 
ensure my rights as the researcher were protected. Further, as I interviewed the initial 
representatives, the snowball method inadvertently occurred, but to be able to 
interview the suggested interviewees I had to re-submit the forms. As a result, my 
fieldwork was delayed a considerable amount. I have included the main form in 
Appendix 6. 
3.6 Consultative Process 
       Due to the nature of this research, consultation with key 
participants and representatives of different CMaERA agencies was crucial, 
particularly in Ireland, as the IEMA system is quite informal, messy and 
difficult to fully comprehend or engage with as an outsider.  Therefore, I 
would regularly consult with  three or four different IEMA representatives 
whom I developed a working relationship with to discuss my interpretation 
and understanding of the IEMA. This consultation process was beneficial to 
this research as I could question my understanding of terminology, processes 
and relationships which they would then either corroborate or educate me 
on.  However, this process proved most advantageous in terms of my 
conceptualisation of the IEMA within diagrams.  For instance, Figure 4.1 in 
the next chapter proved incredibly difficult to create due to the messy 
formation of the IEMA.  Imagining and trying to draw what this system 
looks like was a feat that I, my supervisors and my participants struggled 
with. However, through numerous consultations, this diagram, as confusing 
as it is, was considered the best representation of the IEMA and one that I 
can defend.  
     This consultation process also occurred within the US case study 
but in a more time limited capacity.  While, I was living in Boston, I was 
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able to ring and question participants about issues I didn’t understand but I 
was also able to converse with colleagues in my host university.  It was a 
different type of consultation than in Ireland but still proved useful for 
confirming certain things such as the effects of ‘Home Rule’ on 
Massachusetts and the operation post the bombing.   
3.7 Research Limitations 
There were several limitations within this research.  
• Access 
• Confidential information 
• Slow policy change 
• Obtaining (full) consent 
Access to relevant agencies was easier in Ireland than in the US. 
The only major Irish agency I failed to access was the Coastguard. Access was made 
easier by the small scale of emergency management in Ireland which facilitated a 
snowball technique. Access was a major issue in Boston as I planned to replicate my 
Irish fieldwork and interview the same or equivalent agencies. This should have been 
made easier due to my extended stay there in 2017. However, there was a lot of 
resistance to participating and very few participants were willing to take part in the 
snowball method for reasons that are still unclear. Several agencies repeatedly 
ignored my requests as well as those made by the staff of the University of 
Massachusetts, Boston. Agencies that did respond never provided a reason beyond 
they are too busy to facilitate the research. Due to these access issues, my Irish case 
study could not be fully replicated. As a result, this research is not a full comparison 
but rather an asymmetric narrative of three cities. The participants in each city are 
highly interested in learning about each other and as a result, I will provide feedback 
and I will ask for those findings to be shared amongst the agencies that were not 
involved.  
Secondly, confidential information was a limitation in two ways. 
Firstly, at certain points discussions could not continue, or points could not be 
clarified as it drifted into confidential territory. This means that some of my 
transcripts or points are vague and underdeveloped. However, this was only a 
problem with An Garda Síochána and Boston Police Department, but both were 
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happy to speak on issues as far as they could. Secondly, I was told information or 
became privy to certain documents that are not in the public domain and will not be 
in the public knowledge. This was often acknowledged by the participant who 
requested it to be edited out or placed off the record. At other points, I made the 
decision based on quick searches for the relevant documentation in the public sphere. 
If I could not find the document publicly, then, unless direct permission was 
received, I did not analyse it.  
Thirdly, slow policy change means that my research was always 
positioned in a sphere of slow change. After each emergency, the response is 
evaluated, and policy is updated to reflect those changes. However, this process can 
take an indefinite amount of time. Thus, any policy reflections from later stage 
events such as Storm Ophelia, will be missing from the research or will be 
completely speculative on my part or the part of my participants. Further, it was 
revealed in November 2016 that the Framework was being revised and updated. I 
kept this planned update in mind throughout the research, but I recognised that, 
firstly, my dissertation would primarily be based on the 2006 Framework, and 
secondly, that any changes in the new Framework may re-situate my findings. 
However, as of October 2018 and from a follow-up discussion with a participant, it 
appears that this new edition has been placed on hold with no real indication as to 
why this is the current state of play.  
Finally, obtaining (full) consent was straightforward for most of 
the interviews. However, a few participants did request that I do not quote them or 
refused to fully engage with the consent form. In these cases, I have transcribed and 
coded the interviews and I have sent the transcripts to them (as with all participants) 
and requested their edits and if they would like to re-think their level of consent. I 
have also said that I will send them the chapters with their quotes highlighted for 
approval. In relation to AGS, I was legally required to send my dissertation to them 
for approval with their interview quotes highlighted. This is a concern as they can 
withdraw permission for all AGS participants at any stage which may have dire 
effects on the narrative of my empirical chapters. After the thesis is submitted to the 
exams office, the relevant sections will be sent to AGS for review.  If they require 
anything to be removed this will be done post-VIVA.   
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3.8 Conclusion 
To investigate ‘how the variety of actors, actants and technologies 
involved in emergency management contextualised within their particular histories, 
cultures and geographies assemble and organise’ the research design included a 
qualitative methodology with a collective case study approach. This was supported 
by a clear philosophical foundation of social assembly aligned with the theoretical 
framework described in Chapter 2. Based on this design, semi-structured interviews 
and an interpretive narrative driven methodology was conducted within Dublin, Cork 
and Boston with particular emphasis on CMaERA organisation and the two case 
study events. The next two chapters are going to explore the policy and activation of 
the Irish Emergency Management Assemblage (IEMA) (Chapter 4) and the United 
States Emergency Management Assemblage (USEMA) (Chapter 5).   
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Chapter 4: Irish Emergency Management Assemblage 
 
4.1 Introduction  
The aim of this chapter is to provide a deep exploration into the 
history, policy and activation of the Irish Emergency Management Assemblage 
(IEMA) to contextualise the evolution of the assemblage and evaluate why a 
CMaERA may oscillate positions between policy and activation. There are three 
objectives to this chapter:  
Objective 1: An exploration of the historical adoption and evolution of emergency 
management in Ireland.  
Objective 2: An in-depth interpretive analysis of the key policy documents 
supporting the formation and operation of the IEMA.  
Objective 3: The analysis of the winter storm events in 2015/2016 to illustrate the 
re-shaping of the IEMA from policy to activation.  
The IEMA consists of first responder agencies, government 
departments, voluntary agencies, private enterprises and other organisations of value, 
as well as technology, processes and cultures (see Figure 4.1). Formally, the IEMA 
assemblage is hierarchical with clear networks of power, with most everyday 
emergencies and local major emergencies being dealt with by first responder 
agencies and, at times, their bureaucratic parents (e.g. the National Ambulance 
Service (NAS) and the Health Service Executive (HSE). However, there is procedure 
in place for a local emergency to be escalated up to a regional or a national 
emergency. Each scale has their own teams and groups, with every agency 
represented at each stage. However, as will be evidenced in this chapter there is a 
more informal co-locating of agencies and departments in a flatter decentralised 
manner with obvious slippage between scales which is left undiscussed across the 
breath of policy.  
The anchor policy for dealing with major emergencies as opposed 
to everyday ones is the “Framework for Major Emergency Management” (MEM, 
2006a), from herein referred to as the “Framework”. This document and the Strategic 
Emergency Management National Structure and Framework (SEMNSF) document 
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will be the key policy explored within this chapter pulling on supportive documents, 
guides and protocols when necessary.  
Using these documents, and the expert interviews, this chapter will 
provide an overview of the Framework and an exploration into the relationships, 
contestations and repetitive elements of the different scales of the IEMA. This will 
include five assessments as to how policy and policy decisions influence the shape of 
the IEMA: sovereign power, decision-making; unaccounted silo legacies; geography 
of Framework development and linguistic choices 
By demonstrating the different scales and shapes of the IEMA, the 
chapter then proceeds to provide a comparison between the policy-shaped IEMA and 
the active IEMA. To help with this, the section begins with a deeper overview of the 
Flood Guidance document to show how the agencies should coordinate during a 
flood event in line with the Framework and SEMNSF. This then leads onto an 
exploration of the 2015/2016 storm season in Ireland which resulted in major 
flooding and mass devastation across the country. This includes a detailed analysis 
of the role of the event, how inter-agency coordination was created or destroyed and 
its resulting effect on the shape of the assemblage. 
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Figure 4.1: The Irish Emergency Management Assemblage 
 
Source: Author 
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4.2 The Adoption of Emergency Management in Ireland 
Irish Emergency Management policy remained relatively 
undeveloped until the production of the “accident plan” in 1974 (McMullan, 2010). 
This was the first evidence of a push towards inter-agency coordination as it 
discusses procedures for declaring emergencies and also detailed coordinating 
procedures for the different emergency service organisations which would be 
involved in a major accident, including an Garda Síochána and the Fire Brigade. 
However, further development in emergency management in Ireland usually only 
occurred in the aftermath of a major crisis. The following six events are key 
moments that contributed to the creation of new policy, guidance documents and 
pushed IEMA policy to evolve.  
• Event 1: The fatal Buttevant Rail Crash 1980: In the aftermath of this 
crisis the Department of Health organised a conference to review the 
response and explore how plans could be re-evaluated to meet the needs of 
major incidents (O’Riordan, 1992). Thus, the Major Accident Plan and 
Guidelines were produced, including more detailed information regarding the 
roles of the other response agencies and also, the roles that voluntary services 
and the army would have (McMullan, 2010).  
• Event 2: The Stardust Tragedy 1981: Under pressure, the Minister for 
Environment requested that all local authorities develop emergency plans that 
followed his Department's guidelines which gave little heed or consultation 
to the guidelines developed by the Department of Health the previous year, 
resulting in two sets of guidelines for managing major accidents that were 
significantly different causing tension between both departments (O’Riordan, 
1992 and McMullan, 2010). 
• Event 3: The Big Snow 1982: As a response to heavy blizzards, the 
Department of An Taoiseach organised and chaired an inter-departmental 
committee with representatives from several government departments 
including “Environment, Justice, Health and Defence” (McMullan, 2010). 
They produced the draft of the ‘Framework for Co-Ordinated Planning for 
Major Emergencies’, the first major inter-agency framework for Ireland. 
And, after a number of years of feedback and consultation, the Department of 
the Environment was assigned the lead agency for emergency management 
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within the Irish State (O’Riordan, 1992 and McMullan, 2010). Over the 
following years, a lot of planning was done at both the national level and at 
the operational level thus, by 1986 most agencies had produced and exercised 
plans (O’Riordan, 1992 and McMullan, 2010). However, O’Riordan (1992) 
asserts that two key hopes of the departmental committee had been ignored; 
“comprehensive hazard analyses” and “the co-ordinating groups were not 
involved in the preparation of the plans” (McMullan, 2010).  
In 1986, a new departmental committee was convened to assess 
emergencies before they occurred, however, it still had the same departmental 
representatives as before. They evaluated the previous package and all exercises that 
had occurred and in 1989 concluded that the current emergency management system 
was satisfactory (O’Riordan,1992 and McMullan, 2010). But, as O’Riordan argues 
although, there was a satisfactory emergency management system in Ireland, the idea 
“of a nationwide series of co-ordinated plans, prepared by an inter-organisational co-
ordinating group, on the basis of local hazard and resource analysis, which would be 
exercised and tested at regular intervals, appears to be quite some distance from 
reality” (O’Riordan, 1992;57 and McMullan, 2010). The 1984 Framework survived 
for twenty years before it was reviewed and the current Framework for Major 
Emergency Management (2006) was accepted by the Government. This framework 
is now currently under review as of November 2016. However, since 2006 several 
events have led to the issuing and revision of guidance and protocol documents by 
the MEM (Major Emergency Management) team to accompany the Framework. Just 
two examples of these events are listed below and one potential event which may 
also feed directly into the editing of the Framework as well as the revision of 
guidance and protocol documents. 
• Event 4: Flooding 2009 and 2011: Areas of Ireland have always been prone 
to flood events, but November/December 2009 and October 2011 resulted in 
a series of extreme levels of precipitation (McGrath, 2016). These rare events 
combined with the increase in property built on floodplains during the 
property boom resulted in flood devastation never before seen on a national 
scale. This prompted a review of the then current flood guidance document 
based on “feedback received from the Principal Response Agencies in the 
aftermath of the serious flooding experienced in parts of the Country” (MEM, 
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2013) and in 2016 a “Protocol for Multi-Agency Response to Flood 
Emergencies” was issued by MEM. 
• Event 5: Series of ISIS and lone wolf terrorist events across the globe 
particularly Manchester and London in 2017: Due to the increasing extent 
and evolving types of terrorist attacks on the continent and worldwide, the 
Major Emergency Management team have begun writing guidance 
documents for such an event occurring in Ireland. I was briefly shown the 
draft during an interview in early 2017 but it has either not been published 
yet or is unavailable to the public. There have also been more inter-agency 
training days for response to terrorist attacks (The Irish Times, 2017; The 
Journal; 2018). This is an interesting moment in Irish emergency 
management as there is a need for significant preparation prior to an attack 
occurring rather than post attack. This is a significant evolution in how 
emergency management theory develops in Ireland.  
• Event 6: Storm Ophelia October 2017: This was a significant weather 
event for Ireland that required a national red alert, activation of a national 
emergency protocol and the deployment of all response agencies. As is good 
practice, this event will be reviewed and may result in a significant change in 
guidance or protocol documents going forward. It also may contribute to the 
editing of the Framework.  
4.3 The Framework for Major Emergency Management 
The Framework for Major Emergency Management is the 
overarching policy document for the handling of emergencies, crises and disasters in 
Ireland. It was compiled by a national steering committee and approved by the 
Government of the day in 2006 replacing the Framework for Co-ordinated Response 
to Major Emergency, published in 1984 (MEM, 2006; 2015). Both the 2006 and 
1984 Frameworks were developed as a response to the first three events and 
numerous other ones that occurred over the decades. While, the final three events are 
contributing to the development of new policy guidance documents around flooding 
in 2013 and terrorism in 2017they will eventually inform the new edition of the 
Framework. But as can be seen in Figures 4.2 and Table 4.1, the current Framework 
remains as the overarching and anchoring policy document for agencies responding 
at the local or regional scale. The national scale of the IEMA is not governed by the 
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Framework for Major Emergency Management, although it does keep in tone with it 
through the Strategic Emergency Management National Structure and Framework 
document.  
Figure 4.2: Linking Major Emergency Plans with National Plans and Other Plans. 
 
Source: Redrawn from a Figure in the Framework for Major Emergency 
Management (MEM, 2006: 39). 
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Table 4.1: Geographical hierarchy of response as outlined in the Framework 
Geographical area Details 
Local/agency level Principal Response Agencies coordinate response. 
Regional level Regional Steering Groups would promote interagency 
coordination across regional spaces. 
National level In the case of emergencies that are long-term or cover or 
have the potential to cover a large geographical area of the 
island of Ireland, the response is organised and led by the 
parent department of the PRA’s through a National 
Steering Group and emergency plan 
Source: MEM (2006) 
 
The Framework was developed through an inter-departmental 
committee, since replaced by a National Steering Group (NSG). It was originally 
drafted by an inter-agency Review Working Group comprised of members from An 
Garda Síochána (AGS), the HSE and Local Authorities. Currently it, and its 
accompanying guidance and protocol documents, are led and supported by the Major 
Emergency Management (MEM) Team in the Directorate of Fire and Emergency 
Management, located within the Department of Housing, Planning and Local 
Government. In 2006, this was the Department of the Environment, Community and 
Local Government (MEM, 2006). 
The Framework provides a general overview of the procedure and 
steps of action to be taken by each Principal Response Agency (PRA) (i.e., Local 
Authority, HSE and AGS), utilising the all-hazard approach, while also providing 
limited direction as to how external agencies, such as voluntary services, work 
alongside the PRAs (MEM, 2006). Other actions it describes are:  
• Declaring a major emergency; 
• Information on inter-agency co-ordination; 
• Command and control; 
• Sharing and use of resources; 
• Allocation of responsibility; 
• Common Terminology; 
• The management of crises that are a direct consequence as a result of the 
original event. (MEM, 2006) 
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Further, the Framework acknowledges that it can only be effective 
if each PRA develops and establishes their own protocol of procedures. These 
specific protocols are often done at both an agency and local level ensuring that the 
Framework as a generic plan is applied at the local scale in a more efficient manner. 
By creating individual plans, each agency is planning for a range of emergencies 
within their own capacities and knowledge of the area. Local knowledge is 
particularly important for the mitigation and management of an emergency as it 
ensures more trust between the agency and community and a better knowledge of 
weaknesses in the area or team. This also feeds into the importance of the 
formal/informal dichotomy that becomes very evident across the IEMA as it is 
dissected. For instance, the Framework and individual plans create very formal 
networks, but there is a sub-culture of informal networks that help make the IEMA 
work. This informal aspect is not covered in the policy but is a theme that was 
continually advocated by the participants and becomes increasingly important in 
future chapters. 
In support of the Framework, the Major Emergency Management 
National Steering Group have also produced guidance and protocol documents that 
focus on more specific aspects of the Framework and specific incidents that are a 
high risk in Ireland, such as flooding, to ensure a uniform response across the 
country. Examples include: “A Protocol for Multi-Agency Response to Flooding” 
(MEM, 2016); “A Guide to Severe Weather Emergencies” (MEM, 2010); and “A 
Guide to Flood Emergencies” (MEM, 2013).  
The Framework is a guide for agencies responding to emergencies 
and as it is written with the underpinning philosophy of the all-hazards approach it 
adequately prepares agencies for every eventuality. However, it is not without its 
complexities, contradictions and critiques. At times, inconsistencies and language of 
political power and control are evident.  
One short introductory example is that the Framework refers to the 
writers being the “Review Working Group supported by the Department of 
Environment, Heritage and Local Government” (MEM, 2006:10) under the “aegis of 
the Inter-Departmental Committee on Major Emergencies and has been approved by 
Government decision.” (MEM, 2006:11). Yet, on the same page it is recognised that 
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the Inter-Departmental Committee on Major Emergencies is now the National 
Steering Group (NSG), which according to Appendix F2 of the Framework is a 
group “chaired and supported by the Department of Environment, Heritage and 
Local Government and consists of representatives of ” (MEM, 2006: 9) various 
government departments as well as key emergency service agencies and local 
authorities. It is now chaired by the Department of Housing, Planning and Local 
Government. The National Steering group refers up to the Inter-Departmental 
Working Group (IDWG) on Major Emergencies, with the IDWG being the liaison 
between government and emergency response agencies while the National Steering 
group oversees the national implementation and revision of the Framework. 
However, there is also a Task Force that lies on, or slightly above, the same scale as 
the IDWG, which the NSG also reports too. The Task Force “co-ordinates and 
oversees the emergency planning activities of all government departments and public 
authorities” (Citizens Information, 2017).  
What the above paragraph illustrates is a hybrid, messy, confusing, 
disjointed and duplicated form of governance that represents several government 
objectives and provides a small snippet of the power relations that are operating 
within the IEMA that are now explored further.  
4.4 IEMA - Local/Agency Scale 
The Strategic Emergency Planning Guidance document was 
produced in 2004 by the Department of Defence for the national scale. It 
implemented the use of assigned lead government departments with the Framework 
adopting the idea at the local scale. The Principal Response Agencies are the 
designated lead agencies at the local and regional scale, with each being pre-assigned 
certain events in which they take the lead. For instance, the local authorities take the 
lead for flooding, AGS take the lead for terrorism, and the HSE for health-related 
incidents. There are two methods to assigning a lead agency. The first is by pre-
assignment, the second is by default. The default agency is the Local Authority 
which is required to manage emergencies that do not fit into assigned categories. The 
Fire Brigade is not a designated PRA as they fall under the remit of local authorities. 
However, their senior officers are critical in the different steering groups, as 
discussed by Participant 1 of ID13 a senior officer in the Fire Service: 
84 
 
“I think we certainly would be very proactive in driving the policy as an 
organisation. So, we are looking at the requirements from the national 
directorate in terms of the, if you take flood as an example, we have a flood 
guidance document which each Local Authority should comply with in terms 
of their planning arrangements. So, we would take that document and adapt it 
within Dublin city. That level of policy and the way we ensure that we are in 
compliance with that, with the development of flood plan arrangements 
which we currently have. We have done a workshop, which we chaired and 
facilitated that … and it was very positive.” (Participants R1:1D13) 
Under the PRA’s are auxiliary services such as the Coastguard, 
Defence Forces, Red Cross and Civil Defence, amongst many other private 
voluntary agencies. The Coastguard is interesting due to its positioning at the 
local/agency scale. At the Major Emergency Management Conference in 2016 it was 
announced that the Framework was going to be revised. Consequently, a member of 
the audience requested information on whether the Coastguard would be assigned 
PRA status as opposed to remaining an auxiliary service. Mr Sean Hogan (Director 
of Fire and Emergency and a key member of the 2006 Framework group) responded 
by explaining that the Coastguard were not assigned PRA status as they function 
offshore and that the Framework covers events that occur on land and within the 
Irish state. However, the discussion led to the potential to change their position going 
forward. After this conference, the same discussion arose during one of my 
interviews with the participant explaining it as such: 
“Likewise, with the coast guard or the river here, there has been two decades 
of war with the Irish Coast Guard, they regard the coast guard as a bunch of 
enthusiastic amateurs and whatever. It is an arrogance born or whatever and 
it is a real cultural piece.” (Emergency Management Representative). 
It is difficult to discuss this more deeply due to not gaining access 
to the Coastguard (discussed in Chapter 3), but the idea to exclude the only agency 
with full capabilities for dealing with coastal emergencies seems problematic. 
Although AGS have some water capabilities, they are not as advanced or distributed 
geographically as the Coastguard, meaning that the rescuing of people at sea will 
primarily always be a Coastguard call. However, the thought process back in 
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2005/2006, as explained at the MEM Conference, offers some insights into power 
dynamics and territorial protection that emanates throughout the Framework. The 
Framework was about land emergencies as off-coast emergencies were rare. So, if it 
were to happen the Coastguard would still respond, just under the lead of another 
agency which, due to the perceived amateurish skills of the Coastguard was deemed 
appropriate as evident by the above quote.  
Although, the rationale behind the decision can be explained, it still 
does not accurately reflect a cohesive coordinated emergency management system 
when the only agency with a specific set of skills is excluded from a leadership and 
decision-making role. As the revision of the Framework has been postponed it is 
difficult to say whether the role of the Coastguard will be upgraded or not. 
However, for any major events that happen at a local or agency 
scale, there are a series of procedures. The Framework cites eight "major elements of 
response" (MEM, 2006:51). These include "declaration of a major emergency, 
mobilisation of resources, command, control and co-ordination of response, 
information management systems, management of the site of emergency, casualty 
management, protecting exposed populations and public information.” All of these 
elements come together to create an efficient response. The following section will 
look at command, control and co-ordination with information management systems 
explored in later chapters.  
4.4.1 Command, Control and Co-Ordination 
The Framework uses the terms command, control and co-
ordination10 as a linguistic tool in which they can represent the hierarchy and 
networks of power that create and sustain the IEMA assemblage (MEM, 2006). The 
Framework protects itself by acknowledging that the terms may be used in different 
ways at different times but that within the Framework they are set and defined as the 
following:  
• “Command – meaning the process of directing the operations of all or part 
of a particular service (or group of services), by giving direct orders; 
                                                          
10 Throughout this thesis coordination is spelled in line with US policy but spelled  “co-ordination” if 
used in a direct quote from  Irish policy. 
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• Control – meaning the process of influencing the activity of a service or 
group of services, by setting tasks, objectives or targets, but without the 
authority to give direct orders;  
• Co-ordinate - meaning to bring the different elements of a complex activity 
or organisation into an efficient relationship through a negotiated process. In 
an emergency context, this may include the mandate/authority to make 
certain decisions in pre-defined areas, where a normal consensual approach 
does not appear to meet the needs of an emergency situation; 
• Co-operate - meaning to work together towards the same end; 
• Collaborate – meaning to work jointly on an activity.” (MEM, 2006; 53) 
These definitions ensure the creation of a hierarchy of networks but 
negate to develop upon or account for the more informal relationships which are 
decentralised and flat and also helps to inform practices of co-ordination, co-
operation and collaboration and ensure more respect to the positions of command 
and control.  
The command structure and organisation of co-ordination centres 
is broad and complicated. Beginning at the PRA scale, each should have a 
"Controller of Operations" (COO) (MEM, 2006:54) at the event site. Initially, the 
lead officer and first on scene takes the role of COO until the pre-selected personnel 
arrives. The COO has an important role in decision-making, ensuring coordination, 
communications and the organisation of resources, logs and activating the  
information management systems. 
If there is a jurisdictional issue around an event (for instance, it 
borders a number of AGS divisions) multiple units may respond. In this situation, it 
should be internally decided who will be the COO for that PRA taking account of the 
situation, skill and appropriate level. If an event occurs on the boundary of a Local 
Authority the COO is derived from the Local Authority whose "rostered senior 
officer was first to attend" (MEM, 2006:55). The COO of the lead agency will be the 
on-site coordinator. These jurisdictional issues raise concerns around the effective 
governance of emergencies as each PRA have their own functioning regions which 
overlap with the regional divisions as outlined in the Framework. For example, each 
county has their own Local Authority with Dublin and Cork, for instance, having 
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more than one. Then AGS have 6 regions (An Garda Síochána, 2018) and the HSE 
has 92 ambulance bases and 9 community health regions (HSE, 2018). Thus, regions 
of governance are mis-aligned making inter-agency coordination difficult as each 
agency is working within different scales and geographies. 
However, there is a suggestion within the Framework that inter-
agency coordination should be developed during everyday emergencies so that when 
a big event occurs the procedures, hierarchies, culture, processes and methods are 
already trialled and practised, but these emergencies are usually localised and small. 
Thus, there are few chances to assess how the jurisdictional governance issues may 
play out during a major emergency. For the facilitation of inter-agency coordination 
and the management of a major emergency the coordination centres have very 
specific and important functions such as communication, meeting and refreshment 
spaces. Any issues that arise during the activation of the Framework will be dealt 
with by the lead coordinator at a coordination centre. Coordination centres can be 
remote, as in specially developed coordination centre trucks, or in dedicated centres, 
such as the National Coordination Centre or in pre-assigned hotels or offices. 
There are several types of Coordination centres: On-Site 
Coordination, Local Coordination (Off-Site), Crisis Management Teams (CMT) and 
national (Figure 4.3). Figure 4.3 details which agencies are expected to be 
represented at each centre. However, it refers to local and national incidents and 
negates to recognise the regional scale, which is a consistent issue throughout the 
policy. However, the Framework does explain that if a local event is escalated up to 
a regional event that the “chair of the local co-ordination group can declare a 
regional emergency” (MEM, 2006: 62) where it is essential that a Regional 
Coordination Centre is opened. Depending on the situation this escalation can result 
in the closure of the Local Coordination Centre, or the regional and local centres can 
work in tandem with the local operating in an assistive capacity. The lead agency 
from the declared local event, who escalated it up will also be lead agency at the 
regional scale.  
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Figure 4.3: Command, Control and Co-ordination Levels and Information Flows  
 
Source: Delaney (2018) sourced from the Framework for Major Emergency 
Management (MEM, 2006: 57)11 
Although there is a lead agency, each PRA or auxiliary service still 
retains power, control and command over their own resources and operations. This is 
                                                          
11 Figure 4.3 acronyms - DCMNR: Department of Communications, Marine and Natural Resources; 
DFA: Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade; DoD: Department of Defence; DEHLG: Department of 
Heritage and Local Government (please note this is now known as Department of Heritage, Planning, 
and Local Government); DJELR: Department of Justice, Equality and Law Reform now known as the 
Department of Justice and Equality; DHC: Department of Health and Children, DAF: exact definition 
unknown but it is now referred to as the Department of Agriculture; AGS: An Garda Síochána; LA: 
Local Authority; HSE: Health Service Executive and CMT: Crisis Management Team.   
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important to note in relation to how assemblage theory is understood. The 
Framework supports Deleuze and Guattari’s idea that assemblages are fluid and 
borderless so that the coding practice creates efficient organisation but does not 
overpower the assemblage allowing for deterritorialization and reterritorialization to 
occur if and when necessary. These can occur because the Framework is an 
unlegislated policy document which encourages all agencies to create their own 
individual plans but determines that there is a hierarchy and networks of power when 
responding to a major event. It also ensures that each agency retains full operational 
power and control over their own resources and can oscillate within the assemblage 
both horizontally and vertically when required.  
4.5 IEMA - Regional Scale 
The next scale is the regional scale which is relatively 
underdeveloped in policy terms. For instance, the Framework only briefly touches on 
it as many of the procedures are the same as the local but cover a wider geographical 
space. The Republic of Ireland is split into eight pre-determined regions for the 
management of regional scale events (see Figure 4.4). A local event may be 
escalated up to the regional scale by the lead local co-ordinator if any of the 
following criteria are met: resource availability, “consequences” for the localities, 
crosses jurisdictional boundaries of either a “Local Authority or AGS”, or where 
several PRA’s converge (MEM, 2006:62). However, the main intention of the 
regional scale as suggested by the choice of language and sentence structure in the 
below quote is to ensure coordination across jurisdictional boundaries and minimise 
conflict between different local authorities and agencies which is difficult due to 
varying scales of governance 
“[…] the Framework requires that the principal response agencies, within 
defined regions, should work together to coordinate the inter-agency aspects 
of major emergency preparedness and management” (MEM, 2006: 35). 
The regional scale in organisation is more politically and policy-
driven than the local scale and has some similar groups as at the national scale. 
These groups at both scales are all striving towards similar goals cross-cut with the 
same people.  
Figure 4.4: Map of Major Emergency Management Regions 
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Source: MEM (2018) 
 
4.5.1 Regional Steering Group 
It is suggested within the Framework that the development of a 
Regional Steering Group is “in keeping with current practice” (MEM, 2006: 35) and 
is comprised of senior staff from the PRAs. The Principal Response agencies, as 
dictated in the Framework, are Local Authorities, AGS and HSE. The main role and 
responsibilities of the Regional Steering Group is to ensure that the objectives of the 
Framework are delivered and implemented across the eight regions, to create an 
“annual budget for […] regional preparedness” (MEM, 2006: 35), ensure a 
“development programme” is created for regional level response, “risk assessments” 
are conducted (MEM, 2006:35) that processes of mitigation at the regional scale are 
completed, regional level co-ordination and centres are developed, and that each 
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PRA’s plans are analysed and accepted. From this develops the Regional Working 
Group. To ensure inter-agency coordination the chair of the group, changes every 
year, to one of the PRA’s. 
4.5.2 Regional Working Group 
The main aim of this group is to support the implementation of 
major emergency management development at the regional scale. This is a very 
similar aim to that of the Regional Steering Group however, it is made up of “key 
personnel in the principal response agencies” with the chair reporting to the steering 
group (MEM, 2006:36). The language used to support the need for two groups is 
interesting. “Senior officials” (MEM, 2006:35) and “key personnel” (MEM, 2006: 
36) are very similar. The working group is not comprised of operational staff, rather 
both groups are comprised of personnel of higher ranks with perhaps the difference 
being that the staff in the regional working group may still have a few operational 
tasks. This became clear through my interviews with AGS. One of the participants 
has the rank of Inspector and sits on a Regional Working Group. Inspector is the 3rd 
rank from the bottom but based on the numbers employed in that position in 2015 in 
comparison to those both above and below it, it can be deemed that rank of Inspector 
is still very much a senior official (see Figure 4.5). Thus, the use of different terms of 
those working in each group may appear to provide a differentiation between the two 
groups, but it is staff from similar levels of authority occupying these spaces 
meaning that the knowledge shared is similar and does not account for lower ranking 
officers. 
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Figure 4.5: Rank and number of Garda in 2015 
 
Source: Horgan (2016) 
 
The Framework lacks depth in its exploration of the regional scale, 
so much so, that after just a few short paragraphs the discussion returns to the roles 
of both the working and steering group. The lack of explanation of the regional scale 
in the Framework, and the minimum discussion that occurred about it during 
interviews, suggests that it is a bureaucratic middle layer which is rarely activated. 
Basically, it maps onto no agency in terms of geography especially since there is a 
lack of regional government in Ireland. However, in terms of interagency 
coordination, it is an important element for the facilitation of training and for the 
development of both formal and informal networks.  
4.6 IEMA - National Scale 
The national scale is not informed by the Framework, but from 
different policy documents. Between 1984 and 2004, national emergency 
management was organised via a ‘Task Force for Emergency Planning’ and an 
‘Inter-Departmental Working Group on Emergency Planning’ (MEM, 2006 and 
O’Riordan, 1992). In 2004, these bodies implemented the ‘Strategic Emergency 
Planning Guidance” policy. The main aim of this policy was to create effective 
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emergency planning between the government and public agencies. The policy was 
noted by a participant as an iconic document which outlined the governance of 
emergency management from the national scale. However, in December 2017, the 
‘Strategic Emergency Management National Structure and Framework (SEMNSF, 
2017) was released by the Office of Emergency Planning to replace the 2004 policy.  
The Office of Emergency Planning (OEP) reports to the Minister 
for Defence and is responsible for the “coordination and oversight of emergency 
planning” in Ireland (European Commission, 2017). Upon a close reading of the 
document it speculatively appears as an updated version of the 2004 policy, although 
it is not referred to as such. Even so, I chose to use this policy instead of the 2004 
policy for two reasons. Firstly, it speaks to a foreseeable technologically-mediated 
future with changing methods of governance based upon algorithms and anticipation 
in a way that the 2004 policy could not envision. Secondly, it is clearer in its 
explanation of the organisation of emergency management in Ireland.  
4.6.1 Overview of the National IEMA Structure 
Figure 4.6 illustrates the verticality of the IEMA assemblage at the 
national scale, while also recognising aspects can be vertical and horizontal 
depending on the situation and the agencies involved. Although hierarchy is clear at 
this level, there is a symbiotic characteristic to this part of the assemblage. If one 
agency fails in their remit or does not coordinate with the other effectively, all 
elements both up and down the hierarchy are affected. By discussing each group 
separately, the blurring of scales within and between agencies and the power of the 
national versus local scale becomes clearer. All information was analysed from 
SEMNSF (2017) unless otherwise noted.  
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Figure 4.6: IEMA National scale organisation 
 
Source: adapted from information available in the SEMNSF (2017) 
4.6.2 Department of Defence 
The Department of Defence is interesting because at the ministerial 
level it is at the top of the hierarchy with only the Taoiseach’s Office12 preceding it 
in some cases. The Minister for Defence is the chief of the ‘Government Taskforce 
on Emergency Management’ (herein referred to as GTF). The highest specific 
emergency management entity. However, the displacement of the Defence Forces as 
one moves down the hierarchy creates an interesting observation on the network of 
power that systematically controls and shape the IEMA.  
                                                          
12 An Taoiseach’s Office is missing from the diagram because it does not have a role in decision 
making beyond being the national figurehead as stated in Chapter 2, Taoiseach Varadkar would be 
Agamben’s prime example of a sovereign leader.  
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As discussed in the local/agency section, the Defence Forces are an 
auxiliary service at the local scale and must be invited in by the lead agency or 
department. However, in a contradictory and ironic fashion, this invite usually goes 
through the Department of Defence.  
“So, if for instance any of these agencies [participant is referring to the 
PRA's] request assistance from the Defence Forces they will contact firstly 
the Department of Defence and if they need something immediately, if it was 
a severe weather crisis and they needed assistance immediately, the local 
authorities for instance would get in touch with the barracks that is closest to 
them. So, for instance, if there is a crisis in Kilkenny City, for example, the 
local authorities would contact Stephen's Barracks located in Kilkenny." 
(Participant ID22) 
This loss of power for the Defence Forces as they move down the 
scale from national to local and from department to operational is a clear example of 
disconnection between policy and mechanisms of governance and is evidence of 
power stripping. This is illustrates a messy power dynamic between the Department 
of Defence and the Defence Forces as it is clear that the Department of Defence have 
a major role at the national scale and are influential within the OEP while also 
having operational staff working within the office. There is no obvious explanation 
for this messy and obvious under-appreciation of the Defence Forces and yet, 
historically, Ireland's emergency management system continually requests their 
involvement during major emergencies.  
4.6.3 Government Task Force and the Sub-Groups 
This consists of all government departments, HSE, AGS, Defence 
Forces, as well as other state authorities such as the Office of Public Works (OPW) 
and the Revenue Commissioners (SEMNSF, 2017). The key role and responsibilities 
of this force include, but are not limited to:  
• Coordinating emergency management policy; 
• The “political leadership” (P. 6) for the IEMA assemblage as a whole; 
• Coordination across and down the assemblage; 
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• A space for government departments as well as agencies to share knowledge 
and best practices across and down the assemblage;  
• Specific sub-groups to deal with particular aspects of emergency 
management.  
The sub-groups consist of government departments, agencies, non-
governmental organisations, and private consultants or actors. Each sub-group is 
assigned a specific aspect or issue within emergency management that needs to be 
evaluated. An example of a sub-group is the National Steering Group on Major 
Emergency Management. 
4.6.4 The Department of Housing, Planning and Local Government 
The positioning of this department is contested. Some suggest that 
it should be aligned with the Department of Defence and others view it is a lead 
government department (LGD) and thus, like the Departments of Health and Justice 
and Equality its positioning is lower down the hierarchy. Based on the SEMNSF, I 
have positioned it at the same level as the GTF as it is the home of the Directorate of 
Fire and Emergency Management which chairs the National Steering Group. 
However, this is another complex element of the assemblage because the Department 
of Housing, Planning and Local Government (DoHPLG) is the lead government 
department which governs the local authorities who then subsequently govern the 
fire service.  
4.6.5 The Directorate of Fire and Emergency 
This was set up in 2009 to primarily support the fire service but its 
remit extends into the preparation, mitigation and management of major emergencies 
such as flooding in a coordinated manner with local authorities and government 
departments. As a result, the Directorate under the guise of the DoHPLG, chair the 
National Steering Group.  
4.6.6 The National Steering Group on Major Emergency Management 
This sub-group has authority over specific research regarding Irish 
Emergency Management as a whole. It facilitates the implementation, management 
and revision of the Framework for Major Emergency Management and feeds back up 
to the Inter-Departmental Working Group on Major Emergencies which is part of the 
Government Task Force.  
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4.6.7 Lead and other Government Departments and Government Information 
Service 
The 2004 Strategic Emergency Planning Guidance outlined the 
importance of assigning lead government departments and agencies. This has been 
continually re-iterated through policy and is a key anchor of the all-hazards 
approach. The LGD is assigned certain emergencies prior to an event occurring and 
the lead agency usually corresponds to the LGD. For instance, the Department of 
Health is the LGD for the HSE who manages the National Ambulance Service. The 
LGDs main role is to coordinate a national response. For instance, in the case of the 
Aussie Flu during Winter 2018, the Department of Health led the national campaign 
with the HSE acting as the mediator between government departments and General 
Practitioner services, hospitals and patients. Further, the LGD is responsible for “risk 
assessments, planning and preparedness, prevention, mitigation, response and 
recovery” (SEMNSF, 2017; 6). 
All Government Departments have a support function during 
emergencies. They can be called upon by the LGD to facilitate actions, provide 
personnel or resources or support functions. Further, they can be escalated up to the 
LGD as the event changes and requires different types of expertise. Further, the 
Government Information Service is linked with the LGD to ensure the maintenance 
and function of communications systems during an emergency.  
4.6.8 Office of Emergency Planning and the National Emergency 
Coordination Group 
The OEP is managed by the Department of Defence and supports 
the chair of the GTF. It has several functions:  
• It manages and operates the National Emergency Coordination Centre 
(NECC); 
• Provides support in “identifying capability gaps and informing capability 
development” (SEMNSF, 2017; 7); 
• It is a focal point for emergency management in Ireland; 
• It has the capabilities to provide training, education and advice to any 
government department or agency; 
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• “The OEP has the objective of improving and coordinating emergency 
planning and bringing the necessary cohesion to the emergency management-
related work of the various Departments and Agencies.” (SEMNSF, 2017; 7);  
• It also prepares the National Risk Assessment for Ireland (NRAI) with 
government departments following European Union (EU) guidelines. The 
NRAI "evaluates the natural, technological, civil and transportation risks" 
(SEMNSF, 2017; 7) that may face Ireland. It also ensures that our emergency 
management protocols comply with EU mandates regarding risk 
management. 
The National Emergency Coordination Group (NECG) is activated 
during a national event by the Office of Emergency Planning (OEP). During the first 
meeting, all members of the GTF are required to attend but thereafter, they only need 
to be present if it is deemed necessary. Sub-groups may develop from this to deal 
with specific aspects of the event. 
4.6.9 National Security Committee 
This is discussed in SEMNSF (2017) but does not seamlessly fit 
within the structure of the IEMA at the national scale. Thus, as in Figure 4.6, it is 
situated near the top of the hierarchy, but it is a stand-alone group. It is chaired by 
the Secretary-General of the Government and includes senior officials of the 
Department of Taoiseach, Justice and Equality, Foreign Affairs and Trade, Defence 
Forces and AGS. The reason for its stand-alone nature is that it is specifically 
concerned with security and involves the most senior of officials in Ireland. It is 
mobilised as a resource for emergencies if there is a security element. The next 
section will explore that national scale in terms of its power structures, position in 
the assemblage and relationship with the lower scales of the IEMA.  
4.7 Politics, Power and Position  
The role of politics, the effects of power and the position of 
agencies (i.e. PRA or auxiliary) within the IEMA can be identified and examined via 
the Framework and SEMSNF by questioning what is missing, who was involved, 
and language choices. These five assessments offer critical insights into how the 
policy informs the shape of the assemblage, leaves space for the assemblage to 
oscillate and contributes to inter-agency tensions making coordination more difficult. 
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Firstly, at the national scale, emergency representatives meet government officials. It 
is at this scale that we can trace back to a sovereign authority that has the power to 
act on the IEMA assemblage. There is a very clear sovereign power in the Taoiseach, 
but even he is informed by Department of Defence who have the skill set required to 
gather, analyse and disseminate information. Thus, in times of major emergency, the 
Taoiseach is a figurehead, a person to whom the public can turn to, respond to, and 
debate with. The Taoiseach's Office is a public sovereign in times of distress, but it is 
the Minister for Defence who makes the final decision or at least informs the 
Taoiseach of possible decisions regarding a situation. Thus, the highest powers are 
clear and important in the case of any national major emergencies. At present, there 
have only been a handful of major emergencies none of which could be classed as 
national.13 The true number is debated with key participants being unsure of what 
has been classed as a major emergency, what has invoked the activation of policy 
such as the Framework for Major Emergencies. As of yet, there have been major 
emergencies that are localised which require national input but rely mainly on local 
resources. There has been no major national spatially broad emergency, but Storm 
Ophelia was a close contender. The development of Ophelia suggests that Ireland 
has the potential of having a major weather event which will need a clear and 
understanding response from all scales of the IEMA assemblage.  
Secondly, the process of decision-making and policy-making that 
occurs for emergency management in Ireland leans towards the political powers 
while limiting the agencies inputs. The Framework instils this power division and 
muting of agencies. Figure 4.7 presents how policy decisions are made and are 
introduced into the service. It was noted that policy decisions went straight from the 
Department of Justice to AGS in a “structural manner” (Emergency Services 
Representative), thus allowing the Garda Commissioner and higher ranks to have 
more input into the direction of policy. This produces space for the sharing and 
acknowledgment of particular knowledges to be included in policy. For instance, the 
experiences of operational staff provide unique insights into the effectiveness of 
different response protocols. However, by creating conversations between the 
                                                          
13 Hurricane Ophelia and the Beast from the East, although assigned code reds and were national scale 
events, they were never actually declared a major national emergency. I have not been made privy to 
the reasons for not declaring them national emergencies.  
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operational and senior staff and the Department of Justice (DoJ), decision making, 
and policy formulation becomes a process created by the embodied sovereign 
authority, i.e. the DoJ, but influenced and dispersed by AGS. Further, as the policy 
moves from the DoJ directly to the agency that implements and acts upon the policy, 
there is a clearer understanding of it and a quicker sharing of information down 
through the ranks. Alternatively, the Fire Service and the National Ambulance 
Service are under middle agencies that “are bureaucracies who were never on the 
ground” (Emergency Services Representative). Policy directives and the decision-
making process remains firmly at the central government level, a true overt and 
powerful sovereign who dictates policy towards the middle agencies, who then direct 
the Fire Service and Ambulance Service. Thus, there is a “splintering effect within 
agencies which has an impact on major emergencies” (Emergency Services 
Representative). Simply, policy is written by policymakers who have never been in 
the service or worked on the ground, so the policy does not always accurately reflect 
the reality of the service and its mandates. This was illustrated by the fire service: “I 
suppose there is a weakness there on the clarity of the mandate that the fire service 
has in flooding.”  
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Figure 4.7: Hierarchy of emergency management decision-making and policy 
creation 
 
Source: Adapted from a participant’s rough sketch. 
 
                 Thirdly, as described, Irish emergency protocol has historically 
been written after an event. The Framework attempts to create pre-emptive planning, 
however, it does so without actually making any of the key agencies change how 
they approach different crises due to it being unlegislated. This resists rocking the 
‘proverbial boat’ by legislating a Framework that could provide a more stable and 
coordinated response system through formalised inter-agency relations and the 
breaking down of the antecedent silos. Examples include silo driven government 
departments, which are a key barrier to the development of a CMaERA in Ireland. 
This is evident during the early years of emergency planning between the 
Department of Health and the Department of the Environment (O’Riordan, 1992 and 
McMullan, 2010) as discussed. However, the problem still prevails today, with the 
Civil Defence frustrated with agencies rarely coordinating with each other.   
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“One of the issues I think that you should look at in your conclusion, one of 
the problems with the MEM is it is under the Department of Environment [it 
is now under the Department of Housing, Planning, Community and Local 
Government] and they don't talk to us.” 
While, a key emergency management policy writer recognised that 
the silo shape of the IEMA restricts information flow and that the effective 
organisation and use of resources is weakened due to each agency wanting 
independency. While another representative suggests that the reluctance to de-silo 
comes from an innate will to be “in charge”.  
“I suppose looking generally at the government departments and you used the 
term silo there a while ago, if your parent agency or your parent boss is your 
government department you see issues of this, and they are across in the 
papers that they have issues of knowing what the other government 
department are doing. So, if that is at the very top it is very difficult to drip 
feed down to the bottom of sharing that type of information. […] So, I think 
there will always be siloes until we break out, until you have the three 
agencies responding, and I suppose the perfect example of the silo is one of 
the deficits in Ireland is the three control centres should be in one building” 
(Participant ID31). 
“The culture there is we own, we are, coordination isn't a word that they 
would be familiar with. In charge is the word they use; they are in charge. 
And I say this about my own service, I have great difficulty with this about 
our own service” (Participant ID26). 
Interestingly, within these silo agencies it is expected that media 
representatives will work together to ensure that the same information is shared from 
each agency to the general public but as identified by participant ID19 this does not 
occur.  
“Again, you had the three response agencies got into a room with each of 
their spokespersons for the press conference and they were very, very siloed. 
They talked about this particular Q&A list, about what was happening in 
their area. What they forgot to do in all of that was, the media liaison officers 
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that is, was to liaise with the other media liaison officers in the other two 
agencies to make sure that nothing they were saying was going to undermine 
or cast a bad light on what the other two agencies were doing”.  
So, it is recognised by a range of participants that the silo 
institutional form of the IEMA still exists and is problematic but is there a way of 
breaking down these barriers and overcoming these issues? This idea will be 
explored in Chapter 7 but for now Participant ID32 is working carefully in Cork to 
try and do just this as he argues that 
“It doesn't happen overnight; you have to work. But what happens to break 
down those silos and barriers between the different agencies and change the 
culture of the organisations is the training and working together. We do the 
centre agency training and that is when the different agencies come together 
and train and get to know each other and that is very beneficial”.  
Fourthly, the writing of the Framework was geographically 
exclusive as the members of the Review Working Group, who revised the 1984 
Framework, consisted of the Department of Environment, Heritage and Local 
Government as it was then known, the HSE, AGS, Limerick County Council, South 
Tipperary County Council, and Cork County Council (MEM, 2006). This group had 
no representation for a number of agencies, nor did the representatives speak for a 
range of regions in Ireland including cities.  
Comfort and Kapucu (2006) propose that urban areas have specific 
issues due to the complex, multi-faceted systems that create and sustain cities. Thus, 
emergency management protocol should reflect the complexity of urban areas. 
Therefore, the Framework’s standardisation of protocol does not reflect that the 
Emergency Management System in cities are responding in a much more diverse 
area, have many more actors and systems to deal with, but also may have more 
resources than rural areas. Further, as the Framework promotes inter-agency 
coordination, but only confers with certain agencies and regions, it ignores aspects of 
services such as the number of employees. In small towns, such as in the areas 
represented by the councils in the working group, it is easier to form more stable 
formal relations between agencies reducing tensions between them because the 
number employed is less than in cities with multiple stations and thousands of first 
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responders. Therefore, cities find it harder to form formal relationships between 
agency staff, resulting in increased tensions as there are no strong inter-agency 
working relationships.  
“I would think... I have worked in three parts for the ambulance service, I 
have worked in the West, Dublin North Leinster and the South, those three 
different areas so you would notice where there is relationships built up. 
There is a better inter relationship dynamic there in the west where maybe 
there isn’t a lot of change of personnel but because of the hours there is a lot 
of change of personnel, so it doesn't have that same community 
relationships.” [This was a difficult quote to hear, my notes suggest he was 
referring to Dublin for the latter half. (Participant ID16) (Adapted and edited 
from the personal experience of a first responder). 
When this issue was raised with one of the writers of the 
Framework their answer was political in the sense that, they recognised the issue but 
were also able to adequately defend it. They also accepted that not all were happy 
with the consultation process.  
“That is a fair question, looking at the people who are involved in it. You are 
talking about the working group and the steering group and whoever might 
have been involved. Different people have been mandated by virtue of the 
position that they held but there was a huge consultation exercise went on as 
part of that so every organisation that was referenced there, particularly the 
voluntary sector at the time, I recall a huge effort went into the consultation 
process with them. […] What we did... You met groups of people everywhere 
and we had had a lot of experience before that and we listened to what we 
heard. In fact, I would counter your point, this is a very interesting point you 
raised though, I would say that there was a number of things that really 
influenced us in writing up that document. One was the progress being made 
in the south region, they had set themselves up as a region, the old health 
board region, and they were well advanced. So, in effect what the Framework 
did was take a lot of the good ideas that were out there and brought them 
forward. There was a second piece that came from the Midland health board 
area […]. There was a lot of things happening in the Midland health board 
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region, there was a midland major emergency group and a lot of the ideas 
that are in the Framework, in fact, emerged from work that was done down 
there. So, while I might have been the vehicle and this pen might have been 
the vehicle to actually convert it into paper, I would argue very strongly in 
fact that it was capturing what had gone on out there in terms of good stuff, 
in terms of good practice. And the driver for it at the time was the old 1984 
Framework which had been in place. If you went to stuff, and I did go, I went 
to exercises and things outside, people didn't know of that, hadn't heard of it, 
so this was part of a big campaign, I attended exercises where people were 
reinventing wheels. They had no idea that there was a Framework within 
which they should have been operating, so it was within that context the 
piece was written. So, for your geographic perspective, now it is an 
interesting point, I had never viewed it like that. Not everyone was happy 
with all the consultation piece within it but that happens.”  
The process undertaken for the formation of the new Framework 
resulted in the emerging consequences of institutionalisation as each agency had 
their own idea as to how the Framework should be written and operationalised, 
which suited or prioritised their own agency culture. This inter-agency conflict 
merged with the obvious geographical exclusions created a policy document which 
remained unlegislated but the cornerstone of emergency management in Ireland. 
This decision to paint over inter-agency conflict rather than refer to it in the policy or 
provide a means for compromise ensures that each agency can internalise and use the 
Framework as they see fit following Agamben’s idea of sovereign control through 
providential will. This proves problematic when the IEMA is activated and each 
agency uses or does not use the Framework in different ways. 
Finally, in Chapter 1, there is a limited overview of language 
choices that I now wish to deepen with regard to their usage in an actual policy 
document as it provides key insights into some of the practices and processes of the 
IEMA which, at times, contribute to the re-shaping of the IEMA. Choosing to use 
the term ‘emergency’ is somewhat political in that it encourages the emergency 
services to use it as they can identify with it. The use of emergency makes a 
connection with their name, intentions and services. Further, the term emergency is 
simultaneously a term of crisis and hope, a vehicle for action and change and a 
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mechanism of governing and response. It is often a catalyst in our evolution towards 
resiliency which is a key concept in the Framework which also pushes for re-
evaluation of events to ensure issues are continually solved and positive initiatives 
are built upon, event after event. Thus, choosing to use emergency is attractive to the 
key agencies but it is one that allows space for learning, rebuilding, retraining and 
resilience and capacity building. However, choosing to use the term ‘major’ signifies 
that the Framework is for those rare events that could be akin to a crisis or disaster. 
The Framework defines a major emergency as  
“any event which, usually with little or no warning, causes or threatens death 
or injury, serious disruption of essential services or damage to property, the 
environment or infrastructure beyond the normal capabilities of the principal 
emergency services in the area in which the event occurs, and requires the 
activation of specific additional procedures and the mobilisation of additional 
resources to ensure an effective, co-ordinated response” (MEM, 2006:15) 
By adding the term ‘major’ to ‘emergency’ the event is associated 
with often deadlier crises or disasters in comparison to normal emergencies which 
occur daily and are disruptive but manageable. However, the term crisis is used 
within the Framework in reference to a particular group of teams called the Crisis 
Management Teams which are a “strategic level management group” located in each 
PRA and run by the senior team. The main intention of this group is to provide 
assistance to their “PRA representative at the Local Co-ordination Group, their COO 
on site and maintain the agency’s normal day-to-day services” (MEM, 2006; 62). 
Thus, the use of crisis here is used to acknowledge that extra support is needed and 
that there needs to be a team in place to ensure that the agency remains active outside 
of the emergency and yet, choosing the term ‘crisis’ and ‘management’ seem 
misplaced because this team is a support network responding to a major emergency. 
Thus, there is a lack of consistency within the Framework on what terminology 
should be used and what they actually mean in terms of Irish Emergency 
Management.  
This proved even more problematic when the term disaster was 
analysed. Throughout, the entire Framework it was used seven times, once as part of 
an explanation of a Figure, once as part of the principles of emergency management 
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and once in a footnote describing the Air India Disaster. However, the other four 
times within the body of the Framework and in the Minister’s preface it is used in 
connection with the general public.  
This is quite revealing with regards to social expectation, the 
beliefs of the agencies and the power of this group but also the choice to use disaster 
when discussing the public has specific consequences linguistically. Below are the 
ways it is used: 
• “It is generally acknowledged that the public are most receptive to safety 
messages in the immediate aftermath of a disaster” (MEM, 2006:30). 
• “In many emergency situations, the public respond to assist friends, 
neighbours and even complete strangers when disaster strikes” (MEM, 
2006:75). 
• “It is recognised that communities that are empowered to be part of the 
response to a disaster, rather than allowing themselves to be simply victims 
of it, are more likely to recover and to restore normality quickly, with fewer 
long-term consequences” (MEM, 2006:75/76) 
• “It is through this continuous process and through regularly carrying out 
exercises to test the plans that we can be sure that we are as prepared as 
possible to protect the public should disaster strike” (MEM, 2006:9). 
The key elements of the quotes have been highlighted to explain 
the power, societal expectations and linguistic consequences. The overarching theme 
within these quotes is the patronizing tone in respect to the public with undefended 
terms such as: "it is generally acknowledged that the public are most receptive," or 
"rather than allowing themselves to be simply victims". It is this tone that stems from 
the knowledge aspect of power allowing the Framework to be presented as a 
document for those with experience and presents the public as unsure how to deal 
with these situations. The language should recognise that communities and citizens 
are often more aware of these situations then acknowledged and that they can offer 
local expertise and knowledge that the IEMA agencies do not have.  
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“It’s going take all the skills that we have got and let’s utilise them for our 
own community and that is why the community is vital in that”. (Participant 
ID02) 
“Because we acknowledge that just like the support has to be both ways, we 
need to support community and we need to support agencies, we need to have 
a partnership because when a flood happens, or a disaster happens, if you 
already have a partnership in place and you know what your expectations are, 
and you know your strengths and weaknesses and where we can pull 
resources. Obviously, a community can be much more prepared in that 
sense”. (Participant IDI) 
Thus, by choosing to use the term ‘disaster’ as opposed to 
‘emergency’ there is a suggestion that the IEMA may deem the event an emergency 
but to the general public, it's a disaster or at least that is how it will be viewed. The 
language is forceful and violent, "disaster strike", and implies fear and abnormality. 
Further, in media discourses, the words ‘disaster’, ‘emergency’ or ‘crisis’ are rarely 
used, so there is little reasoning why when discussing the public that the term 
changes to disaster over emergency except if it is to denote power on the IEMA side 
and an expectation that the general public are ‘dramatic’ due to misguided 
understandings of emergencies. Linguistically, this creates a you/them dichotomy 
with the IEMA being the authority figure and the general public being “docile 
citizens” to borrow the term from Foucault, (1977/78). This creates two distinct 
groups, the IEMA with the knowledge and experience while, the general public is 
perceived to be unknowledgeable and in need of guidance from the IEMA grouping. 
Further, language informs and enforces the decision-making 
process. In the Framework, the language used to illustrate the different decision-
making processes is particularly confusing to an outsider or someone unfamiliar with 
the broader emergency management plans. For instance, the sentence structure and 
choice of words in the following opening sentence of the decision-making section of 
the Framework have been chosen carefully, but also inclusively for those with 
experience and who have certain levels of power, as the terminology insists on a 
form of shared knowledge between the close-knit top-scale group to be fully 
understood.  
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“Mandates, in the context of a major emergency response, establish the 
envelopes of empowered activity and decision-making to be expected, 
without references to higher authority.” (MEM, 2006: 59). 
 Words such as “mandate”, “envelopes” [in this context] and 
“higher authority” all reveal the thinking of those who developed the Framework and 
represents the clear structures of power and hierarchy, but also the importance for 
shared power and a flatter approach during emergencies. For instance, referring to "a 
higher authority" is almost akin to the theological sense of God. This is supported by 
Agamben’s theological grounding of how power works in relation to a sovereign 
authority (Agamben, 1991; 1998; 2003). Thus, by analysing key terms such as 
“higher authority” it creates the illusion of a sovereign power with ultimate control. 
Regarding terms like “mandates” and “envelopes”; no clear definition of either is 
provided in the Framework.  
The power of the word ‘mandate’ is interesting as it is a word of 
power or control. It can be defined as "an official order or commission to do 
something" (Oxford English Dictionary Online, checked 28/2/18). Thus, using the 
term mandate is in direct contradiction with the unlegislated nature of the 
Framework. Although all agencies do use the Framework and do cooperate with the 
suggested procedures and policy development, it is still just an advisory document 
rather than an authoritative Framework. By choosing to use a power-charged word 
such as mandate within this context there is a shift towards control and a re-
enforcement of governance procedures. The Framework argues that "the purpose of 
these mandates is to make explicit the decisions that need to be made at the various 
levels and to define how decisions are to be arrived at quickly" (MEM, 2006: 59). 
Thus, there is a sense of urgency within their defence of the use of mandates, but it is 
also presenting a fear that without these mandates, decision making between 
agencies would be difficult or contested. 
The final word choice of “envelopes” is the key reason for the 
sentence being confusing and needs dissecting to reach the actual meaning behind it. 
However, this research suggests that the term “envelope” is actually a very important 
choice as it suggests a covering or structure that protects something valuable. Thus, 
using it in this way creates a subtle defence for the use of “mandates”. It suggests 
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that by using these decision-making mandates we are enveloping or protecting the 
emergency management structure to ensure that inter-agency coordination is 
effective, fast and efficient. Thus, suggesting that procedures for inter-agency 
coordination and the positive outlook on their ability to coordinate as an IEMA 
assemblage is actually a little superficial as the real aspects of inter-agency 
coordination such as decision-making processes are mandated and enveloped rather 
than advised as with the rest of the Framework.  
Essentially, my critique suggests that there should be different 
words used that are not as power-centric or as hierarchically dividing as they are 
guiding documents, not legislative. They offer suggestions on how to respond and 
organise as an assemblage during an event but there are no legal ramifications for not 
following these documents. However, all of this is best practice policy but what 
actually happens during a major weather event? There is specific in-depth guidance 
for flooding which corresponds with the Framework and SEMNSF which will help 
to illustrate the proposed policy shape of the IEMA during an activation. 
4.8 Case study of the Flood Guidance Protocol 
Due to the complexities and inter-scalar issues across the two 
anchor policy documents, it was difficult to fully reveal how the IEMA re-shapes 
between policy and activation. Thus, here I provide a short overview of the 2013 
Guidance Document on managing flood events before delving into an actual event to 
demonstrate the different IEMA shapes in relation to one type of incident rather than 
in general. The Flood Guidance Protocol was produced by the Major Emergency 
Management team to work alongside the Framework. It is a detailed guidance 
document which, in line with the Strategic Emergency Planning Document and 
Framework, assigns local authorities as the lead agency for a flood event. However, 
each PRA has a range of roles and responsibilities before, during and after a flood 
event which this document outlines. For instance, AGS has responsibility around 
traffic control and the HSE are assigned to deal with any health risks that may 
develop and are critical in the implementation of evacuation centres. It requests that 
each PRA has a specific flood emergency plan tailored to their own locality and the 
development of a flood working group with representatives from the PRA’s, 
voluntary and private sectors. Further, it illustrates the scalar structure of the IEMA 
during flood events.  
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Figure 4.8: Flood scales 
 
Source: MEM (2013) 
 
As detailed in Figure 4.8, the Local Authority as the lead agency 
carries out the impact assessment and decides the response level depending upon the 
information received from Met Éireann, the ESB, and Waterways Ireland or from the 
telemetric early warning system. Taking in all the available information, and 
consulting with members from other Local Authority departments (i.e. the fire 
department, gully department, and media) they choose the appropriate response 
level.  
Level 1 response is a need to monitor the situation. In this case, the 
other two PRA's are not involved. If it escalates to a level 2 situation, the event is 
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seen as severe and may require routine response from operational sectors of the 
Local Authority (i.e., gully clearing, etc). It is at this stage that the media and other 
PRA's are informed about a potential situation and the public is alerted to possible 
flooding. 
At level 3 the event will probably cause damage and could affect 
the normal delivery of PRA services, but it is not a major emergency. Usually, at this 
stage, it is still deemed localised flooding but at a wider scale – it is not a regional or 
national event. However, the engineer on call within the Local Authority will alert 
the FLAG (Flood Action Group) team, which involves 20 different agencies and the 
setting up of a local coordination centre.  
At Level 4 the Major Emergency Plan is activated and the Crisis 
Management Team is convened. Further, the management of the event is transferred 
from the Local Authority (who usually will remain the lead in the local coordination 
centre’s around Ireland), to the Department of Environment, Community and Local 
Government representing an inter-scalar re-shaping of relationships, power 
structures, governance and scales.  
This is a straightforward process. However, flood events are not 
controllable and so they can often be localised but widespread creating difficulties on 
when to escalate from level 3 to level 4. When this occurs, the Department of 
Environment and the Office of Emergency Planning may consult with the Minister 
for Defence who is the Chairman of the Government Taskforce on Emergency 
Planning to make the final decision. In severe cases, the decision to declare a 
national emergency may even go as far as the Taoiseach. So, how did this policy 
translate to the winter storms and flooding events of 2015/2016? 
4.9 Case study 1: Winter Storms and Flooding Events 2015/2016 
Winter 2015/2016 involved nine storms between November 12th, 
2015 and March 2nd, 2016. This is compared to winter 2016/2017 which had five 
storms between November 19th, 2016 and March 3rd, 2017. McGrath (2016) argues 
using, historical storm data that the island of Ireland can expect an average of four 
stormy winters every 10 years thus, making winter 2015/2016 unexceptional. Even 
so, November 2015 had an average rainfall of 130%-190%, with Storm Abigail (the 
first in the new storm naming system (DoHPLG, 2016 and NBC, 2015) passing 
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north of Ireland between November 12th and 13th. This was closely followed by 
Storm Barney between November 16th and 18th. The strength of this storm is 
evident in Figure 4.9 with the highest November gust ever recorded at Shannon 
Airport (DoHPLG, 2016 and McGrath, 2016). Storm Clodagh occurred at the end of 
November and brought an end to the third warmest November since 1900. 
November had 14 days of gusts greater than 50 km/h, with many places recording 
twice their November average rainfall (DoHPLG, 2016 and McGrath, 2016).  
Figure 4.9: Shannon airport, November 2015 
 
Source: McGrath (2016: np). 
 
December 2015 proved to be the wettest since 1850 with Storm 
Desmond occurring between the 3rd and 8th bringing days of intense rain with up to 
36 hours of rainfall in some places (DoHPLG, 2016 and McGrath, 2016). The 
intensity and longevity of the storm was because it was slow-moving and formed due 
to a “mild and moist air mass” (DoHPLG, 2016:15). December 12th was another 
heavy rain day followed by a relatively normal few days until December 20th when 
there was significant rainfall from the 21st until the 26th (McGrath, 2016). In the 
middle of this rainfall, on December 23rd, Storm Eva occurred. Then between 
December 28th and 30th, Storm Frank resulted in more heavy rain and “mean 
sustained winds of 35 knots” (McGrath, 2016: np). This culminated in “five weather 
stations recording new monthly accumulation records” of “943mm” from the 
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previously held record of “790mm” (McGrath, 2016: np). It also proved to be the 
warmest December since 1855 (DoHPLG, 2016 and McGrath, 2016).  
“January was the wettest in the last 20-40 years with half of the 
total rainfall for the month falling in two days (5th and 9th). However, due to a spell 
of colder and drier weather, the middle half of the month, was relatively dry until 
Storm Gertrude hit on the 29th with mean sustained winds of 53 knots with gusts of 
up to 70” (DoHPLG, 2016:17 and McGrath, 2016: np). The first half of February 
brought Storm Imogen on the 7th with sustained winds of 54 knots (McGrath, 2016: 
np). The season ended with the windstorm Jake on March 2nd (DoHPLG, 2016 and 
McGrath, 2016). 
4.9.1 Flooding 
Although McGrath (2016) suggests that winter 2015/2016 was not 
an exceptionally stormy season, the Department of Housing, Planning and Local 
Government in their ‘Report on Flooding’ (DoHPLG, 2016) argue that it was 
exceptional as it broke several rainfall records and led to severe flooding 
countrywide see Figures 4.10, 4.11 and 4.12.   
Figure 4.10: Flooding in Lahinch, Co Clare 
 
Source: McGrath (2016: np) 
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Figure 4.11: Aerial view of the outskirts of Athlone 
 
Source: McGrath (2016: np) 
 
Figure 4.12: Flooding in Kilkenny City 
 
Source: McGrath (2016: np) 
 
It was believed by many that this was the worst flooding on record, 
so Met Éireann tested this hypothesis through a “reference of 75 water level gauges 
which were chosen due to the quality of data available” ((DoHPLG, 2016:21). The 
study concluded that the flooding was worse than the 2009 season and thus, the 
worst on record as “37 of the gauges recorded their highest, 23 recorded their second 
highest and 12 recorded their third highest meaning that 72 of the 75 gauges 
recorded extreme levels” (DoHPLG, 2016:21/23 and McGrath, 2016: np).  
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Storms Abigail, Desmond and Frank were the most significant for 
flooding, with the largest flood events occurring between the 6th and 13th of 
December and the 29th December and 5th January, with the “first flood event 
registered on November 15th” (DoHPLG, 2016:69 and McGrath, 2016: np). This 
resulted in the country being in a state of flood emergency for two months, with 
flood events being widespread (see Figure 4.13). 
Figure 4.13: Spatial Distribution of the winter 2015/2016 flood events 
 
Source: DoHPLG (2016: 23) 
 
4.10 Inter-agency Coordination during the Winter Storm Events 
Up until December 3rd, response remained at the local scale with 
local authorities acting as the lead response agency and coordinating with the other 
PRA's. From the 3rd of December onwards, the National Coordination Group 
convened and remained in-situ from December 7th until January 13th inclusively. 
Legend:    Highest flood on record  Second highest         Third  highest   
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No major emergency was declared, but the severe weather protocols of each PRA 
and the state were activated including the ‘Flood Guidance Document”. The 
response was multi-scalar and was deemed an all-government response (DoHPLG, 
2016). The departments and agencies represented at the governmental level and in 
the National Emergency Coordination Group for severe weather can be seen in 
Figure 4.3 on page x, this re-illustrates what the national scale assemblage looks like 
based on policy, but the ‘Report on Flooding’ (DoHPLG, 2016) provides a list of the 
departments and subsequent agencies who actually sat in the National Emergency 
Coordination Group (NECG) meetings during the winter storms. This illustrates a 
much more pro-active and inclusive assemblage with a clear re-shaping of the 
assemblage and more dynamic power networks (see Figure 4.14). 
For instance, all government departments (noted as the names they 
operated under in 2015 and 2016) were represented, with key departments also 
having representatives from the agencies they govern. This is particularly interesting 
as these agencies have a mix of local, regional and national scales and their 
representation in the NECG allowed for the smooth transfer of information from the 
local up to the national scale. This blurring of scales is important because as noted in 
both the Framework (MEM, 2006) and the ‘Report on Flooding” (DoHPLG, 2016) 
and generally, within emergency management theory (Haddow et al, 2016), it is 
essential to recognise the need for various scales of response within command, 
control and coordination activities. However, these structures are already operating 
within specific agencies which then need to be retained but also re-shaped when 
coordinating across agencies and jurisdictions to ensure an effective response. In 
terms of this event, it was particularly crucial that all response scales were able to 
operate effectively and quickly because the flooding was national in that it covered 
almost every county as seen in Table 4.2 and 28 local authorities claimed for 
“exceptional costs” from the Department of Housing, Planning, Community and 
Local Government (2016:58). However, the event was also local as it affected very 
specific parts of counties see Table 4.2. Thus, the local response was critical in the 
key areas of emergency management from preparedness, mitigation, response and 
recovery. Due to it being a protracted event the Defence Forces, the voluntary sector 
and the community became critical aspects in the local emergency management 
assemblage with the ‘Report on Flooding’ (DoHPLG, 2016:49) stating in detail the 
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need to broaden and clarify the role of the volunteer sector and "community 
volunteer". This was because the quick and coordinated response, resilience and 
community spirit helped to ensure that fewer houses and businesses were affected by 
these storms than had been by the 2009 storms even though the water levels were 
higher this time.  
Table 4.2: Flooded Locations with Date of Initial Reports of Flooding 
Location of Flooding  County  Date of Initial Reports of 
Flooding  
Bandon  Cork  05/12/2015 and 
30/12/2015  
Athlone  Westmeath  05/12/2015  
Crossmolina  Mayo  05/12/2015  
Castlefinn  Donegal  05/12/2015  
Ballybofey  Donegal  05/12/2015  
Ballinasloe  Galway  05/12/2015 and 
05/01/2016  
Claregalway  Galway  05/12/2015  
Portumna  Galway  05/12/2015  
Ennis  Clare  05/12/2015  
Feakle  Clare  05/12/2015  
Killarney  Kerry  05/12/2015  
Athleague  Roscommon  06/12/2015  
Craughwell  Galway  06/12/2015  
Galway City  Galway  06/12/2015 and 
02/01/2016  
Foxford  Mayo  07/12/2015  
Monaghan  Monaghan  07/12/2015  
Montpelier  Limerick  09/12/2015 and 
05/01/2016  
Castleconnell  Limerick  09/12/2015  
Annacotty  Limerick  13/12/2015  
Corbally  Limerick  13/12/2015  
Shannonbridge  Offaly  15/12/2015  
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Carrick-on-`     
Shannon  
Leitrim  16/12/2015  
Springfield  Clare  28/12/2015  
Dundalk  Louth  28/12/2015  
Graiguenamanagh  Kilkenny  29/12/2015  
Thomastown  Kilkenny  29/12/2015  
Inistioge  Kilkenny  29/12/2015  
Clonmel  Tipperary  29/12/2015  
Midleton  Cork  29/12/2015  
Fermoy  Cork  30/12/2015  
Mallow  Cork  30/12/2015  
Enniscorthy  Wexford  30/12/2015  
Cavan  Cavan  28/12/2015  
Source: DoHPLG (2016: 25/26). 
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Figure 4.14: Departments and agencies who attended the National Emergency 
Coordination Group for winter storms 2015/2016 
 
Source: Figure information retained from the ‘Report on Flooding’ (DoHPLG, 
2016). 
 
So, how does this collaborative inter-scaler, inter-agency and inter-
jurisdictional coordination re-shape the assemblage and the power networks that 
allow it to function on a day-to-day basis? There is a specific policy shape to the 
IEMA, but it cannot adequately describe how these departments, agencies and 
groups will re-shape and operate during a major emergency. Reports written after 
major events are critical for gaining insight into how these assemblages actually 
work and respond and for development of lessons which can inform new 
relationships, power dynamics and destruct and re-develop an assemblage or part of 
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it. The ‘Report on Flooding’ (DoHPLG, 2016) provided insights into six ways in 
which the coordinating aspect of the flood events re-shaped the assemblage and 
changed how the power within it operates.  
Firstly, the shape of the assemblage as illustrated is policy-based 
and conforms to everyday workings, meetings, policy and report generation. It does 
not represent the actual assemblage formation in response to major emergencies. The 
shape of the assemblage changes as the IEMA shifts from a primarily covert and 
policy generating assemblage (not including the first responder agencies which are 
active on a daily basis) to a response agency in light of a major emergency such as 
the flood events. This shift is the catalyst for the oscillation of the assemblage where 
it moves from being hierarchical towards flatter with some agencies or aspects of the 
assemblage still operating within the messy middle. This is critical for understanding 
power. In its everyday shape, power is structured and controlled with very clear 
networks, sovereign authorities and decision makers. However, as the assemblage is 
actioned for a response, power becomes more dispersed, splintered, bounces and 
encapsulates Foucault’s understanding of power is everywhere. Each agency retains 
its internal structures of command and control, but then must fit within a broader 
response system using its own structures, while power is splintered between agencies 
and departments resulting in power bouncing between agencies with specific 
skillsets. 
Secondly, the use of a single response room for the National 
Emergency Coordination Group is superficial for the ease of information sharing and 
effective decision making. On a more critical level, it changes how the departments 
and agencies interact as it re-shapes the assemblage from being in a hierarchical 
pyramid structure with very clear levels of authority and straight-forward power 
networks and sovereign authorities to a flatter shape where the government 
departments are all on the same level with no obvious structural hierarchy between 
them except for the acknowledgement that the lead government department should 
be, and was, the Department of Housing, Planning, and Local Government. 
However, the Department of Taoiseach and the Department of Defence are both 
present and in the policy are the highest authority over emergency management, so 
there is a conflict or tension between the power dynamics of these departments on 
who is the final decision maker. This then shifts the assemblage back into a messy 
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middle position where, depending on the situation and the people present, the current 
Taoiseach and Ministers, affects how these departments actually work together with 
a defined lead agency, but also within a clear statutory hierarchy. This relates to the 
idea of imagined assemblages, where people can know their role and responsibilities, 
but due to perceived power and hierarchy defer to those above them thus re-creating 
the assemblage as one that is deflective of policy and reflective of Foucault’s idea of 
the subject, social discipline and authority.  
This departmental relationship, combined with the presence of 
agencies parented by other departments, also re-creates the power structures of the 
assemblage. The senior officials of these agencies are representative of the 
operational staff on the ground and engage with their department as well as with 
other agencies and departments. However, as the gatekeepers of local information, 
there is a splintering of power and an illustration of how power bounces. Power is 
splintered as the parent authoritative departments rely on the agencies to provide 
real-time information on the emergency, staff and resources, issues and anything else 
pertinent to the response or recovery stages. However, this power is further 
splintered as it moves from the NECG to the local scale where the local coordination 
centres capture the information and choose what is necessary to share upwards. 
Power bounces between the departments at the national scale and at the local scale 
based on the most critical threat or issue at that point. Although the Department of 
Housing, Planning, and Local Government and the relevant Local Authority are the 
lead for flood events when issues around health or welfare arise the lead agency may 
shift to the Department of Health and HSE as described by participant ID05 from the 
HSE.  
“There is a formal handover at that time and you may find, we will just say 
for instance and this would be an extreme example, following a flooding you 
will always have flood waters, you will have problems with infestations, 
biological threats but if it was deemed that that threat was the worst then the 
HSE might take the lead at that point”. 
Thirdly, the positioning of the Civil Defence during the winter 
events as an agency of the Department of Defence is crucial for understating the 
often-blurred lines and positioning of agencies in the assemblage. The Civil Defence 
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is under the authority of both the Department of Defence and the Department of 
Housing, Planning and Local Government and at the local level provides its services 
under the relevant Local Authority (Civil Defence Strategic Plan, 2010). Thus, 
during the winter storms, the governance of the Civil Defence was messy as their 
position in the assemblage was constantly oscillating between being structured in a 
formal hierarchy when directly commanded by the Department of Defence and 
becoming flatter in structure when they were operating at local scales after being 
requested by relevant local authorities (DoHPLG report, 2016). This oscillation and 
messy re-position of the Civil Defence emanates due to tensions between the Civil 
Defence and the DoHPLG “one of the problems with the MEM is it is under the 
Department of Environment and they don't talk to use” (Participant ID14). Further, 
the power dynamic the Civil Defence has within the broader assemblage, ensures 
that its position, however fluid, is retained within the assemblage at national scale as 
it is the only voluntary agency who was invited to attend the NECG during these 
storms.  
Fourthly, no national emergency was declared and yet the national 
structure for responding to severe weather events was activated while keeping the 
majority of power and responsibility at the local scale. This is where the scaling of 
events and the procedures become unclear within Irish policy and illustrate a covert 
sovereign authority. The local or regional scale in Ireland can request the declaration 
of a national emergency, but as with the 2015/2016 storms and preceding and 
subsequent events, the national scale can self-establish which is akin to the ideas of 
‘oikonomia’ because the “King rules but does not govern”. At the national scale they 
receive and amalgamate information, organise resources and provide guidance and 
support, but the responsibility remains at the local scale where they have a 
providential will regarding the level at which they will engage with the national 
scale, the Framework or coordinate with other local agencies. Thus, power is 
splintered and dispersed across the PRA’s and, in particular, the local authorities as 
the lead agencies activate their own plans and ensure that all needs are met (Gordon, 
1972 and Sennellart et al, 2007).  
Fifthly, with providential will comes the ability to retain control 
over the activation of agencies and their resources as illustrated by the ‘Report on 
Flooding’ (DoHPLG, 2016) which discussed that the Defence Forces were 
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introduced to the response through an invite by the relevant local authorities and the 
LGD. However, prior to these events, a letter was distributed to all local authorities 
by the Defence Forces outlining how exactly the Defence Forces and their resources 
could be deployed, thus creating a strict boundary of operations. Post the 2015/2016 
storms, the Defences Forces developed these boundaries further reflecting upon their 
role during the flood events where they deployed “3488 personnel, 626 vehicles and 
10 helicopter flights” (DoHPLG, 2016:47) as illustrated by the following 
conversation with participant ID22. 
ID22:“No, we conducted a post-event review following the severe flooding 
during winter 2015 and early 2016 and we held a civil authority conference, 
it was an internal conference. I suppose we released the updated directional 
review earlier in the year and we looked at how we could improve things 
should one of these scenarios happen again. And one of the areas that came 
up was a request for assistance performa because sometimes when requests 
come in it might be facts and they might be difficult to read, or the facts may 
not have the particular point of contact that the local leaders in the Defence 
Forces are going to meet out on the ground. Sometimes the exact location of 
the exact task might be a little bit unclear so by having this form it would 
give people as much information so that they can prepare to the best of their 
capabilities before they deploy. 
Interviewer: I think you might be one of the only agencies […] that has this 
form […].  
ID22: I didn't want, and I stressed it at the conference, I didn't want this to be 
another layer for people to think we don't want to be requested and this is 
more bureaucracy, it wasn't that at all. It is to really help the corporal or the 
sergeant who works in the local barracks when he goes out on the ground to 
meet the people and it is to give them as much information as possible”. 
Sixthly, the role of Met Éireann in predicting the storms and 
subsequent flooding, and the use of the storm naming system and colour code system 
for the first time ensured more cooperation and response from communities. This 
contributed to the enhanced role that the local community had in the response effort 
and introduced them as a key aspect of the IEMA (DoHPLG, 2016) especially in 
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relation to the sharing of local knowledge with response agencies as described by 
participant ID02 who argues that "you are dealing with the people who know what 
they are talking about [but that] it is also utilising local knowledge". Although the 
new naming and colour coded system were effective for a more efficient and 
coordinated response, the ‘Report on Flooding’ (DoHPLG, 2016) argues that the role 
of Met Éireann and early warning systems need to be further developed into a 
national flood forecasting and warning service. Although Met Éireann is under the 
authority of the DoHPLG, they are a highly autonomous agency offering the most 
relevant and real-time information for the implementation of response networks thus, 
they are assigned much more power and a voice both within the NECG and in front 
of the public too. However, it is a different type of power, it's not one of control or 
authority, but one of knowledge and truth which the departments and PRA's then 
internalise and assess within their own institutional and cultural practices and 
respond by following their own severe weather plans and the procedures laid out in 
the Framework. Thus, as there is some providential will, the Met Éireann warnings 
can be assessed by multiple agencies at different scales and the approaches to 
response can differ slightly. These slight changes were not outwardly included in the 
report, but the choice of recommendations for the local scale response suggests that 
the national scale recognised the differing approaches and slow response 
mechanisms. They recommended several lessons and future implementations, five of 
which are mentioned below.  
1. “Measures should be considered to further enhance the dissemination of 
public information in the lead up to severe weather emergencies to strengthen 
individual preparedness and improve public safety” (MEM, 2006:35). 
2. “Local Authority Severe Weather Teams should review their arrangements 
for convening and maintaining operations throughout a prolonged 
emergency” (MEM, 2006:47). 
3. “Standardised templates for reporting from local level to national level 
should be developed” (MEM, 2006:47). 
4. “It is recommended that local authorities give more public visibility to their 
coordination work so that the public know who to contact and how if they 
need to during an emergency” (MEM, 2006:72). 
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“While the Framework for Major Emergency Management is seen 
as effective in underpinning the coordination of the response last winter [2015/2016], 
the National Steering Group has decided that it will be reviewed with a view to 
incorporating learning points from recent severe weather emergencies to further 
enhance inter-agency co-operation in response related activities” (MEM, 2006:72). 
4.11 Conclusion 
The IEMA works. It responds, it coordinates, it is effective. 
However, the policy documents are over complicated, often contradictory and the 
procedures and systems are often replications of other groups and processes. With a 
future revision of the Framework, there is potential to streamline emergency 
response, share the knowledge up and down the scales, increase training and reduce 
working and steering groups and offer a more concise, easier to follow manual for 
dealing with major emergencies. It is also essential to choose the terminology and 
use it in respect of every aspect of emergency management in Ireland. The 
Framework and other guidance documents should also recognise the importance of 
informal networks and legacy institutional cultures which may hinder efficient inter-
agency coordination. Meanwhile, jurisdictional boundaries, in the case of major 
emergencies, could be re-drawn so that governance can be more straightforward, 
with less reliance on quick decisions amongst a small cohort of senior officers from 
different agencies. These suggestions should be a focal point to ensure a future of 
efficient inter-agency coordination in Ireland.  
Further, inter-agency coordination has a direct role in how an 
assemblage oscillates and re-shapes from the recognised ontological positions of 
assemblage theory. This chapter illustrated this idea by providing evidence of the 
IEMA in action and determining that at times it occupied a messy middle space 
where aspects could be hierarchical and flat simultaneously. However, more 
importantly, it brought assemblage theory and the idea of ‘oikonomia’ together by 
arguing that humans have a providential will and can reject formal structures and 
boundaries, deconstructing the assemblage, and instead, responding based on 
working histories and informal networks. This introduces a different idea of 
assemblages as entities which can be formal and informal but only work and are 
sustainable if the participants remain within their designated positions. The next 
chapter repeats this format in light of the USEMA.  
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Chapter 5: Framing the United States Emergency Management System 
 
5.1 Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to provide a deep exploration into the 
history, policy and activation of the United States Emergency Management 
Assemblage (USEMA). It will contextualise the USEMA and evaluate why it may 
oscillate positions between policy and activation. There are three objectives to this 
chapter:  
Objective 1: An exploration of the historical adoption and evolution of emergency 
management in the United States.  
Objective 2: An in-depth interpretive analysis of the key policy documents 
supporting the formation and operation of the USEMA.  
Objective 3: The analysis of the response to the Boston Marathon Bombing in April 
2013 to illustrate the re-shaping of the USEMA from policy to activation.  
The United States Emergency Management Assemblage consists 
of first responder agencies, government departments, voluntary agencies, private 
enterprises and other organisations of value, i.e. agencies which can provide different 
benefits in times of need, as well as technology, processes and cultures. Formally, 
the USEMA is hierarchical with clear networks of power at the local scale and policy 
which is influenced by the state and federal scale. The mechanism by which crises 
are escalated upwards is documented through the Stafford Act 1988 and supported 
through a range of other legislated policy documents which emanate from both the 
state and federal scales. Policy documentation at the local scale was difficult to 
obtain, thus the websites of Boston’s Office of Emergency Management is utilised, 
as well as key findings from the Boston participants.   
This chapter frames the US Emergency Management System in the 
same manner that Chapter 4 framed the Irish system. The anchor Act for dealing 
with major emergencies is the Stafford Act and it is discussed alongside policy that 
refers to it, such as the National Response Framework (DHS, 2013) and the 
Massachusetts Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan (2017).   
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Using these documents, as well as others, this chapter provides a 
detailed overview of the federal scale and the evolution of the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA) through key policy moves, illustrating that FEMA 
was born, died and resurrected through two key phases 1980-2001 and 2001 to 
present. A discussion on state-scale response in Massachusetts will follow 
illustrating the relationships between the federal, state scale and local scale and the 
policy and procedures in place for dealing with major emergencies in the State. 
Boston, as the local scale, will then be discussed exploring their inter-agency and 
inter-jurisdictional relationships through some key participants. The conclusion will 
then identify some of the benefits and disadvantages of the system including, its 
formalised structure, neglect of the informal and its military connotations. Finally, 
the Boston Marathon Bombing in April 2013 which resulted in 3 deaths, mass 
casualties and a week-long response effort is studied to illustrate how the USEMA 
oscillated from its policy-dictated shape to new shapes during three unique stages of 
the week-long response.  
5.2 The Evolution of Emergency Management in the United States of America 
In the early to mid-20th century, emergency management in the 
USA was militarised and preoccupied with the protection of their territory from 
foreign intruders. This occurred at the national/federal scale and was characterised 
by military action and spending with no clear theoretical foundation. However, "the 
Civil Defense Act of 1950” (Marietta, 2012; 111) was the first key moment in 
modernising emergency management as it shifted the focus from large-scale 
protection to local scale emergency management. However, the Act was still security 
driven and overlooked non-security but more frequent events that occurred at the 
local scale (Marietta, 2012)14.  
It was not until the 1970s that contemporary emergency 
management theory and practices began to emerge in two ways according to 
Marietta (2012). Firstly, there was a recognition that although there are emergencies 
that require military response at the national/federal scale, there are also emergencies 
at the local scale that require a civil response. Thus, the 1970’s mark a transition 
                                                          
14 It is worth noting here that in the US the local scale can be understood as a much wider area than in 
Ireland. For instance, hurricanes can cross multiple states and are deemed both regional and local 
simultaneously. Regional as they cover such a large area and local as each area responds 
independently. 
129 
 
from a military approach which predominately focused on the threat of nuclear war, 
rather than ‘actually occurring’ events, to a system that recognised and planned for a 
range of hazards (Marietta, 2012) and the ‘Civil Defense Act of 1950’ is amended in 
1976 to include events of a non-military nature (Marietta, 2012 and Canton, 2007). 
Secondly, a more theoretical foundation for emergency management was formalised 
as opposed to the ad hoc coordination that had occurred at the local scale prior to the 
1970s.  
In 1979, US emergency management was continually evolving and 
was being theorised as a continuous and cyclical process (O’Riordan, 1992; 
Marietta, 2012) of “mitigation, preparedness, response and recovery” (Baird, 2010, 
O’Riordan, 1992; Rogers, 2011) known as ‘Comprehensive Emergency 
Management’ (CEM) (O’Riordan, 1992; Marietta, 2012; McEntire, 2007). This 
emerged via a publication titled ‘ A Comprehensive Emergency Management: A 
governor's guide’ (1979) which deemed that the theoretical foundation and best 
operational practice for emergency management was to utilise the all-hazards 
approach and further it by incorporating socio-economic and cultural contexts within 
plans and procedures.   
The guide explained the procedures for the management of 
domestic crises and was an important step in moving emergency management away 
from its military connotations and connections (National Governors Association, 
1979 and Marietta, 2012) and it was a key contributing factor to the development of 
FEMA. 
After the development of CEM, local scale emergency 
management further evolved due to different Fire Departments in Southern 
California actively coming together to coordinate and respond to crises in the region 
as they found that different institutional "cultures", "procedures" and debate over 
who the "on-scene authority" was created conflict (Marietta, 2012:103). Thus, the 
"Fire Departments were forced to form inter-institutional relationships and find a 
common means of communication (both technologically and culturally)." (Marietta, 
2012:103). This resulted in the development of "FIRESCOPE (Firefighting 
Resources of Southern California Organized for Potential Emergencies)" (Marietta, 
2012:104 and Canton, 2007:89). The idea behind FIRESCOPE was to create the 
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structures that coordinate different agencies in terms of protocol and management 
prior to an incident. This evolved into an Incident Command System (ICS) 
(Marietta, 2012) which became the common system across US Fire agencies. It also 
began to be used for the coordination of other agencies such as Police, EMS 
(Emergency Medical Services) and Voluntary Agencies. ICS "creates a standardised, 
scalable organising structure that emphasises flexibility during emergency 
management and creates a process for unifying the command, operations and support 
functions of all responding agencies [...] so that the best outcome can be achieve[d] 
while ensuring that the disciplines do not work at cross-purposes." (Merietta, 2012: 
104/105).  
However, it was not until after 9/11 that two major reforms took 
place. Firstly, the ICS became the "standard operating procedure of multi-agencies 
emergencies" (Merietta, 2012:105; Canton, 2007) and was expanded to become the 
National Incident Management System (NIMS) to coordinate various agencies 
during a range of crisis and it has "advantages, including scalability, multi-hazard 
flexibility, and especially inter-disciplinary coordination." (Merietta, 2012:105-106 
and FEMA, 2016). Secondly, there was the emergence of the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) which is an overt and controlling mechanism of the 
sovereign authority at the federal scale. This resulted in DHS changing 
organisational structures such as the dismantling and re-establishment of FEMA with 
an increased focus on terrorism combined with less transparency and inter-agency 
coordination. Thus, emergency management, although decentralised, still has strict 
governance structures which operate through a mechanism of shared but dispersed 
power to protect certain truths, infrastructures and people (such as, institutional 
cultures, siloed agencies, and frameworks which are government tools of control and 
power during major events). In an era of neoliberal policy and the roll back of the 
state, the federal and regional scale still retain power over emergency management 
plans. However, there is still a need for other agencies (both the public and private 
response agencies) and citizens within communities to be actively incorporated 
especially at the local scale in the formation of emergency management policy or 
wider policy which informs community risk as discussed by participant IDI. 
“They are not thinking ‘actually we should be talking to our local 
communities and seeing what they want.’ […] But what we noticed was there 
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was planning going on but not with the community and whatever was 
happening in terms of a conversation about climate change adaptation it 
wasn't involving the community and no resources were being funnelled down 
to community planning”. (Participant IDI)  
Thus, through the NIMS development, the institutionalisation of 
CEM and the development of FEMA and DHS, the discipline of Emergency 
Management created a shift in how policies and procedures were written and 
implemented. However, Haddow and Bullocks (2005) argues that FEMA and DHS 
are actually no longer adopting a CEM or even an all-hazards approach to 
emergency management as they are preoccupied with terrorist-related events and are 
increasingly overlooking natural and technological hazards. A recent example of this 
is the governance and management of Hurricane Harvey in Houston, Texas which 
saw a slow uncoordinated emergency response (TIME, 2017; New York Times, 
2017). This also reflects a return to a more militarised and national scale response, 
shifting the direction of emergency management once more as a result of governance 
shifting from discipline to control (Kitchin et al, 2017).  
The above section offered snippets of the evolution of emergency 
management as a discipline and practice. These historical moments affect how the 
USEMA is shaped within policy and offer insights into why the USEMA may 
oscillate positions and re-shape when activated. To explore this, the different policies 
that operate at the different scales of the USEMA need to be identified and 
explained. This will provide an understanding of how the USEMA is shaped in 
policy before the case study illuminates its shape during activation.  
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5.3 USEMA Policy 
5.3.1 Federal Scale 
The governance of the United States is defined as a “constitutional 
federal republic” (US Department of State, 2004: 3). This differs slightly from the 
model of democracy which governs Ireland in that the United States Constitution 
creates the structures in which all government scales operate and this, in turn, 
weakens the power of the Federal Government. Thus, the use of the term ‘federal’ 
reflects on the decentralised network of governmental power resulting in a national 
government and separate governments in each state (US Department of State, 2004). 
However, the forms of governance used in the US and Ireland are similar in terms of 
their status as republics in which both countries elect representatives to act on their 
behalf.  
The United States Constitution explicates the organisation and 
powers which the federal government are in control of ,such as national defence and 
engaging with foreign powers amongst others, as described by the US Department of 
State (2004). The US constitution also refers to the role, responsibilities and power 
of state governments limiting the power of the Federal Government. Each state 
retains its own constitution in which it describes the role of the local. The local scale 
retains more power and responsibility than in Ireland as US local government have 
responsibility for “cities, counties, towns, school districts, and special-purpose 
districts, which govern such matters as local natural resources or transportation 
networks” (US Department of State, 2004;5). 
However, this organisation of decentralised governance and power 
as dictated by the US Constitution is not black and white as over time it has been 
amended to reflect current needs and this has changed the role of the federal 
government and increased its influential powers over states. For instance, the federal 
government creates and funds programs which are then delivered by individual state 
governments, for example, emergency response. However, as these programmes are 
federally funded the finance can be withheld from the state if they do not concede to 
the instructions of the federal government, creating influential power stemming from 
the federal to the state and in turn to local governments. The US State Department 
(2004) refers to an example which occurred in the 1970s when the federal 
government needed to lower highway speeds and instead of legislating lower limits 
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they withheld state finance until the states reduced the speeds themselves. Further, 
the influential power that the federal scale have on emergency response was 
described by a representative of emergency management policy in Boston.  
“It’s called NIMS [National Incident Management System] and ICS [Incident 
Control System] and those are mandated to be used by the Federal 
Government, the US government says that if you want money from us to do 
preparedness response work these are the things you must do.” 
(Representative of a US emergency management agency) 
5.3.2 Federal Emergency Management Agency 
Emergency management at the federal scale is managed by FEMA. 
The origins of FEMA can be traced back to the 1978 National Governors 
Association who published a report on emergency preparedness which illustrated 
concern over weak national policy and coordination. The report recommended the 
amalgamation of siloed federal programmes, the creation and use of comprehensive 
emergency management and for a concentration on mitigation and recovery (Drabek 
and Hoetmer, 1991 and FEMA, 2012). This report and the criticisms that the Federal 
Government faced after the Three Mile Island nuclear power plant accident in March 
1979 in Pennsylvania resulted in President Carter supporting the amalgamation of 
federal programmes, resulting in the development of FEMA (FEMA, 2012). The 11 
agencies which amalgamated to form FEMA are: 
• “Defense Civil Preparedness Agency, Department of Defense.  
• Federal Preparedness Agency, General Services Administration.  
• Federal Insurance Administration, Housing and Urban Development.  
• Federal Disaster Assistance Administration, Housing and Urban 
Development.  
• National Fire Prevention and Control Administration, Department of 
Commerce.  
• National Fire Academy, Department of Commerce.  
• Community Preparedness Program, National Weather Service (Commerce).  
• Dam Safety Coordination, Executive Office of the President.  
• Earthquake Hazard Reduction Program, Executive Office of the President.  
• Consequences Management of Terrorism, Executive Office of the President.  
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• Warning and Emergency Broadcast Program, Executive Office of the 
President.” (FEMA, 2012:NP) 
FEMA was assigned with responsibility for federal policy, 
resources for response and inter-agency coordination both horizontally and 
hierarchically (FEMA, 2012). Initially, the FEMA director was appointed by the 
President until the development of the Department of Homeland Security following 
9/11. However, the amalgamation of 11 agencies created tensions and issues which 
foreshadowed the bureaucratic issues which the Department of Homeland Security 
would later face.  
5.3.3 Phase 1: 1980-2001: The Birth of FEMA  
This period represents a series of plans, policies and technologies 
implemented to coerce inter-agency coordination and a smoother transition from 
siloed agencies into a single agency. FEMA aimed to focus on the mitigation and 
recovery aspect of emergencies but like Ireland, they focused on accidents that had 
already occurred rather than on future threats and risks.  
Thus, between 1982 and 1983, FEMA adopted the Integrated 
Emergency Management System. This program appears to be aligned with the 
principles of the all-hazards approach as it aims to ensure the maintenance of 
“emergency management capabilities nationwide for all types of emergencies and 
across all hazards at all levels of government” (FEMA, 2012: Nd and MA-CEMP, 
2017). It was developed to reduce the jurisdictional issues of several often 
incompatible or duplicated plans resulting in resource wastage and tension between 
equally qualified responders for responsibility and control of an event (Perry and 
Mushkatel 1986, Blanchard 1986 and FEMA, 2012).  
In 1987, President Reagan’s ‘Presidential Policy Guidance’ 
attempted to shift focus from all-hazard Civil Defense Programmes, which had 
become the central focus of emergency management for the mitigating and 
management of hazards, back towards militarised programs particularly related to 
protecting US territory from soviet nuclear threat (FEMA, 2012; Marietta, 2012). 
The shadow of militarised and national scale emergency management was a crucial 
hurdle for FEMA to overcome and this last push by President Reagan undermined 
FEMA’s remit.  
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In 1988, the Robert Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency 
Assistance Act was implemented. This Act has proven to be crucial for current 
emergency management, with participants using it as the foundation for current 
emergency management practice. As Participant IDG argues: “the law that spells out 
how all this works is the Stafford Act”. This Act is similar in tone and focus to the 
Strategic Emergency Management National Structure and Framework (SEMNSF) 
document in Ireland with the key difference being that the Stafford Act is enforced, 
while the SEMNSF acts as the Irish national scale advisory policy document. 
However, both focus on how to manage emergencies and the different roles and 
responsibilities of relevant national agencies. The Stafford Act focuses on pre-
mitigation and preparedness in a way that is lacking in the SEMNSF.  
The Stafford Act was implemented to create federal assistance for 
state and local governments with Congress wanting them to develop comprehensive 
disaster preparedness plans and to prepare for inter-agency coordination at all scales 
(Stafford Act, 1988). The Act is amended from the Disaster Relief Act of 1974, with 
further minor amendments in 2000 and 2006, and is responsible for the current 
system in which a Presidential disaster declaration is needed before federal 
assistance can be provided. This reduces the power stripping of state and local 
government who retain control over their own disasters unless increased resources 
are needed from the federal state, at which point the State Governor will request a 
presidential declaration. If no declaration is made, then the local and state scale are 
not afforded federal funds and resources. There are two avenues for achieving the 
presidential activation as discussed by participant IDG, a researcher at Harvard.  
“If there is a disaster that happens that is big, or if it is a natural disaster like a 
hurricane which you see coming, you know these places open up and once 
damage has been incurred you do your best to make an estimate. Or if the 
Hurricane is coming up the coast you kind of make an estimate of what you 
think the impacts will be. Then the State Emergency Management agency 
will put together a report. They will forward that to the governor, the 
governor will then submit that to the President and that report basically asks 
for what they call a Federal Disaster Declaration. If it is after the incident has 
occurred or if in the case of a hurricane it’s called a pre-landfall declaration 
and basically those are the legal requirements to start the money flowing to 
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start FEMA to open up their challenges and to start a national level response. 
But that is how things get from the state all the way up to FEMA”. 
The Stafford Act is a highly detailed document consisting of 180 
pages that illustrates how federal emergency management operates today. “Title II: 
Disaster Preparedness and Mitigation Assistance” states that the President can:  
1. Establish a disaster preparedness program that coordinates relevant agencies 
and allows the President to provide technical assistance to states while they 
are completing a comprehensive plan to prepare for disaster.  
2. Provide grants to states for preparing emergency plans.  
3. Establish pre-disaster hazard mitigation programs which provide financial 
support to states from the national pre-disaster mitigation fund. 
4. Create a federal inter-agency task force for the implementation of pre-
disaster mitigation plans which are provided by the federal government.  
5. Implements a disaster warning system. This involves the readiness of all 
appropriate federal agencies to provide warnings to states and local 
authorities who then share the warning with the public. The President can 
make use of civil defence communication systems and commercial systems 
which are given voluntarily.  
However, the use of commercial systems for issuing warnings is no 
longer restricted to a presidential decree as evident in New York. “On September 
17th, 2016, following an explosion in  Chelsea, Manhattan, a mass terror alert was 
issued by the Office of Emergency Management, New York Police Department and 
the FBI through all phone networks (see Figure 5.1). It was received by an unknown 
number of people and provided information about the key suspect - Ahmed Khan 
Rahami. The Press secretary for New York Mayor, Bill de Blasio, stated that it was 
the first use of this alert at a "mass scale" and the suspect was caught within 3 hours” 
(Delaney, 2016).  
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Figure 5.1: Smart phone terror Alert. 
 
Source: Twitter. 
“Title III: Major Disaster and Emergency Assistance 
Administration” (Stafford Act, 1988) discusses the federal response after the 
declaration of a major disaster. The President will appoint a federal coordinating 
officer who oversees initial appraisals, the development of field offices and 
coordination across all scales. The President’s staff will also create emergency and 
regional support teams. Further, it sets out the requirements for state mitigation 
plans. These include a description of mitigation processes and support for the 
development of local mitigation plans (Stafford Act, 1988).  
“Title IV: Major Disaster Assistance Program and Title V: 
Emergency Assistance Programs” (Stafford Act, 1988) are similar with both 
discussing how a presidential declaration is made as discussed by participant IDG 
above. The request from the Governor should include the number of resources 
available and a commitment to cost-sharing, the situation must be deemed beyond 
state capabilities. Title IV also allowss for the Governor to be able to request the 
President to direct the Secretary of State to use the resources of the United States 
Department of Defense for emergency work. Emergency work for the Department of 
Defense is similar to the work that the Irish Army carries out during crises and 
includes clearance and restoration. However, unlike in Ireland where the Defence 
Forces can be used for a protracted period, the Department of Defense can only be 
used for a maximum of ten days before they return to military duty (Stafford Act, 
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1988). Under Title V the President can also declare a major disaster without the 
Governor’s approval or request if it is deemed to fall under the responsibilities of the 
US Government, as outlined in the United States Constitution.  
There have been several criticisms levied against the Stafford Act 
especially considering the response to Hurricane Katrina, with a particularly 
damning article in Frontline by Leger et al, (2009). Two of these criticisms are: that 
it is slow due to the inefficient mobilising of different scales of bureaucracy which 
creates barriers to effective and fast federal response (Tierney, 2001), and that it is a 
discretionary law. The President does not have to declare a major disaster and by not 
declaring such, certain facilities will not be re-built or protected, and lower-income 
citizens will be adversely affected and that there is no requirement for citizen 
engagement in the recovery aspect of a major emergency.  
The next major change for FEMA, after the Stafford Act, was the 
appointment of James Lee Witt as the Director by President Clinton in 1993. 
Director Witt was the first professional Emergency Manager to be appointed to the 
position (FEMA, 2012) resulting in significant changes to FEMAs focus by making 
mitigation a priority, while disaster relief and recovery were streamlined. This 
resulted in two important policy documents which attempted to identify risks and 
preparation before disasters occurred. In 1993, the Hazard Mitigation and Relocation 
Act was a proactive response to dealing with flood risks as it relocated vulnerable 
houses and businesses away from floodplains. In 1996, the Defense Against 
Weapons of Mass Destruction Act (also known as the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Act) 
was legislated to finance counter-terrorism in light of the “World Trade Center 
Bombing in New York City in 1993, the Tokyo, Japan Subway Sarin Gas Attack 
(1993), and the Murrah Federal Office Building Bombing, Oklahoma City, 
Oklahoma (April 19, 1995)” (FEMA, 2012:nd).  
5.3.4 Phase 2: 2001-Present: The Birth of the Department of Homeland 
Security and the Death and Resurrection of FEMA.  
The second phase of Federal Emergency Management began in 
2001 with a clear focus on terrorism and the creation of the Department of Homeland 
Security in response to 9/11. The Homeland Security Act of 2002 resulted in two key 
policy implementations for the management of major emergencies. Firstly, it enabled 
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the Department of Homeland Security to create the National Incident Management 
System (NIMS) (GAO, 2006: 6 and MA-CEMP, 2017). NIMS is similar to the Irish 
Framework for Major Emergency Management as it provides a framework that cuts 
across all bureaucratic and governance scales to ensure that response is coordinated 
for all events. Further, it explains all responsibilities “of federal, state, and local 
governments and various first responder disciplines at each level during an 
emergency event”. NIMS is centred around two key concepts: “multi-agency 
coordination and unified command” (DHS, 2013:3 and MA-CEMP, 2017). These 
concepts are essential to the development of emergency management policy as they 
call for one “set of objectives”, a “collective response”, better knowledge sharing 
and “coordination”, recognising agency command and objectives, and ensuring all 
agencies are legally safe, recognised and positively utilised within one plan (DHS, 
2013:3/4).  
The development of NIMS led to the evolution of the Incident 
Command System (ICS) as a standardized organizational system for the command 
and coordination of emergency response, which is utilized at each jurisdictional scale 
(MA-CEMP, 2017:6). The Incident Command System is used worldwide, including 
in Ireland (DoHPLG, 2016). The US system has “five functional areas—command, 
operations, planning, logistics, and finance/administration—for management of all 
major incidents (FEMA, 2008:1)”, with the Irish plan differing slightly in its remit 
with four major areas – command, control, communications and information 
management. Both systems also describe the importance of preparedness and 
training before incidents occur. 
Secondly, the Act required that the Department of Homeland 
Security develop a National Response Plan (NRP). This plan was enacted in 2004 
and was underpinned by the all-hazards philosophy for the response to emergencies 
that needed federal help (GAO, 2006 and DHS, 2004). It was developed to be 
aligned with the DHS mission “of preventing terrorist attacks within the United 
States; reducing the vulnerability to all natural and man-made hazards; and 
minimizing the damage and assisting in the recovery from any type of incident that 
occurs” (DHS, 2004; np). The full policy is unavailable to the public, but a brochure 
with the key points appears to be similar to the policy actions of the framework. The 
NRP refers to events of “national significance” as the only type of event the plan 
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applies to. “National Significance is defined as an actual or potential high-impact 
event that requires a coordinated and effective response by an appropriate 
combination of federal, state, local, tribal, nongovernmental, and/or private-sector 
entities in order to save lives and minimize damage and provide the basis for long-
term community recovery and mitigation activities” (GAO, 2006: 6 and DHS, 2004, 
np). It was drafted by a series of agencies (see Figure 5.2), that cut across the above-
mentioned scales (DHS, 2004).  
The NRP covers the four key areas of any major emergency plan - 
prevention, preparedness, response and recovery - but also places emphasis on the 
importance of a local response ensuring that even when federal assistance is required 
it is offered as on-site support and does not interfere with “existing plans under the 
planning assumption that incidents are typically managed at the lowest possible 
geographic, organizational, and jurisdictional level” (GAO, 2006: 6). The plan also 
creates a multi-agency vertical structure to assist in inter-agency and inter-
governmental coordination that occurs simultaneously at different scales (Figure 5.3) 
and it created several new “coordination mechanisms” (np).   
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Figure 5.2: Partners of the NRP 
  
Source: DHS (2004) 
 
Figure 5.3: New Coordination Mechanisms 
 
Source: DHS (2004)  
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The NRP was replaced by the National Response Framework 
(NRF) in 2008 with further editions in 2013 and 2016. It builds on NIMS and ICS 
which provide the standard command structure and it uses the same aim of 
coordinating across the differing jurisdictional scale as the NRP. It is part of the 
National Preparedness System and was initiated by the Presidential Policy Directive 
PPD-8: National Preparedness. PPD-8 aims to “strengthen the security and resilience 
of the United States through systematic preparation for the threats that pose the 
greatest risk to the security of the Nation” (DHS, 2013: 1). It supports five key areas 
as opposed to the four in the NRP - prevention, protection, mitigation, response and 
recovery - and is underpinned by five key principles (DHS, 2013:6):  
1. “Engaged Partnership” – Officials at all scales collaborate to ensure no one 
scale is overcome by the extent of an incident. This is of particular 
noteworthiness due to the finding that agencies and resources were 
overwhelmed during Hurricane Katrina (GOA, 2006:6)  
2. “Tiered Response” – Response should always begin at the local scale and 
only be escalated upwards when it is necessary.  
3. “Scalable, flexible and adaptable operational capabilities” – This is to ensure 
that response and resources are adaptable as the incident changes or grows 
and meets the requirements set by NIMS/ICS .  
4. “Unity of effort through unified command” – Under NIMS/ICS there is 
respect for each agency’s own command structure, and this is upheld in the 
NRF. This contributes rather than hinders both horizontal and vertical inter-
agency and inter-governmental coordination with scales blurring within the 
unified command structure (see Figure 5.4).  
 
 
 
 
  
143 
 
Figure 5.4: Unified Coordination structure 
 
Source: Author produced from DHS (2013:41) 
 
5. “Readiness to act- Effective response requires a readiness to act that is 
balanced with an understanding of the risks and hazards responders face.”  
Similarly, to the Irish Framework, the NRF has a series of 
guidance and protocol documents which support it known as annexes: Emergency 
Support Function (ESF) Annexes, Support Annexes and Incident Annexes. The NRF 
is also the first document to discuss federal assistance without enacting the Stafford 
Act. The normal manner to access federal resources is by following the procedures 
set out in the Stafford Act as explained earlier, but the NRF briefly discusses another 
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mechanism for declaring a federal emergency. This tends to be through a specific 
federal department in response to highly specific incidents (see Figure 5.5).  
Figure 5.5: Examples of other federal authorities 
 
Source: DHS (2013:17/18) 
 
However, the biggest change that occurred from the Homeland 
Security Act of 2002 was the formation of the Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS) in 2003. It was organised as a single, cabinet-level organisation and 
amalgamated 23 federal agencies including FEMA. As FEMA was absorbed into 
DHS it became part of the Emergency Preparedness and Response Directorate of 
DHS. During the process of absorption some of its responsibilities were initially re-
organised and in 2005, the development of the Office of Preparedness further 
reduced FEMA’s responsibilities to a focus on response and recovery only. This 
development resulted in reverting back to the structural organisation that existed 
prior to FEMA’s development in 1979 as now Federal Emergency Management was 
once again decentralised across several offices and agencies (Haddow et al, 2016).  
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However, Hurricane Katrina proved to be a major turning point for 
the development and organisation of FEMA. Prior to Hurricane Katrina, FEMA had 
conducted evacuation exercise for New Orleans resulting in several 
recommendations, but as the DHS re-allocated funds to other priorities such as 
terrorism, the recommendations were never implemented. Thus, in 2006, the 
Administrations Report, “The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons 
Learned” and Hurricane Katrina’s GAO’s (Government Accountability Office) 
‘Preliminary Observations Regarding Preparedness, Response, and Recovery’ 
testimony before the Senate, Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 
Committee were released with the findings positively benefitting FEMA. The 
Administrators report developed from a series of “congressional hearings” involving 
“125 recommendations and 11 critical actions” that were to be completed before the 
“2006 hurricane season”. Meanwhile, the GAO testimony illustrated four major 
issues, two of which will be discussed. Firstly, as the response was similar to 
previous events, there is a need to “define and communicate leadership roles, 
responsibilities and lines of authority (Nd)”. This is an aspect that the Framework for 
Major Emergency Management does very well. There needs to be an understanding 
of how the National Response Plan is activated, training and planning need to be 
conducted and “response and recovery capabilities” (Nd) need to be developed. 
Secondly, FEMA’s response to Hurricane Katrina was weak and created concerns 
around its organizational placement. The GAO report recommended one of three 
options: its disbanding, remains within DHS, or becomes an independent agency. 
Further, changes that occurred out of the GAO testimony and the Administration’s 
Report were the President being assigned more power, the re-organization of FEMA, 
and the exact responsibilities of the DHS were clarified (FEMA, 2012 and Haddow 
et al, 2016). These changes were combined with six new pieces of legislations 
including ‘The Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006 
(PKEMRA)’ (Haddow et al, 2016).  
Of all six new pieces of legislation, the PKEMRA affected FEMA 
and emergency management the most. FEMA was re-established as an agency under 
the Department of Homeland Security and provided with statutory authority which 
involved DHS re-organising emergency management functions as part of FEMA, 
which in turn provided FEMA with new forms of power and status within the 
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USEMA federal scale (FEMA, 2012 and Haddow et al, 2016). Further, even though 
FEMA remained under the DHS, some autonomy was provided with FEMA’s 
administrator being granted communication powers with Congress as a form of 
protection to ensure organizational autonomy and from its focus being re-directed by 
DHS (FEMA, 2012 and Haddow et al, 2016). However, the administrator still 
reports to the Secretary of Homeland Security but oversees the enacting of the 
Stafford Act, the operation of the National Response Coordination Centre, and is 
generally in charge of overseeing the key points of emergency management (DHS, 
2013).  
As is the norm across the US, most federal departments have 
regional or field offices that work alongside state and local agencies. FEMA has 10 
regional offices (see Figure 5.6) with each having a Regional Response Coordination 
Centre which oversee several states. During activation, they remain in 
communication with FEMA headquarters and begin the process of providing federal 
assistance until unified coordination is established (DHS, 2013) in response to a 
State’s request for assistance. 
Figure 5.6: FEMA Regions 
 
Source: DHS (2013:42) 
 
5.4 State Scale 
The State scale of emergency management acts as an intermediary 
between the active federal scale and powerful local scale. The State scale will be 
studied through the Massachusetts Emergency Management system. Massachusetts 
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emergency management is organised in a similar manner to that of the other 49 states 
and follows the directives and policies such as the NRF when organising and 
creating their own policy. As illustrated above, federal policy weakens the power of 
the federal scale but also the state scale by determining that all response begins at the 
local scale and is escalated from there. However, as Massachusetts is a home rule 
state, the control the state has at the local scale is further weakened.  
Home rule is a form of self-governance applied to cities, towns and 
counties. Almost all states have some form of home rule provision but the degree to 
which it is applied varies. Massachusetts adopted a strong version of home rule in 
1966 (relatively late in terms of other states) (Department of Revenue, 2017) 
allowing any city or town in the Commonwealth to determine their own laws 
through their own legislative body. Three participants explained it in relation to their 
own position and knowledge resulting in interesting perspectives, but all recognised 
the strength of it. Participant IDF, a researcher with the Harvard T.H. Chan School of 
Public Health, described its strength by comparing it to New York State and 
explained the complications for inter-jurisdictional governance which arise out of 
home rule.  
“Massachusetts is a home rule state. New York is a home rule state, and I 
lived in New York for a long time and the comparison is stark because home 
rule means that local control is the primary factor in government. So, in 
Massachusetts, that means every town is self-governing and the state really 
has more of an overseeing role. But the primary place where decisions are 
made is at the town level. So, for Massachusetts, we have counties in 
Massachusetts, but they don't mean anything, so there is not a county 
government like there would be in Britain. So, New York says they are a 
home rule state, but New York has county government where the county 
executive is like the county mayor, as well as having the town system, so 
there is still a town system and there is a county system above it. 
Massachusetts doesn't have that county system so that is another thing in 
Massachusetts, if you had a strong county system you could do it based on 
counties. You could group things based on counties, although the city of 
Boston is a county so that wouldn't help the city of Boston, it would help 
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other parts of the state. But we don't have that, so it is kind of that extreme 
home rule dynamic in Massachusetts.”  
Participant IDM an emergency management official with Boston 
City Hall describes home rule and the number of self-governance cities and towns 
that communicate with the state.  
“That is one thing you should realise about Massachusetts, that it is a home 
rule state which essentially means that there is a lot of power within the local 
governments. Even though we have counties within Massachusetts, they don't 
serve a purpose in terms of some sort of governance structure within 
emergency management. So, there are 351 communities within 
Massachusetts and each one of those works directly with the State emergency 
management agency, there is no in between”.  
Participant IDF explains it in terms of coordination between single 
authorities and how the strength of home rule actually creates an important role for 
the state, even a weakened state, in a management position.  
“In Massachusetts, in the US in general, we don’t have counties but if you 
had counties in a state, that would be like the biggest entity so it’s the cities 
and towns, so we have what we call home rule, they are in charge, so Boston 
can do what they want, Cambridge can do what they want, Somerville can do 
what they want. Now, sure there has to be some sort of coordination there, so 
Somerville can’t be telling people to evacuate to Boston and Boston is telling 
people to evacuate to Somerville that is not going to work”.  
Participant IDF raises an interesting concern regarding the 
confusion that can develop from jurisdictional coordination especially in a state like 
Massachusetts where jurisdictions cover a relatively small geographical area in 
which it is easier for incidents to cross boundaries (see Appendix 7 for a map of 
Massachusetts Cities and Towns). For instance, the Boston metro area has 101 
municipalities, while Massachusetts, in total, has 55 cities and 296 towns (MA-
CEMP, 2017). All have their own laws, emergency services, and self-governance. 
However, participant IDF explains that the miscommunication that could occur 
between different jurisdictions is:  
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“managed through the state, you know, trying to monitor those messages, so 
MEMA, the state agency monitors what the locals are doing, making sure 
that that kind of thing isn’t happening. It is a lot more complicated than if the 
state could just come in and say this is what we are going to do. Other states 
can do that! Massachusetts, the way our local government is structured, the 
state does not have the authority to sort of tell local communities what to do”.  
5.4.1 Massachusetts Emergency Management Agency 
MEMA is the Massachusetts Emergency Management Agency 
which coordinates federal, state and local agencies during crises. It was created by 
the Massachusetts Civil Defense Act of 1950 with the aim of planning and training 
for major disasters and to work with communities to develop their resilience and 
capacities (MA-CEMP, 2017) across the Commonwealth. Each state is federally 
required to have developed Comprehensive Emergency Management Plans (CEMP).  
MEMA is responsible for the development of the Massachusetts 
plan ensuring it conforms to the requirements of NIMS and ICS by following the 
procedures developed by FEMA (MA-CEMP, 2017). CEMPs are essential 
frameworks for ensuring efficient coordination across scales and agency types, i.e. 
federal to local and emergency responders to voluntary organisations. By staying in 
tune with NIMS, CEMPs discuss in detail all phases of emergency management as 
discussed at the federal scale: “prevention and mitigation, preparedness, response 
and recovery” (2-2/2-3) and the flexibility of ICS allows Massachusetts to apply it to 
its own circumstances thus, ensuring efficient coordination of resources and agencies 
during times of emergency. The CEMP can be activated by the Governor or any 
other authorized individual if a “Gubernatorial State of Emergency” (3-12) has been 
declared by the Governor for specific areas or vast areas of the Commonwealth or a 
Presidential declaration has been attained. The Presidential declaration must be 
requested by the governor through the FEMA Region 1 administrator.  
When an emergency has been declared the State Emergency Operations Centre 
(SEOC) is activated as a Command and Control Centre. The SEOC operates on a 
day-to-day basis to monitor emergencies across the state (see Figure 5.7). If the 
CEMP is activated, then the MEMA director retains responsibility for determining 
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the appropriate declaration. These activations can either be in response to an 
emergency or planned events such as July 4th or the Boston Marathon.  
Figure 5.7: Activation levels 
Source: MA-CEMP (2017)  
The SEOC is organised and activated to support local ‘Emergency 
Operation Centres’ (EOCs) and to ensure that local responders have the resources to 
deal with the emergency (NRF). In order to achieve this type of working relationship 
and inter-agency coordination, the state structures must adequately integrate into the 
local incident command structures. These relationships are developed through three 
mechanisms: Regional EOCs, WebEOCand Emergency Support Functions (ESFs). 
Firstly, MEMA has three regional offices across the Commonwealth which act as 
primary contact points for local areas and share information from the Regional EOCs 
back up to the SEOC. This on-site information is critical in decision-making and 
resource allocation. These regional EOC’s are often working alongside the local 
EOCs in a manner that the SEOC would find difficult or timely at the beginning of 
an event. 
 Secondly,  WebEOC is an online emergency operations centre and 
crisis management system which  supports the “ICS method of response 
management for significant incidents, in addition to providing a unique toolset for 
supporting daily operations in the regional response centres” (EPA, 2019), the 
SEOC, local EOCs and individual agencies.. It is described by the Capital Area 
Council of Governments (CAPCOG) (2019) as a 
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“communications and response tool for emergency management coordinators 
and first responders. As a tool, it allows emergency management personnel to 
provide and view information about incidents. WebEOC lets agencies track 
the allocation of local resources regionally to improve response to disasters 
and terroristic threats. It also allows other emergency centric institutions — 
such as hospitals, health departments, and various city departments — to be 
alert of situations and prepare their own response” (edited for conciseness). 
Thus, WebEOC can be imagined as a type of Facebook for 
emergency response where real-time information and necessary data is shared 
between response agencies. This is supported through map functions, different types 
of plugins and noticeboards which replace the paper or whiteboard type noticeboard 
which historically had been used by emergency response centres worldwide 
(Intermedix, 2013) and are still being used in Ireland. Further, the type of plugins, 
maps and boards can be changed to represent the need of each local area and state 
and everything is time stamped and meta-data is collected  in relation to the user, 
agency, location, edits etc.  
Thirdly, the Massachusetts Emergency Support Function teams 
(MAESF) are essential for ensuring coordination. There are 16 teams consisting of 
trained individuals for a range of agencies and jurisdictional scales. Each ESF is in 
charge of one broad element of an emergency and the MEMA director will designate 
who is the lead for each aspect during an activation. (see Appendix 8 for the list of 
MAESFs).  
Finally, the CEMP plan provides information for the planning, 
training and review of emergencies. However,  one of the critical aspects of the 2017 
plan, was the application of the Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk 
Assessment (THIRA) which produced several different potential risks for the 
Commonwealth (see Figure 5.8). This was a multi-agency and multi-jurisdictional 
project that built upon the federal THIRA, thus ensuring coordination was part of the 
planning process and not just the response phase. However, conducting a project of 
this nature helps the CEMP plan to be more focused on actual threats and allows for 
training exercises either agency specific or inter-agency to be more tailored to the 
actual emergencies they may face. The CEMP plan builds upon the all-hazards 
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approach as dictated by the federal government, but the application of THIRA also 
reduces the planning for potential events and ensures that both broad and specific 
plans can be written and trained. Broad plans are in line with the all-hazards 
approach and can be applied to any situation. The specific plans can be based on the 
outcomes of the THIRA to ensure knowledge, training and coordination are as 
efficient as possible before an actual event.  
Figure 5.8: THIRA hazards 
 
 
Source: MA-CEMP (2017) 
 
Although the MA-CEMP is quite detailed, it is relatively black and 
white, and presents the state response system in its most perfect structure. However, 
the reality of emergencies and who actually sits in EOCs or what these agencies 
actually are, was revealed through two key participant interviews. Participant IDG 
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describes the activation of MEMA, who sits in the State EOC and their role as a 
coordinating agency for the local scale. 
“MEMA stands up their operations centre at whatever at partial activation all 
the way up to a full, most other municipality in the impacted area would stay 
at the same level. […] In those EOCs you would find all those different 
agencies, Boston invites the Red Cross in and other outside partners, MEMA, 
for the state, they do the same, the Salvation Army. They have the State 
Police in there, the Department of Conservation which is like the Park 
Rangers and environmental protection for the state so those EOCs they do 
that, it is true multi-agency coordination, it is not just representatives from 
the agencies that those EOCs are for, they bring in outside groups. […] So, 
the support and FEMA is a coordinating agency, the same thing with MEMA 
they consider themselves coordinating agencies they are not, while people, 
while the public might view them as a response agency, their main job is to 
get the people that are out on the ground doing the work, mainly that is folks 
from the local and individual communities that are impacted, the state and the 
federal systems are there to make sure they have the resources that they need 
to respond to the disaster or emergency basically”. 
Participant IDC of a volunteer organisation describes the 
organisation of MEMA’s EOC.  
“So, anytime something happens we have the bunker in Birmingham, 
Massachusetts, it is the MEMA Bunker, […] So there is a bunch of different 
desks there and they are all manned by different non-profit agencies, different 
agencies all come together, and they man the phone lines. So, if something 
ever happens and you are getting calls in there you can direct people to the 
resources they need to go to”. 
What is evident, throughout this section and from the participants, 
is the importance and power of the local scale for the activation of the state scale and 
yet, as will be seen in the next section, the local scale depends on the state and 
federal scale for the organisation of their policy. Thus, there is a symbiotic 
relationship between all the scales. 
154 
 
5.5 Local Scale 
FEMA and MEMA are coordinating agencies that help the local 
scale to deal with any emergencies that may arise. This section will explore the City 
of Boston, the capital city of Massachusetts and home to 673,184 residents (US 
Census Bureau, 2016) with a landmass area of 231 km2 (Open Data Network, 2016) 
and just one of 101 municipalities that make up the Boston Metro Area.  
Emergency Management in the US is local first and must be scaled 
upwards through the appropriate channels. Local emergency plans and departments 
are built on the foundation of the federal procedure and policy in order to ensure 
funding streams. This presents a positive consequence at the local scale as the 
community becomes a focus alongside policy writing, hazard identification and 
training. By exploring Boston’s Office of Emergency Management’s (OEM) 
website, it became obvious that the target audience was the general population as it 
involved short blurbs, clear instructions, vital information and user information. This 
differs from the Office of Emergency Management’s website or the MEM website in 
Ireland which provides some general information, but mostly requires searching 
through long and difficult policy documents to find any relevant information. The 
only exception is the “Be Winter Ready” website which is exactly like Boston’s 
OEM website just more restricted in the hazards it covers.  
The Massachusetts Civil Defense Act of 1950 legislated that each 
municipality required an emergency management program and a person to oversee 
such. Boston’s OEM, a department of City Hall (the elected governing body), meets 
that requirement and works closely with local responding agencies: Boston 
Emergency Medical Services (EMS), Boston Fire Department, Boston Police 
Department, Boston Public Health Commission, MEMA and various private bodies 
and volunteer organisations. However, Boston’s OEM developed after 9/11, as 
historically one first responder agency held the office of emergency management, 
which is a structure still seen across Massachusetts as Participant IDM discusses 
“So, for Boston emergency management, this office specifically existed after 
the September 11th attacks and came out of the urban area security initiative 
because we were receiving grant funding and then when we hosted the DNC 
[Democratic National Convention] there was a lot that had to happen for that. 
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Now emergency management used to be and its inception under fire, but we 
quickly realised that because there are various functions as well and 
emergency management is really about the coordination piece of police, fire, 
EMS, public health, all the different functional areas that it became its own 
office. […] I think we are one of two communities out of the 351 in 
Massachusetts that has a full-time emergency management director. Most of 
them are part-time or it is part of another job. So even within the metro 
Boston homeland security region, the emergency manager is also the fire 
chief or the police chief. You are going to find that across the 
Commonwealth, across the country, a lot of it falls under police or fire.” 
The MA-CEMP also requires every municipality to have their own 
EOC in which actions can be coordinated across all phases and inter-agency and 
inter-governmental coordination can be handled appropriately. Boston’s OEM 
oversees the Boston EOC which coordinates with Regional EOCs (REOC) and 
eventually the SEOC if required.  
“So, our emergency management office really coordinates that entire process 
and we are the conduit for having the representatives in the EOC provide 
information from their departments and their operational elements and then 
pushing that information up and common operating picture, situational 
awareness, up to the Mayor's office and getting them all the information”. 
(Participant IDM). 
However, Boston is slightly different as discussed by participant 
ID: “Now Boston being as big as it is, there are times when we will interact directly 
with FEMA, but we usually always let the State know about it”. This means that 
communication between the local and federal scale can, and does, occur by 
circumnavigating the established channels. In Boston, the Mayor has the authority to 
declare a state of local emergency so that citizens can begin preparing (MA-CEMP, 
2017: 4-19) while, the city will utilize its own resources and agencies initially, with 
the potential of activating the “community-to-community mutual aid” (MA-CEMP, 
2017: 1-9) programmes which helps a city like Boston overcome jurisdictional issues 
and attain resources quickly. City Hall and the OEM will only request state or 
federal help if all local resources have been exhausted or the situation is 
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overwhelming for the agencies, personnel and resources. The SEOC being enacted 
helps distribute resources to the scene and is the first step in moving towards federal 
aid, if it is required. If the state and local resources both become overwhelmed or 
exhausted then the governor will request a presidential declaration at any time post 
the event for 30 days (MA-CEMP, 2017).  
“So, then the local government puts a request into the State who then puts it 
into the Federal Government. So, if it reaches a certain threshold then we can 
enact what is called the Stafford Act. And that basically means that the 
Federal Government can come in with additional resources to fit 
circumstances of the incident”. (Participant IDA) 
As discussed earlier, the coordination and handling of emergencies 
are easier and more efficient when potential hazards and risks have been identified 
but at the local scale, it is not a federal requirement to undertake any such task. 
However, the Federal Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000, restricts FEMA funding for 
municipalities who do not engage in hazard and risk identification and mitigation 
plans every five years (CoBNHMP, 2014). In the 2014, “City of Boston Natural 
Hazards Mitigation Plan” the risks were identified (see Figure 5.9) but the 
definitions of the likelihood of these events as defined in Figure 5.10 were taken 
from the Massachusetts Hazard Mitigation Plan of 2010 as no new data was 
available. The natural risks that are most likely to have the highest consequences are 
mainly weather based events, with flooding being likely with a medium impact. 
However, I propose that flooding is now highly likely with high consequences as is 
evident from the figures of Quincy, MA (a city which neighbours Boston) and 
Boston Harbour in March 2018 and from participant IDB who stated:  
“I think that coastal flooding is seen as more of that big issue that people 
might be aware of but there are definitely huge problems with our existing 
infrastructure and storm water management infrastructure is very old”. 
Finally, this plan is specifically about natural hazards and is the 
only plan accessible on the OEM website. Most likely, there is an equivalent for 
human-made disasters but this unavailable.  
Figure 5.9: Identified Hazard 
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Source: (CoBNHMP, 2014:25).  
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Figure 5.10: Definitions for reading  
 
Source: (CoBNHMP, 2014:26) 
 
Figure 5.11: Coastal Flooding in Hough’s Neck, Quincy MA March 2nd, 2018. 
 
Source: Byrne, A (2018) via Facebook. 
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Figure 5.12: Coastal Flooding in Hough’s Neck, Quincy MA March 2nd, 2018. 
 
Source: Byrne, A (2018) via Facebook. 
 
Figure 5.13: Coastal Flooding in Hough’s Neck, Quincy MA March 2nd, 2018 
 
Source: Byrne, A (2018) via Facebook. 
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Figure 5.14: Coastal Flooding at Boston Harbour MA March 2nd, 2018. 
 
Source: 7 News-WHPN Boston via Facebook Live.  
 
Figure 5.15: Coastal Flooding at Boston Harbour MA March 2nd, 2018. 
 
Source: 7 News-WHPN Boston via Facebook Live.  
 
Figures 5.11 to 5.15 illustrate the potential for flooding in the 
Boston region with the hazard identification list illustrating the vast range of natural 
hazards that may affect the region creating difficulties for citizens to prepare and 
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respond effectively. Boston’s OEM has one public plan in place, “Ready Boston”, 
which would have contributed to the population being prepared for the above event 
and others. This is a city-wide community emergency preparedness plan which 
according to OEM (2016) “educates and empowers Bostonians about the hazards 
they may face” and encourages preparation. It is developed under FEMA’s Ready 
America Plan and both focus on the all-hazards approach thus, shifting away from 
the publicly available natural hazards plan towards an acceptance that the population 
needs to be prepared for all types of events. It is simple in its development and 
requests of people by asking that the population take part in 3 steps. First, have a 
plan. Second, have a kit and go-bag and finally be informed about your risk. It also 
informs the public of the alert system that can provide information to the public via 
text and provides access to evacuation plans (see Figure 5.16).  
Figure 5.16: Text alert regarding extreme weather June 29th 2018 
 
Source: Leddy, M (Private message) 
 
This system was supported by Participant IDC, a member of a 
volunteer agency with a research component, who explained the value behind such 
simple requests and the questions they use to make vulnerable communities realise 
their need to achieve these steps. 
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“They are very basic; it is three steps. Stay informed, make a plan, build a kit. 
So, it is staying informed, what are your local hazards, and what would you 
do if there was a tornado versus a hurricane? I mean there aren't any here but 
if a winter storm hits what are you going to do? And then making a plan, just 
making sure you have contacts in the city and outside of the city to call. So, if 
phone lines get really mashed up during any emergencies, so basically telling 
people to send a text if you can, if you can get to your friend down the street, 
call your family in a different state, call your friend in a different state or 
across the US and then making sure that you and your family have a meeting 
place, designated beforehand. If something were to happen somewhere else, 
where would you meet? Down the street or a neighbourhood meeting place a 
little bit further out. Just so if you can't get in contact you at least know where 
to go”. (Participant IDC). 
Boston is facing a range of crises, but it benefits from excellent 
emergency services, great coordination and the ability to work alongside both state 
and federal scales. Further, Boston’s location neighbouring other cities, results in a 
higher level of resources and staff before they must escalate upwards. This is 
summed up by participant IDK  
“I mean we had the marathon bombing in 2013 and there was so much 
cooperation, everybody just... What did they call it? Swarm intelligence. 
Everybody did what they had to do without really communicating why they 
did it, but it just worked so well.” 
5.6 USEMA Activation: Case study 2: United States- Boston Marathon Bombing 
April 15th, 2013 
At the 117th Boston Marathon, two homemade improvised 
explosive devices (IEDs) were detonated on Boylston Street in two separate 
locations near the finish line killing three and wounding 264 people. It resulted in a 
week-long inter-agency and inter-jurisdictional response resulting in the death of one 
suspect and the arrest of the second. This section will give an overview of the key 
events as outlined in detail by the After-Action Report (AAR, 2014) and briefly 
discussed in the House Homeland Security Committee Report (HHSCR, 2014). This 
timeline is to give a brief introduction of the attack and response, so it will appear 
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plotted, but the gaps will be filled during later discussions on inter-agency 
coordination in this chapter.  
Monday 15th 
The Boston Marathon began at 9am with the final runners setting 
off at 10.40am resulting in some 27,000 runners on the course by 11am and the elite 
runners finishing at 12.36pm. The Red Sox game begins in Fenway in Kenmore 
Square which is part of the marathon route. At 2.08pm the Red Sox game ends and 
at 2.24pm, course medical stations between 1 and 8 are closed. Then at 2.49pm, the 
first bomb detonates in front of 671 Boylston street, with the second bomb 
detonating 180 yards away at 755 Boylston street 13 seconds later (ARR, 2014). 
Wednesday 17th 
As a result of public requests, the FBI begin acquiring numerous 
photos and videos from the public of the attack and potential suspects. 
Thursday 18th 
At 10.28pm an armed robbery occurs at a store in Cambridge, a 
neighbouring city of Boston. Then at 10.31pm, an MIT Police officer is fatally shot 
while sitting in his cruiser. It is suggested that these attacks are linked and a BOLO 
(Be on the Lookout) is declared. Then at 11.20pm, an SUV is carjacked.  
Friday 19th 
At 12.19am Cambridge Police Department receives a 911 call from 
the victim of the SUV carjacking after he escapes. After about twenty minutes of 
police interviews, the victim says he recognises the carjackers from the Boston 
Marathon Bombing and that his SUV has a Manufactured Tracking system (ARR, 
2014).  
At 12.41am, the tracking system locates the vehicle in Watertown 
and an officer of Watertown Police Department (PD) begins following it but is told 
to hold back by superior officers until they arrive. As the SUV travels the officer 
remains behind it and another vehicle, a Honda Civic, at a distance until the SUV 
stops and the suspect exits and begins walking towards the officer’s cruiser shooting. 
At this point, the officer's supervisor arrives, and the suspect begins shooting at him, 
barely missing the officer as he shot through the windscreen. At this point, the 
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second suspect emerges from the Honda Civic and begins throwing homemade IEDs 
at the officers.  
At 12.44am, “shots fired” is relayed via radio to other police 
departments to respond. BPD, Cambridge PD, Transit PD, Massachusetts State 
Police (MSP) and nearby communities respond with several hundred officers 
arriving as the suspects continue the shootout and throwing IEDs and a pressure 
cooker bomb at the officers (ARR, 2014).  
At 12.49am the first suspect is tackled by officers and is struck by 
the vehicle of the second suspect as he flees the scene. The first suspect is arrested 
and brought to a hospital. The second suspect flees while shooting and wounding an 
Massachusetts Bay Transport Agency (MBTA) Transit Officer. He drives half a mile 
before abandoning the car and fleeing on foot.  
At 12.56am several areas of Watertown are restricted, and a larger 
perimeter is set up for a comprehensive grid search, which is not completed until 6 
pm. At 1.06am the first suspect is pronounced dead in hospital, but his fingerprints 
are used to identify him and his younger brother as the second suspect. Thus, at 
2.05am the FBI releases clear front facing photos of the suspects (ARR, 2014).  
At 7.15am a suspicious person carrying a package is reported to 
have been picked up by a taxi driver and dropped at South Station, it was suggested 
that the passenger than boarded a Amtrak train. The report was taken seriously due 
to the taxi driver being of middle eastern characteristics and appearing on the federal 
terrorist watchlist. The report does not explain what made the taxi passenger 
suspicious. As a result, South Station was locked down, the taxi driver was 
questioned and an Amtrak train in Norwalk, Connecticut which departed from South 
Station was searched for the passenger. At 9am, it was determined that no suspect 
was found on the train and that the taxi driver was innocent as his name had been 
misspelt, and he did not appear on the watchlist.  
At. 6.42pm, Watertown PD receives a 911 call from a member of 
the public stating that an injured individual is in his parked and tarped boat. Multiple 
police units respond with officers shooting at the boat at 6.54pm until a superior 
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officer orders a ceasefire and movement under the tarp is noted at 7.05pm (ARR, 
2014).  
At 7.43pm tactical decisions are made to deploy flashbangs in the 
boat to lure the suspect out but at 7.46pm no suspect emerges. At 8.02pm, the FBI 
Hostage Response Team is deployed alongside the “MSP Special Tactical 
Operations Team who deploy a Bearcat armoured vehicle with an armoured arm to 
pull back the tarp” (ARR, 201432). The suspect does not engage with hostage 
negotiators straight away but at 8.41pm he emerges from the boat and is arrested and 
brought to a hospital. This ends the response portion of the Boston Marathon with 
the following days being about recovery, community resilience and grief.  
5.7 Inter-agency Coordination During and Post the Boston Marathon Bombing.  
The response to severe weather events and terrorist events notably 
changes the shape of an assemblage in differing ways as the response must cater for 
different eventualities and circumstances and yet, both emergency management 
systems responded to their individual events using the all-hazards approach.  
Both the Irish and US events required national input but did so in 
very different ways based on policy, need and preparation and both came from very 
different positions. Ireland was given warning of the impending storms and was able 
to prepare whereas Boston had no warning about the attack, but due to the marathon 
certain response procedures, the SEOC and medical tents were already in place, 
which helped to create a quicker and more efficient response ensuring that anyone 
who made it to hospital survived (AAR, 2014). “So, the marathon is kind of an 
interesting phenomenon in that the marathon is kind of treated as a planned disaster” 
(Participant IDF). 
Even so, this was a prolonged event that shifted the assemblage 
from a very clear procedurally hierarchical shape to a misshaped, messy 
simultaneously hierarchical and flat assemblage where the lines blurred. Roles and 
responsibilities become confused as inter-agency coordination weakened, as power 
splintered everywhere and bounced between agencies, scales and jurisdictions.  
The After-Action report (2014) identified a series of issues with 
coordination, which all contributed to the illustration of a messy structured and 
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continually changing assemblage emerging during the crisis, even when procedures 
were already partially activated. Figures 5.17 to 5.19 represent the changes in the 
assemblage shape as the event unfolded over the week. The power networks could 
not adequately be drawn but are very much present and accountable for the 
continually changing shape.  
Figure 5.17: Stage 1- Boston Marathon Emergency Management Assemblage-pre-
planned 
 
Source: Information retained from the After-Action Report (2014). 
 
Figure 5.17 illustrates the pre-planned assemblage for the Boston 
Marathon as per the After-Action Report (2014). There were several control centres 
around the city and state which activated from 7 am on Monday the 15th. Notably, 
Boston Emergency Operation Centre was not open, instead multi-agency 
coordination occurred in the MEMA headquarters in Framingham located an hour 
outside of Boston. The Multi-Agency Coordination Centre (MACC) was: 
“staffed with more than 80 personnel representing Police and Fire 
Departments from Hopkinton, Ashland, Framingham, Natick, Wellesley, 
Newton, Brookline and  Boston, MEMA, MSP, MBTA Transit PD, 
Commonwealth Fusion Centre (CFC), Massachusetts Department of Fire 
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Services (DFS), Massachusetts Department of Transportation (Mass DOT), 
Massachusetts Department of Public Health (MDPH), Office of Emergency 
Medical Services (OEMS), Massachusetts National Guard (MANG), Office 
of Technology and Information Services (OTIS), American Red Cross 
(ARC), AMR Ambulance, Cataldo Ambulance, Fallon Ambulance, Boston 
EMS, the Boston Athletic Association (BAA), the US Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS), the Federal Bureau of  Investigation (FBI), the 
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), the Federal Emergency  
Management Agency (FEMA), the National Weather Service, and Amateur 
Radio.” (ARR, 2014:19). 
Locally within Boston, the Law Enforcement Coordination Centre 
(LECC) was based at Boston Police Department (BPD) headquarters with 
representatives of 
“BPD command staff, Boston Fire Department (BFD), Boston Emergency 
Medical Services (Boston EMS), Massachusetts Bay Transit Authority 
(MBTA) Transit Police (Transit PD), Massachusetts State Police (MSP), and 
Boston Regional Intelligence Centre (BRIC).” (ARR, 2014:19).  
These two control centres were the focus of inter-agency 
coordination, but there is a clear scalar and jurisdictional separation between them. 
The MACC is the location for federal and state agencies and response agencies from 
different towns and cities affected by the marathon, including Boston, as discussed 
by participant IDM, while health functions are supported by the Massachusetts 
Department of Public Health Operations Centre.  
“For some of the larger scale activations which are the planned events, the 
State is involved as well, so MEMA will have a rep here. The Marathon is 
the one time that we will also send a rep to their location because the 
marathon goes through, I can't remember how many communities, but every 
community is based at MEMA and then they will also have someone at our 
operations centre. So, we work with them for bad weather, larger events, but 
there is constant interaction between our agencies.” (Participant IDM). 
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The LECC primarily consists of agencies based in Boston with the 
exception of the MSP and MBTA, which are agencies with a broader jurisdictional 
governance. This distinction is in line with the Stafford Act (1988), DHS (2013) and 
MA-CEMP (2017), where a response is local first and escalated upwards through the 
pre-determined channels if deemed necessary. The activation of the state scale prior 
to the marathon, is due to the scale and inter-jurisdictional character of the event. 
The activation of both the MACC and LECC is evidence of power bouncing as 
issues along the course are dealt with by different centres of the assemblage based on 
the geographical location of such thus, suggesting that the assemblage is 
theoretically, and via policy, a hierarchy with the MACC being senior (MA-CEMP, 
2017, DHS, 2013) to the LECC. However, the local scale via policy (Stafford Act, 
2018, MA-CEMP, 2017) retains full autonomy and power while also ensuring that 
the MACC is activated to help with the marathon thus, relinquishing some control 
and power resulting in power shifting and bouncing between the two centres. 
Therefore, this assemblage, is in practice, flat but in theory hierarchical, so it 
oscillates between the two ontological assumptions discussed by Brenner et al, 
(2011) and McFarlane (2011a&b) and within this shifting and oscillation some 
agencies, or aspects of the assemblage, are positioned in the middle moving 
positions as required. For instance, the medical control centres are neither flat nor 
hierarchical they support the health aspect of the marathon only and are not inter-
disciplined like the MACC or LECC so, depending on the issue and relationships 
between the centres the medical control centres can oscillate positions in order to be 
able to efficiently respond.  
Figure 5.18: Stage 2 - Response assemblage post attack-Monday 15th 
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Source: Information retained from the After-Action Report (2014).  
 
Figure 5.18 illustrates the change in the shape of the assemblage 
post attack on Monday 15th. The Figure is a clear depiction of the assemblage, but it 
does not show the power dynamics and aspects of a weak inter-agency coordination 
which hindered the response. Firstly, Boston Emergency Operations Centre activated 
30 minutes after the attack, delaying the use of WebEOC for the sharing of 
information to other agencies within Boston and across the state and it incurred an 
even longer delay in receiving staff. The importance of the WebEOC for the 
marathon is illustrated by participant IDM.  
“So, for the marathon, we have the marathon route within the map, we have 
the exact location of all the assets and where they are staged, and then you 
have all the CAD (Computer Aided Dispatch ) calls coming in and then you 
have where the WebEOC posts. And we have 311 within the city of Boston. 
We also have all the 311 calls being mapped." (Participant, IDM).  
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The ARR (2014) has recommended that the Boston EOC is always 
activated for the marathon going forward in order to help with inter-agency 
coordination and jurisdictional issues. Both the MACC and LECC and 
Massachusetts Department of Public Health Operations Centre remained active 
while a Unified Command Centre (UCC) was organised for senior officials of key 
agencies of all jurisdictional scales. For example, Boston OEM, MEMA and FBI 
were all present. The development of so many operations centres caused confusion 
with agencies who were unsure of the tasks they were responsible for (ARR, 2014) 
as there was no clear hierarchy or command structure (ARR, 2014). This illustrates 
the beginning of a messy assemblage consisting of several centres of operations all 
lacking efficient communication and, thus, weakening coordination between 
agencies, jurisdictions and scales. Further, lack of preparation in identifying the 
location for the UCC beforehand, created unnecessary tensions and stress searching 
for an appropriate and well-equipped location after the event had unfolded. This lack 
of preparation resulted in the UCC needing to request that mobile communications 
operators ensure that mobile infrastructure covers the UCC as the infrastructure had 
collapsed under the pressure of the lines post attack (ARR, 2014).  
“So, during the marathon, the phone system was overloaded but we could 
still text, data still went” (Participant IDD) 
“I do recall it during the Boston marathon bombings and trying to call anyone 
here the phone lines just weren't functioning. People started spreading 
rumours, they shut it down. We didn't shut it down; the capacity isn't there.” 
(Participant IDC) 
“During the marathon bombing it was difficult to communicate across all 
agencies as the mobile telecommunications went down” (Former Boston 
Police Department Commissioner Bill Evans)15.  
On the finish line, where the two attacks occurred, first responders, 
as well as the Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD), SWAT, Air Wings and 
                                                          
15 A direct interview with Former Police Commissioner and Incident Command Officer Bill Evans 
proved impossible to attain.  However, he spoke at the American Ambassador’s Residence in October 
2018 (see Appendix 9 for the invite and notes.  Thus, when Bill Evans is referred to it is taken from 
his speech and is not verbatim.  
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surrounding hospitals all activated the relevant agency response. This was aided as 
“they set the bombs off 4 hours in, when the crowd had moved rather than earlier 
when the winners were coming in. Further, because it occurred at the finish line the 
medical tents were already set up. Thus, within 20 minutes everyone was removed 
from the scene and they all survived, anyone who died, died there” (Bill Evans). 
However, as the mobile phone network was overloaded the 
responders used their radios for communication but neglected to use the marathon 
specific channels that would have facilitated quicker sharing of information across 
agencies (ARR, 2014). This illustrates a lack of recognizance of the importance of 
inter-agency coordination at the operational scale and a restriction on the sharing of 
power between agencies. Further, the relationships between law enforcement and 
hospitals became fractious due to the intimidating presence of law enforcement 
officials interviewing patients and taking victims cell phones for analysis, without 
properly explaining the process. This turned out to be invasive but deemed a 
necessary investigative method as all cell phone data was uploaded to a server to be 
analysed. However, delays occurred as it crashed and only one technician was 
available to fix it (ARR, 2014), but this information was not shared with the victims 
or hospital staff. Thus, this lack of information emanated from an imagined sense of 
power and authority that the police officers held by both the investigators, hospital 
staff and patients, which is evident in how the staff and victims described them as 
“intimidating” (ARR, 2014:42) resulting in tension occurring between hospital staff 
and investigators reducing the ability to effectively coordinate. This produced an 
imagined hierarchical assemblage, with law enforcement acting as the King and 
hospital staff and patients being the subjects who must obey due to a sense of self-
discipline and fear of powerful authorities like police forces. (Gordon, 1972 and 
Sennellart et al, 2007))  
Further, there was no Joint Information Centre for the coordination 
and dissemination of information, which resulted in individual agencies providing 
information to the public which was not vetted when the UCC stood down on 
Tuesday 16th. Thus, miscommunication between agencies and the public created 
tensions and confusion regarding situational awareness and true information which 
became critical during the third major stage of the event – the capture.  
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Figure 5.19: Stage 3 - Response assemblage for the capture. 
 
Source: Information retained from the After-Action Report (2014). 
 
This assemblage developed and was re-shaped during a 24-hour 
period from Thursday 18th April until early evening on Friday 19th. The oscillations 
and re-shaping were based on the events that were occurring and the required 
response level, but it also resulted in a lack miscommunication, crossfires, command, 
control, sharing of local knowledge and firing authorisation.  
The initial emerging of the response assemblage occurred after the 
carjacking and chase by a Watertown Officer which involved a firefight between the 
suspects and several police departments. However, there was a lack of firearm 
discipline as described in the After-Action Report (2014: 10)  
"Although initial responding officers practised appropriate weapons 
discipline while they were engaged in the firefight with the suspects, 
additional officers arriving on scene near the conclusion of the firefight fired 
weapons toward the vicinity of the suspects, without necessarily having 
identified and lined up their target or appropriately aimed their weapons. 
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Officers lining both sides of the street also fired upon the second suspect as 
he fled the scene in a vehicle." 
This illustrates lack of management and information of the scene as 
there was no recognisable senior officer (Bill Evans was the Incident Command 
Officer but his efforts were affected by the sheer number of officers leaving the 
staging area and travelling to the scene without authority), combined with limited 
preparation for such an event, where the lines of responsibility are unclear due to 
numerous police departments emerging on the one scene. This was particularly 
confusing because it was a federal case rather than a city or state case, so the FBI had 
taken responsibility as the lead agency after the attack, but they recognised Bill 
Evans as in charge and allowed him to continue to the best of his abilities under the 
circumstances (ARR 2014 and HHSCR, 2014). So, the lack of governance, 
combined with human emotions of fear and anger (Bill Evans recognises this as an 
explanation also), resulted in dangerous crossfires and undisciplined firing towards 
the ‘suspected’ terrorists, as they were at this stage.  
This firefight resulted in the re-deployment of a Unified Command 
Centre in the Arsenal Mall containing most of the agencies of the original UCC, but 
incorporating more local police departments. A request was sent to law enforcement 
officers with "2500 emerging on the UCC from over 116 federal, state and local 
scales" (ARR, 2014:10). It was this extravagant response that facilitated a collapse in 
command structures and inter-agency coordination as only requested officers were 
“assigned roles or provided with a briefing” (ARR, 2014:10) meaning that self-
deployed officers were under no command, received no informational brief resulting 
in “logistical, command and safety issues” (ARR, 2014:10). Further, officers were 
resistant to taking direction from a senior officer of a different agency. This is 
illustrative of splintering power as the numerous police agencies all have to share 
power and knowledge when traditionally they are independent agencies which rarely 
cross jurisdictional boundaries particularly for local police forces such as Watertown 
PD. The role of the UCC should have been to create command structures and 
implement some sort of hierarchy. Instead the splintering of power between the 
agencies resulted in very weak inter-agency coordination. While the police 
departments were undertaking searches and the UCC was attempting to create some 
form of unified coordination, the Governor and Mayor of Boston were informed of 
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the sighting and searches via telephone while the Massachusetts Department of 
Public Health Operations Centre re-opened and prepared for possible casualties. 
While shelters and public orders were put in place in a disorganised manner as 
described by Participant IDF.  
“So, the marathon bombing, I don't know how much you followed it, but the 
Friday after the bombing, so the bombing was on Monday, so the Friday after 
the bombing there was a manhunt where they found the people and had that 
chase through Cambridge. And they shut down the city and everybody was 
told to shelter in place and stay at home. Which I think was unprecedented, or 
at least unusual, that many people to be told, on a workday, to stay at home. 
When it was a beautiful day, warm and sunny, a nice day, it wasn't like a 
snowstorm or anything when people are used to staying at home. And so, it 
started out as, I have to get the exact order, but it started out  maybe Boston 
and then it ended up being extended to all the cities that boarded them. It was 
very piecemeal, so each city decided separately if they were going to put 
issues of shelter in place or whatever.” (Participant IDF) 
Further, the tension and lack of information sharing between police 
departments resulted in the misidentification of the taxi driver as a terrorist and a 
black SUV being shot at by a police officer as it had mistakenly been reported as 
stolen. Consequently, it turned out that the vehicle was occupied by plainclothes 
officers from MSP and BPD (ARR, 2014). Information on their whereabouts and 
vehicle were not shared with the other police departments resulting in police 
agencies firing on police agencies, which is indicative of weak inter-agency 
coordination and an assemblage with no determinable shape.   
This lack of coordination and inter-agency collaboration was 
further identified in the After-Action Report (2014) as it described a disinterest in 
local knowledge. Clearly, local officers would have the best understanding of the 
geography of the area and the community culture. Yet, this knowledge was not 
utilised resulting in a slowness in response to various sightings and information 
which could have been made more efficient if Watertown PD had been included in a 
more knowledgeable and powerful position within the assemblage (ARR, 2014).  
175 
 
Finally, the capture re-centred the assemblage, but again there were 
issues with miscommunication and undisciplined firing, as one officer fired his gun 
due to movement in the boat resulting in other officers firing in the belief they were 
being fired on (ARR, 2014). When, I questioned Bill Evans on this he confirmed that 
the shot was not by a Boston Police Officer, but that it came from an officer with 
inadequate firearm training.  
This case study illustrates the importance for assemblages to have 
fluid borders which allow agencies to shift and move and for assemblages to be re-
shaped to suit the situation. However, this is not an easy task as seen, particularly by 
the third stage. Assemblages need to be structured and require strong inter-agency 
coordination and trust for them to function and respond efficiently. By weakening 
inter-agency coordination, it becomes impossible to recognise the structure of the 
assemblage as either hierarchical, flat or oscillating instead it almost becomes one of 
anarchy and mess. Thus, this furthers the argument that there is a third ontological 
option for understanding assemblages, one which acknowledges that, in reality, 
assemblages oscillate between being flat and hierarchical and how this movement 
occurs has been shown in both case studies.  
However, the Boston Marathon Attack introduces a fourth type 
which is not an ontological understanding, as the assemblage is deconstructed due to 
the axiological foundations and social constructions of the responding police officers 
who responded in an almost primal manner while working within a formal structure. 
The officers involved were disorganised, un-commanded, uncoordinated and siloed 
in their willingness to engage with other agencies but they all had one goal to find 
the second suspect. They all shared the same values of ‘serve and protect’ which 
explains why 2500 turned up. Further, the bombings were a direct attack on their 
social worlds and deconstructed the social safety and comfort of Boston and 
Massachusetts, which could only be re-built when both suspects were captured. This 
resulted in a lack of information, dire coordination, crossfires and ineffective and 
slow response and consequently, the deconstruction of the US emergency 
management assemblage as the response turned into anarchy. Yet, each police 
officer personally knew their role and their responsibility, so the deconstructed 
assemblage can be determined as an imagined rather than a formal assemblage of 
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police officers working to re-build the social world of the jurisdictions they swore to 
protect. 
5.8 Conclusion 
In conclusion, there are some aspects of emergency management in 
the US that are excellent and some that need critique. One of the key positive 
elements of the United States Emergency Management System is that the policy is 
legislated and connected with funding. This ensures a similar system is used across 
the US and that all agencies and scales know the procedures that must be followed. It 
could be argued that by restricting funding for the local scale if they do not follow 
the federal guidelines, is overstretching their power, but it ensures that at all scales 
there are plans, that training is done, and that resources and centres are equipped. In 
a country prone to everything the only way of mitigating and responding to events is 
through formalised policy.   
For instance, during a ride along that I took part in in April 2016, I 
observed several different types of calls from rescue to road traffic collisions (RTC) 
to illnesses in the home. I was unsurprised when Police and Fire turned up to the 
rescues and RTCs but was shocked when they arrived for home calls. Then in 
November 2017, I witnessed several home calls where again all services responded. 
When I informally questioned this (I was not allowed to record anything) the 
responses varied from safety, boredom and everyone is trained so it is just about 
getting on the scene as soon as possible. However, I witnessed how these informal 
networks work and why they are important at the operational level with regard to the 
sharing of information and knowledge quickly. During a major disaster these people 
will rely on each other and by working together constantly the likelihood of an 
efficient coordinated response, at least at operational scale, increases because as 
participant IDK suggests it results in “swarm intelligence, the way a beehive works, 
everybody just knows their role and that is really how it works.” Thus, there is a 
need for the informal aspects of emergency management to be catered for and 
discussed in policy but not in a manner that formalises them.  
Connected to this formal/informal dichotomy and need for 
coordination is the issue of legacy siloed agencies which, as with the Irish policy, the 
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consequences of such is not discussed in the policy. However, with the participants 
of this research, they become clear through their frustrations. 
“[…] but they [Fire] are kind of learning our ways since working with us but 
it used to be a big ego thing on their side and they would end up not having 
as much information, but they are starting to learn, actually EMS seems to 
always get their nose into things and I think it is the way that we present 
ourselves. We want to work with people, not against them and I think Fire is 
definitely starting to see that as a better road to be on, which is good, it is 
good for everybody, but for a long time they didn’t see it that way” 
(Participant IDD). 
“[…] it seems like the way city departments operate normally, that you have 
your body of work that you do, and you focus on and so when you are 
constantly underfunded and understaffed and all these pieces it is harder to be 
more collaborative. It is not an excuse, but it is definitely one of the big 
challenges around how to do this well and generally, some of the best 
practices that I have seen have been around people being able to convene 
people for collaboration in a way where it actually helps them get their work 
done” (Participant IDA). 
Further, this impenetrable structure is similar to a military 
approach which the US emergency management system is still influenced by. This is 
clear in the inaccessibility of emergency management policy, in the influence and 
power that the Department of Homeland Security has at all scales for instance at the 
local scale in Boston it is the DHS that manages funding for the region (OEM, 
2018). Even the language used in some of the documents is military inspired. A key 
example is the use of “Mission” - this is almost an over-zealous word with 
Hollywood connections when the word ‘task’ would be a less political or militaristic 
term to explain the same action (DHS, 2013:20). At the federal scale, there is a pre-
occupation with protecting territory with Trump’s wall and the different responses to 
foreign and domestic terrorism and the findings of the GAO testimony after 
Hurricane Katrina.  
The GAO testimony found that although both government and 
private resources were utilised during Hurricane Katrina, they were overwhelmed 
178 
 
and that the lessons learned from both Hurricanes Katrina and Rita are the same as 
those learned after Hurricane Andrew which devastated Florida in 1992. This raises 
questions about the effectiveness of federal emergency management and its ability or 
will to evolve and build upon lessons learned. Instead, the federal scale appears as a 
bureaucratic politically fuelled arena with weak powers but with a clear sovereign 
authority one-person decision maker in the President. It also illustrates a lack of 
understanding of the probability surrounding repeat events which encourages a lack 
of fast-paced response. Yet, response to foreign terrorist threats is enacted with haste 
suggesting that the protection of territory from foreign powers still trumps protection 
of life and land from natural hazards, which are deemed local issues rather than 
federal.  
Two-word choices have been used in the above paragraph which 
need further explanation. The choice to distinguish between the foreign terrorist and 
homegrown is as a result of recent developments in US history. President Trump has 
enacted several restrictions against immigrants and tourists, the most obvious being 
Executive Order 13769 “Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the 
United States” which was in effect from 27 January 2017 until 16 March 2017, apart 
from when it was blocked by the courts. The key aims were to reduce the number of 
refugees, temporarily suspend the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program and the 
indefinite entry of Syrians. Citizens of Iran, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Sudan and Yemen 
were also blocked from entering even those holding green cards or valid visas.  
 After March 16, Executive Order 13780 “Protecting the Nation 
from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States” continues to restrict travel into 
the US from certain countries and for all refugees who do not have a visa or valid 
travel documents. Trump called the order a "watered down, politically correct 
version" of the prior executive order via Twitter, see Figure 5.20.  
Figure 5.20: President Trump’s response to the Travel Ban 
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Source: Donald Trump’s Twitter Page (2017). 
 
Yet, during homegrown terrorist attacks such as the Las Vegas 
shooting in October 2017 and the Stoneman Douglas High School shooting in 
February 2018, the federal response is to console but enact very little change 
particularly with regard to firearm restrictions. Thus, the decision to distinguish 
between foreign and US terrorist is due to the defined difference in response by 
federal authorities and the clear military approach of defending territory first.  
The second-word choice is ‘local’. There is a vast difference in the 
Irish understanding of local and the US understanding. By stating that natural 
disasters are viewed as local incidents that are not of major federal concern, is not to 
limit them geographically, but to illustrate that a natural hazard is less likely to affect 
the whole of the United States at the same time in the way it can affect Ireland. 
However, floods, hurricanes etc. can affect multiple states simultaneously, but in 
terms of the federal government are still local incidents whereas, military or 
concerns over protection of territory are understood as federal.  
However, at state and local scale the military connotations are 
weaker but the language at the federal is strong, powerful and impactful “unified 
command” (DHS, 2013:6), “Strategic Information and Operation Centre” (DHS, 
2013:6) and “Fusion Centre” (MA-CEMP, 2017: 2-2). Culturally, the US is a 
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military loving country and, although the emergency management programs have 
evolved away from their early militarised days to more Civil Defense operations, the 
language is still akin to strength, protection and power. It still reads as conflict and 
defence language in comparison to Ireland’s softer and contained language.  
Further, due to the three distinct stages of response, the Boston 
Marathon bombing confirms that the assemblage morphs, re-shapes and even 
dismantles to suit the requirements of that particular time and space but also due to 
natural human responses an element that is not as clear in the Irish case study. 
Although, the IEMA and the USEMA have different structures, they both respond in 
the same way. They oscillate between vertical and flat spaces and sometimes they 
occupy a messy middle space because of external issues such as governance and 
internal issues such as inter-agency trust and communication. These two chapters 
defend the proposition that real-world/real-time assemblages cannot be studied 
through only one ontological framework as discussed by Brenner et al, (2011) and 
McFarlane (2011a/b). They are live, fluid and flexible structures made up of real 
people, processes and objects which cannot be confined to one particular shape, 
space or time. Further, how they re-shape is highly influenced by the power 
dynamics between and within agencies, and a study of assemblages needs to take this 
into account but to broaden beyond Foucault’s idea of ‘power is everywhere’ to an 
understanding that yes, it is everywhere but that it is still highly regularised, 
controlled and ultimately there is a sovereign who can take control especially when 
human will begin to affect the response network. This was seen when former Boston 
Police Commissioner Bill Evans, stated that he had to shout and scream at the 
responding police officers at the boat scene, after a rogue shot was taken, to ensure 
that the terrorist and the officers remained safe. The next chapter explores in detail, 
using these case studies, some of the external factors that affect the oscillation of the 
assemblages from a policy shape to an activated shape.  
  
181 
 
Chapter 6: Politics, Governance, (In)formalisation and 
Institutionalisation. 
 
6.1 Introduction 
The previous two chapters provided insight into the power 
dynamics which result in the IEMA and USEMA oscillating positions under 
different circumstances. However, to fully understand how these power dynamics 
actually cause the assemblage to oscillate, it is necessary to study the broader 
external factors that influence CMaERA and its agencies. There are three key factors 
that emerged from this research; political will and governance, institutionalisation, 
and agency (in)formalisation. However, this does not discount other influences such 
as economic factors, resources, the role of the media and socio-spatial factors such as 
funding which were mentioned briefly and deemed as insignificant. This was 
illustrated by a senior official of an emergency service in Dublin who argued that 
“this morning we were talking about equipment for flooding and the issue of finance 
is not the barrier so that would be my sense of it”.  
Initially, it was considered that these three factors were separate 
unconnected factors that could be explained individually. However, as the research 
continued, it became evident that the relationship between the three factors is much 
more complex, messy and inter-scalar. Therefore, this chapter is not structured by 
factors, but through three questions so that the narrative can demonstrate the subtle 
but complex connections between how they influence one another and, in turn, how 
this contributes to creating the conditions needed for the assemblage to oscillate 
when necessary.  
Firstly, this chapter begins by discussing political will and 
governance structures. It brings ‘dispositif’ and ‘oikonomia’ into conversation with 
how a CMaERA is governed, followed by the influence of ephemeral political 
spaces and how that can affect the shape of the assemblage. This then leads to a 
discussion on the informal and formal organisation of CMaERA indicating both the 
advantages and disadvantages of each structure and then, by referring to the case 
studies, it illustrates how these influence the shape of the assemblage. Finally, the 
ignorance surrounding institutionalisation within emergency management is 
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discussed and explored through a  short case study on the institutionalisation of 
AGS.  
6.2 Political Will and Governance 
Firstly, can we understand or categorise the governance of 
CMaERA through Foucault and Agamben’s assertions? To recall, ‘dispositif’ is the 
idea that there are multiple but dispersed sovereigns who govern society through 
decentralised and networked power dynamics whilst, ‘oikonomia’ argues that there 
is one covert sovereign authority who oversees agencies and their leaders in their 
duties. It suggests that the sovereign creates the standards and rules for society and 
encourages their agencies to enforce them. I do not think either assertion can 
adequately capture the complexities of a CMaERA, but I think they offer a position 
to begin thinking through how and why a policy is created and who makes decisions 
at all stages of emergency management. Similarly, to assemblage theory I argue, that 
the governance structures of a CMaERA change as it shifts position in response to an 
event or as it rolls back to its everyday functions.  
The CMaERA, while responding to everyday events or during 
steering meetings, leans towards a flatter assemblage shape and can be easily 
understood to be governed in more of a ‘dispositif’ manner. However, once agencies 
are in the field and senior officials and government departments are in the relevant 
coordination centre, the governance becomes more of an “oikonomia" type, as the 
once-covert sovereign now re-emerges to oversee the work of its underlying and 
usually more expert leaders. An example is the Taoiseach regularly attending the 
National Emergency Coordination Centre during major emergencies. While, day to 
day the Taoiseach remains unseen allowing the sovereigns of each agency to operate 
as they choose. 
“While it is technocratic led, if it is on a stage the Taoiseach will be involved 
in the initial stage, the lead government minister will be involved if they need 
to be but generally they are happy to push it back towards the technocrat.” 
(Representative of an emergency management agency).  
Secondly, what does this theoretical governance system actually 
look like in reality? Regardless, of whether you understand the governance system in 
a ‘dispositif’ or ‘oikonomia’ shape, governance stems from those in control whether 
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there are many or just one. Yet, those in power tend to be those in government which 
is an inherently ephemeral structure which changes over time with new power 
dynamics introducing new priorities, practices and perspectives, which change the 
techniques of governance. Thus, when discussing CMaERA and why they re-shape, 
we need to acknowledge that these are permanent agencies operating within a 
temporary and shifting political space and that they must create a policy that can 
persist across multiple and changing political domains. As detailed in Figure 6.1, the 
ruling government administers the individual agencies of the CMaERA and 
influences the budgets, resources, policy direction and priorities of each agency 
through their parent government department. While senior officials of the CMaERA 
agencies sit on the steering groups and contribute to the writing of policy, it is only 
when the assemblage is activated that their providential will in using the policy 
becomes apparent. If the policy does not work or meet the criteria of the event, their 
expertise will supersede that, (as demonstrated during the response to the Boston 
Marathon Bombing). However, as the CMaERA re-shapes and digresses away from 
the policy structure during major events, why does the policy not evolve 
accordingly?  
Figure 6.1: The relationships between politics, policy and infrastructure 
  
Source: Author 
 
The overarching policy such as the Framework or the Stafford Act 
cannot be easily changed in response to every event especially as they can never 
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fully capture each potential scenario. Instead post-event, CMaERAs conduct cool-
down meetings and the lead agency are “responsible for generating reports and 
everything else afterwards” (Participant ID26) on how the event was managed and 
what could have been done better. These reports are shared and internalised by the 
agencies involved and “because we have done some after-actions after the winter 
storms and consistently across the board, those departments that were at the 
emergency operations centre saw the benefit.” (Participant IDM). These findings are 
usually published as guidance protocols which are semi-permanent as they will only 
change when circumstance dictates, but they “are doing a better job of conducting 
after action reports, we can really look at what went well, there are areas for 
improvement” (Participant IDM), meaning that policy may change quicker than 
before.  
Further, in the IEMA, as the key first responders are governed by 
either national or local government, which as noted is temporary, there is evidence of 
their normally permanent infrastructures being affected by changing political will. 
An example is outlined below as there is a proposal to change the structure of Dublin 
Fire Brigade and the National Ambulance Service.  
6.2.1 Dublin City Council versus Dublin Fire Brigade and the HSE 
The Health Service Executive (HSE) is the parent agency of the 
National Ambulance Service (NAS) who has operational power for the entirety of 
the Republic of Ireland, with the exception of Dublin City. The ambulance service in 
Dublin City is under the remit of Dublin Fire Brigade and is funded, in part, by 
Dublin City Council and the HSE. However, in 2015, it emerged that the HSE and 
Dublin City Council were in talks to transfer the ambulance service back to the HSE 
and, by default, the NAS, as Dublin City Council argued that they were footing the 
bill with the HSE not providing their part of the funding. Thus, Dublin City Council 
and Dublin Fire Brigade (DFB) are in the middle of a conflict regarding funding for 
the Dublin Ambulance Service (The Irish Times, 2015). In this example, the DFB 
ambulance service, which was a permanent feature, is now seen as temporary and 
moveable because it suits political will and finances. It also demonstrates that 
emergencies in the neoliberal city are seen almost as commodities; if they are not 
producing for the governing authority, particularly, a local authority, who is 
operating a neoliberal and austere budget, then they see no reason not to remove that 
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service. This is occurring under one particular city manager with particular economic 
priorities. If a different manager were to take over, the situation may or may not be 
different and it is still an unravelling situation at the time of writing (November 
2018).  
If it goes ahead, the NAS, would take over Dublin City’s 
Ambulance service and provide the service in the same reasonable manner they do 
nationwide, but there are advantages for DFB having their own ambulances serving a 
city the size of Dublin. The key benefit is they can respond to any major event within 
the golden hour even if no ambulance is available because fire-fighters are trained 
paramedics and the defibrillator is on the fire truck. The following conversation 
highlight this: 
“Respondent 1: The ambulances are so busy. 
 Respondent 2: Sometimes we use the fire truck as an ambulance because I 
am on a fire engine today. I'll go and six of us are with the patient and if 
needs be, we will wait and keep him supported until the ambulance arrives. 
 Respondent 1: And if it is a cardiac arrest the lads can give the drugs and 
they have the defibs, so they can shock them, and they can give them oxygen 
and they can give them drugs. If it was an overdose like there are a lot of 
overdoses in town, so the lads can go and give them the narcon and that will 
take them out of the hit if there are no ambulances available. Give them the 
oxygen.” (Participants ID12). 
In Boston, the Office of Emergency Management has also been 
influenced by political will as discussed by participant IDM 
“there are always some political elements and then also how it is viewed. So, 
we had a previous Mayor who really viewed the use of the emergency 
operations centre as the city has lost control when in actuality it is more we 
are activating it and having everybody there because it provides us with the 
ability to control things to have that situational awareness, that one common 
operating picture. And Eleanor (Pseudonym) has been very successful in 
getting that message out and the departments have seen the benefit.” 
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This quote explores the different attitudes and perspectives that 
different governments bring and how it affects even local government offices, such 
as the Office of Emergency Management (OEM). What is particularly notable about 
this latter example is Eleanor’s ability to circumnavigate and spread the message 
about what the OEM is for. It is no easy feat to share this message across local 
government, influence a new Mayor, and also encourage first responder agencies to 
engage. Thus, the approach of the OEM in overcoming politics is a method of 
protection for the office. If the office was only known or used during major 
catastrophes, then its everyday remit and its use during organised events such as the 
Boston Marathon would be underrated and underutilised with emergency response 
being allocated to the SEOC.  
For instance, during the Boston Marathon Bombing, Boston’s 
OEM was not open as, at that point, its necessity was undervalued. A new director of 
the OEM was appointed in 2013 (the year of the bombing) while the current Mayor, 
Marty Walsh, only began serving in 2014. These political changes combined with 
the tragedy of the Boston Marathon resulted in significant alterations being made to 
the OEM as it was now assigned as the lead coordination centre for major 
emergencies in Boston and for prepared events that occur within Boston. This small 
change had radical effects on the States response system who can now coordinate 
directly with Boston. Further, the use of the OEM as an inter-agency centre means 
that there are less agency-specific control rooms that all operating at the same time, 
vying for the same resources and struggling to share information across all agencies 
in an efficient coordinated manner. Although Boston Police Department and the 
health services still have their own operation centres, they send personnel to the 
OEM, creating a hierarchy and knowledge of where direction and decisions will 
come from resulting in coordinated decisions. This significant change to the 
organisation of the Boston branch of the USEMA assemblage, is due to a change in 
political will, new perspectives and priorities after the attack. This results in better 
inter-agency coordination and communication, quicker on the ground operations, 
knowledge sharing and the development of informal relationships in a highly 
formalised system. Thirdly, why does it matter if the CMaERA is formal or informal 
in shape in relation to its need to re-shape? 
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6.3 (In)formalisation 
Understanding formal and informal relationships helps to identify 
how assemblages can be re-structured and can oscillate position as the power 
dynamics within the assemblage and between the agencies are determined by the 
type of relationships at the scene of the event. Power will bounce and splinter 
between the agencies and the inter-jurisdictional scales if the assemblage is more 
informal in response as there is an inherent trust between the responders due to 
previous working histories. Whereas in situations where trust and informal networks 
have not been able to flourish, the assemblage tends to veer towards a hierarchical 
structure. How formal and informal networks develop depends on numerous factors 
including policy and training.  
In the US emergency management policy is highly formalised, 
legislated and restrictive as well as being connected to funding for the local scale. 
While in Ireland, the policy is less formal, unlegislated and not connected to funding. 
Both extremes have their benefits and disadvantages. The benefits of a highly 
formalised system are knowledge and practice and clear routes for resources, 
assistance and funding. The disadvantages of the formalised system is that they 
weaken loose networks which are essential for effective response and inter-agency 
trust and it creates layers of tangled bureaucracy as discussed by Participant IDD, an 
official in Boston Emergency Medical Services (Paramedics)  
“Yeah, it is almost too formalised because at the end of the day we end up 
with a unified command centre, an incident command centre...” 
The benefits of a less formal system are the ability to adapt and be 
flexible in a crisis and with lead agency responsibilities. The disadvantages are that 
decision-making, funding streams and crisis escalations can be more difficult to 
attain or initialize. 
In Ireland, the informal networks developed because of how key 
agencies evolved. AGS and the Fire Service grew and organised without significant 
interaction with each other, resulting in the formation of informal rather than formal 
networks (An Garda Síochána, 2016; Conway; 2014 and Geraghty and Whitehead, 
2004). Whereas, the National Ambulance Service only began in 2005. Before this, 
ambulance services were run separately by regional health boards (adapted from 
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interview notes), further restricting the development of formal relationships. Thus, 
this history of informal networks is still pervasive today even within a landscape of 
formal networks as promoted through the Framework.   
"Even in areas where there are good relationships say between the ambulance 
service and the voluntaries, in other areas there wouldn't be that relationship 
and it's not that there is anything, it's just never formed over time" 
(Representative of the National Ambulance Service). 
Further, as the Framework remains unlegislated, it allows for the 
silo-mentality of agencies to remain as there are no ramifications for choosing not to 
develop formal relationships, individual response plans and thus, to develop better 
coordinated relationships within the IEMA. An example is the siloed nature of the 
four local authorities which govern Dublin County and City; Dublin City Council, 
South Dublin County Council, Dun Laoghaire-Rathdown County Council and Fingal 
County Council. During crises, for example a flood event, these authorities need to 
collaborate and coordinate their expertise, resources and information to allow for an 
effective response. Yet, there is a reluctance to call on each other as illustrated by a 
representative of one of the emergency services: 
“You also have to realise that each local authority is almost like an 
independent nation and they don't like calling in other authorities to assist.” 
(Representative of Emergency Services).  
In the US, formalised policy is both a positive and a negative. It is 
beneficial as it creates a structure with clear processes for the escalation of events up  
the jurisdictional scales in comparison to the Irish system. However, it does restrict 
the power of agencies to request help as the decision-making process is removed 
from the local scale to the Governor or President who has limited knowledge of the 
on-the-ground situation. 
Further, the ability for the President to make a decision to declare 
an emergency or not, is restrictive with no obvious route for an appeal. The Irish 
process, while more complex and repetitive, still ensures that representatives of the 
local scale are in the OEM informing the Taoiseach or Minister for Defence of the 
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situation, so they can make a team decision with input from operational staff that has 
not been shared upwards through advisors.  
Further, these formalised structures focus on inter-agency, inter-
jurisdictional and inter-scale coordination creating a highly structured and formal 
assemblage much more so than the Irish system. However, both neglect to discuss 
the importance of informal networks that help to establish trust across all scales and 
agencies. Trust building can be encouraged during training operations that occur 
within the formalised structures. However, it can only be fostered through the 
informal networks that develop during training, at the scenes of everyday 
emergencies, and through agency-specific community barbecue days or coffee 
mornings, which are a key characteristic of emergency responder agencies in Boston. 
The importance of these informal networks were discussed by participants IDM and 
IDK.  
“We try to formalise, but it is the nature of the beast, there are always going 
to be informal relationships. You are going to pick up the phone and call the 
person you are comfortable with because it is just quicker, and time is of the 
essence.” (Participant IDM) 
“For sure, longstanding relationships.  For me, I have been with the Police 
Department for 33 years, there isn't an agency within the city of Boston that I 
don't know somebody personally that I could pick up the phone and call if I 
need some information or if I need to push something around.  So, it is, even 
though we might not have direct connections, just from being around 
someone, it is kind of a small city. […] The most important time to develop 
those relationships is before your catastrophe happens” (Participant IDK). 
But even more telling is the response from Participant IDD an 
official in Boston Emergency Medical Services (Paramedics):  
“Yeah, it is almost too formalised because at the end of the day we end up 
with a unified command centre, an incident command centre...” 
Thus, by comparing the IEMA and USEMA, the formal/informal 
dichotomy of emergency management can be summed up by a tension between 
protocol and networks. Protocol representing the more formalised US system and 
190 
 
networks representing the more informal Irish system. As a result, there are tensions 
and contradictions between the formal and informal aspects of each CMaERA 
creating a tension point which, when reached causes the agencies to oscillate and re-
shape in order to respond in real-time through whatever means available. They re-
shape in order to push against the boundaries and achieve some level of adaptability 
and resilience or they rely on networks of trust where tasks and responsibilities are 
allocated and shared based on previous collaborative experiences, a characteristic 
which US emergency management struggles to achieve resulting in the formalised 
protocol-based structure, as illustrated by Participant IDM referring to the activation 
of Boston’s OEM. 
“And then probably getting the same people. So ideally if you could have the 
same people there is less of a learning curve and less training. And you may 
need a bench of two or three people which is what we ask for, but it can get 
frustrating when every activation you are getting someone new and probably 
is not the right person to be there. They either don't have the right job 
function, or they are not involved in the actual activation, they are more just 
there as a body. That can be counterproductive.” 
Further, as argued by Brenner et al, (2011:223) accounting for the 
“institutional contexts” of assemblages provides insight into their structure and, 
unsurprisingly, this research found that institutionalisation also contributed to the 
formal/informal dichotomy of CMaERA.  
6.4 Institutionalisation 
Institutional cultures are a characteristic of all emergency services 
and it affects how these agencies coordinate and thus, how the assemblage is shaped 
upon activation. Institutional culture refers to the methods of doing something which 
may or may not be reflected in policy, but it is passed down through the ranks over a 
long period of time until it becomes the only way of doing something, as explained 
by Conway (2014;148/149): 
" In the police force, this is easy to imagine. A rookie is told he will learn the 
job from his superiors; he must do what they do. Their actions become 
internalised as reality by the rookie, who then projects them as reality, 
leading to their institutionalisation over time."  
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Even though emergency management theory proposed inter-agency 
coordination in the 1970s, it never acknowledged the significance of institutional 
cultures and the power they held in retaining agency independence when 
implementing policy (Bharosa et al, 2010; Mendonça et al, 2007).  Thus, when they 
must coordinate during major events, there is space for conflict to arise as is evident 
in the responses to the winter storms in 2015/2016 and the Boston Marathon 
Bombing. As discussed by a representative of an Irish emergency management 
agency: “A big part of the experience for me of coordination is managing rows, rows 
between services, rows between agencies, very understandable, you do have a 
serious situation.” This phenomenon does not make inter-agency collaboration 
impossible, but unless it is recognised and structures are in place to minimise inter-
agency conflict, then institutionalised cultures and behaviours can be detrimental to 
an effective response.  
However, it is not as simple as creating a plan, such as the 
Framework or the MA-CEMP (2017) or NIMS and ICS. As Kapucu (2005) argues, 
trust and working histories are essential for the fostering of strong inter-agency 
coordinated relationships between all agencies at all scales and between the public 
and agencies (McGuire and Silvia, 2010; Bharosa, 2010). In order to develop this 
trust and minimise the damage of institutional differences, agencies need to work 
together more often because trust builds over time as was discussed by participant 
IDA. 
“And developing relationships, that is the biggest piece. I often say that 
people talk about how we need to develop trust in communities and many 
times it is talked about as if there is no reason for mistrust, but we know that 
there is a reason that people have challenges in working with the government 
or trusting what the government is saying. Not because of anything that 
maybe I did or someone who is now talking into the room but by nature of 
being associated with the government there is a level of trust that we have to 
build because there has been a long history of inequities and institutional 
systemic decisions that cause harm to communities." (Participant, IDA) 
In order to develop this trust and minimise the damage of 
institutional differences, the state must intervene and drive inter-agency 
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collaboration by promoting "incentives and information" (Kapucu, 2005; 46). 
Further, trust builds over time as agencies work together more. Therefore, in Ireland 
where major crises are somewhat rare it is vital that inter-agency training and 
meetings are regular to foster this growth of trust. In addition, Mendonça et al, 
(2007) argue that weak inter-agency collaboration and information sharing are 
unlikely to be resolved if "institutional and technological" (p.63) issues are only 
dealt with at one scale i.e. the agency scale and not the community or state scale, 
instead these issues must be dealt with "simultaneously at the various levels" (p.63).  
This is particularly true if you trace the reasons why some 
institutional cultures develop. Institutional cultures usually form through 
mechanisms that help to protect and grow the agency and ensures training or certain 
practices are the same across the board. However, over time, some practices of 
institutional memory can become toxic, restrictive and simply reproduce the status 
quo, with no reflection on the ethics or practicality of the actions. A recent example 
is within the HSE who outsourced cervical smear tests and tried to cover up the 
subsequent mistakes by “legally shredding files” (The Irish Examiner, 2018) and 
requesting the victims sign non-disclosure agreements, or within AGS who have 
been rocked by several whistle-blowers and the breathalyser and penalty points 
scandals (Irish Independent, 2018; The Journal; 2018; The Irish Times, 2017).  
As a PRA and the longest running state agency of the CMaERA, it 
is interesting to explore how AGS has institutionalised over time, in order to protect 
themselves from the outside forces that act upon them. However, similar narratives 
could be written about any of the agencies in the IEMA or the USEMA and, in 
particular, could be compared with US police forces who often respond in racially 
motivated ways. Thus, please read this not, as my assessment of one agency being 
more important, but as an agency that has a long enough history to provide detailed 
accounts of the issues within emergency management assemblages, particularly, in 
terms of weak inter-agency coordination, institutional cultures, mistrust, conflict and 
agency independence, power dynamics and techniques of governance.  
6.4.1 An Garda Síochána  
The development of AGS is one marked by colonial practices. Its 
birth was a direct result of Ireland's fight for independence as it replaced the colonial 
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police force the Royal Irish Constabulary (RIC), a highly centralised force, in 1922 
and was supported by (the) An Garda Síochána (Temporary Provisions) Act of 1923. 
The 1923 Act is the first legislative piece which supports and outlines the duties and 
role of the force. It also changed the name to An Garda Síochána which was made 
permanent by the Garda Síochána Act 1924, and the Police Force Amalgamation Act 
of 1925 which included the Dublin Metropolitan Police, who had co-existed with the 
RIC, to create a national police force. Thus, the practices of AGS have not been 
created within a vacuum but are the direct result of a very turbulent past, including 
civil unrest, the Troubles, modernization, secularisation, civil liberty, neoliberal 
movements, and Europeanization (Conway, 2014). 
Over the last 97 years, AGS has been a respected police force 
worldwide as a (mostly) unarmed force, they have also been regularly lauded and 
praised by the government and yet, they developed during very unstable times that, 
without a doubt, fundamentally affected how they are structured and work as an 
agency. They have undergone scrutiny regarding their practices of promotion, 
treatment of women, operation during the Troubles, dealings with the Catholic 
Church, ignorance of the conditions and practices of the Magdalene Laundries and 
other institutions, and the governance and culture of the force to name but a few 
(Conway, 2014). The last three decades have seen substantial concern over the 
inadequacies of the force through a number of tribunals with the eventual 
implementation of the Garda Act (2005), which attempted to address these issues, 
but has been criticised, especially in recent times, as to its ineffectiveness. For 
example, the Act is supposed to protect Garda whistle-blowers from Gardaí 
retaliation, but as we have witnessed in the last number of years this is not the case. 
Of course, US agencies are also rife with similar issues of institutional cultures, 
insularity and politics, so this is not a uniquely Irish phenomenon.  
Evidence after evidence has shown the deep cultural issues within 
the force which range from bullying, witness tampering, ignorance of procedure and 
inside promotion. However, when calls for accountability regarding the culture of 
the agency came to the fore, the rhetoric produced was that “there was no 
institutional problem in AGS. There may be a few bad apples in the force but there is 
no other, embedded problem to be addressed." (Conway, 2016:120). What also needs 
to be noted is, that although the successive governments have always supported and 
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promoted the force, they have often refrained from providing the relevant resources, 
working conditions and pay that they need to do their job (Conway, 2014). There has 
always been a disconnect between the rhetoric of the government and its actions 
towards AGS that in some way offers an insight into why such a negative culture has 
developed. It has emanated out of years of rhetorical support, low pay and poor 
working conditions (Conway, 2014). Conway (2014) offers the following example 
of this rhetoric. In 1987, the Minister for Justice, Michael Noonan, stated that “the 
Government of the day should not criticise the Garda Síochána. We all know there 
are mistakes in the operation, but it is obscene that the Government and the Ministers 
should be the first to lead the charge in the criticism of the Garda Síochána.” 
(Conway, 2014: 139).  
Further, in October 2016, the Minister for Public Expenditure and 
Reform, Pascal Donohue stated “We don’t need Gardaí to go on strike for us to 
realise how special they are” (The Journal, 2016). Thus, the government rhetoric has 
never changed, but the conditions that the Gardaí work within are slow to transform 
and low morale has been a constant since 1925. This has created a toxic internal 
institutional culture which has led to an ‘us versus them’ dichotomy in which AGS 
are somewhat isolated from government departments and are institutionalised as a 
single entity that struggles to collaborate with other agencies. However, this issue is 
largely created by AGS in collaboration with external forces.  
“Such evidence as exists raises a prima facie case for the contention that 
abuse of police powers may be a product of the history, institutionalised 
structures, limited tools, pressures on, and expectations of, the police and 
may be much more accepted and widespread than we have been led to 
believe. (McAleese 1987:54 and cited in Conway, 2014:148)” 
The most recent change to the structure and organisation of AGS 
has been the Garda Act of 2005. "It was heralded by the Minister as ‘the most 
profound piece of legislation relating to an Garda Síochána in the history of the 
State” (Dáil Eireann: 29/11/06 cited in Conway, 2014:195) as it proposed 
institutional reform with an emphasis on accountability that in recent times, appears 
more like a paper pushing job than actual reality. Further, it supported the continuing 
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and strengthening of centralised power and increased control by the government 
(Conway, 2014). 
“The Minister is also given the power to issue a directive to the 
Commissioner concerning any matter relating to policing and the Garda 
Commission shall comply. This has the potential to undermine the 
Commissioner's operational control of the service." (Conway, 2014; 197).  
This also involved declining to create a Police Authority, which 
AGS has been calling for since the 1940s, to act as an independent authority and 
shift power away from the government, thus decentralising and depoliticising the 
force. “It has repeatedly been rejected by the Minister for Justice on the grounds that, 
‘Dáil Éireann is Ireland's police authority and accountability through the Minister 
and the Commissioner is the most appropriate mechanism for democratic oversight 
of a modern police and security service” (Dáil Eireann: 29/11/06 cited in Conway, 
2014; 201). 
Finally, the Act marked a new age for AGS, one marked by 
neoliberal policy and managerial practices. It advocated for “performance indicators” 
and was the beginning of a “discourse of managerialism” which has since infiltrated 
all aspects of the force and saw no shift back towards values of early day policing in 
both the RIC and AGS (Conway, 2014). However, as the recent breathalyser scandal 
indicates, these ‘performance indicators' do not fix the culture. Instead, they just add 
another layer of bureaucracy where Gardaí must reach a certain target to be seen as 
successful, resulting in false numbers.  
Another key factor that has affected AGS (as well as all other 
public services) in recent years, has been the public hiring freeze and the austerity 
measures they have been placed under. In 2009, recruitment was frozen in all public 
services. This placed AGS under immense pressure as they continually saw 
decreases in their force and gaps at the most senior level due to retirements 
(Conway, 2014). Gaps at the senior level are detrimental to the organisation of the 
force especially during times of crises as it is senior level staff who are responsible 
for the coordination of a response and who are critical within decision-making 
processes (O’Riordan, 1992).  
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Although it was announced in 2013 that the recruitment ban in 
AGS would come to an end, it was not until 2015 that the Minister for Justice, 
Frances Fitzgerald, announced the recruitment of 250 new Garda recruits (The 
Journal, 2015) and this recruitment drive has continued to date as with other public 
agencies.  
The history of AGS provides reasons such as toxic cultures, low 
resources and pay and survival mechanisms which offer an explanation as to why 
inter-agency coordination often proves difficult and is fraught with conflict. 
Therefore, "[i]nstitutional rules function as myths which organisations incorporate, 
gaining legitimacy, resources, stability, and enhances [their] survival prospects” 
(Mayer and Rowan, 1977:340 cited in Conway, 2014) and these myths are passed as 
reality (Zucker, 1977 cited in Conway, 2014). Thus, we see the institutionalisation of 
AGS as these behaviours are “not simply tolerated but dependent upon incorporation 
and support” (Conway, 2014;148). Further, these behaviours and these myths are 
maintained because they benefit the actor, but this institutionalisation creates issues 
regarding change within the institute, be it policy or technological (Conway, 2014).  
Unfortunately, there is numerous evidence of AGSs 
institutionalisation as listed below. All of these conditions have contributed to the 
toxic culture that has developed within the agency. These do not excuse their toxic 
practices, but they do shed light on where these toxic institutional cultures develop 
from and why a sense of protection and independence was needed.16 Conway (2014) 
provides evidence for their institutionalisation:  
• Tight ties between Gardaí and senior ranking officers during tribunals into 
the conduct of the agency – at the time of writing the verdict of the 
Disclosure's Tribunal was just announced clearing Sergeant Maurice 
McCabe, who exposed some of the negative institutional practices. The 
Tribunal also condemned the actions of the then Garda Commissioner, 
Martin Callanan, and other senior ranking officers who closed ranks to 
                                                          
16 Caveat: I choose to use AGS to illustrate why contextualising the history and geography of 
institutions and particularly, siloed institutions provides insight into why assemblages may re-shape. 
However, I recognise that AGS is not the only public agency to undergo institutionalisation, but the 
consequences are similar across agencies.  
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protect these practices, their own careers and pursued a smear campaign 
against McCabe and his family (The Irish Times, 2018). 
• No interaction or questioning of the churches practice – again at the time of 
writing the Magdalene Laundries victims were being honoured by President 
Michael D Higgins and received a state apology with an acknowledgement 
that the state knew what was going on. This is further compounded by stories 
of AGS historically dropping pregnant women at the doors of these Mother 
and Baby homes (Conway, 2014).  
• Evidence of tension between AGS and the Department of Justice as both the 
Morris Tribunal and Dáil have highlighted (Conway, 2014) 
• Dismissal of the procedures set out by the Garda Act (2005) to set up a Garda 
Síochána Ombudsman Commission. Complaints are still being dealt with 
internally (Conway, 2014). 
Due to AGSs institutionalisation developing as a mode of 
protection and subsequently causing a series of toxic cultures to develop AGS finds 
it difficult to coordinate with other agencies and their role within the assemblage is 
often fractious and conflict-ridden as detailed below:  
“There is a cultural piece here, they think that they should in charge of the 
road traffic accident17 and that is the language they use. The job of the 
Guards, the road traffic accident is to coordinate, it is to bring people together 
who need to say what is the situation here, how are we going to protect 
everyone, how are we going to do whatever? We have to be in charge” 
(Participant ID26). 
Due to the detailed narrative offered it is easy to understand why institutionalisation 
can have a negative impact on the shape of the assemblage, especially if there is 
competition between agencies for control, responsibility and leadership. When this 
occurs, the lead agency may be dictated in the policy, but when activated, other 
agencies may begin to overstep their boundaries and ask questions concerning their 
role in the response rather than viewing the response as a coordinated effort with one 
key leader and decision maker. These agencies find it difficult to withdraw control 
                                                          
17 The fire service is in charge of road traffic collisions under the governance of the relevant local 
authority. 
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and be guided by another agency, as was evident in stage 3 of the response in Boston 
when Police Officers would only respond to the senior officials of their force and 
resisted the authority of senior officers from other forces. 
6.5 Conclusion 
So, what does all this mean for the CMaERA assemblage? By 
examining the broader contexts that shape the CMaERA and its agencies and 
merging them where possible, with the findings of the case studies, I argue, that 
emergency management as a whole is too dry-cut and simplified. It ignores 
contextual factors that actually shape how these assemblages respond and more often 
than not, it diverges from policy due to external and burdening factors such as those 
discussed.  
Further, at times, policy and emergency management systems tend 
to be contradictory, demonstrating that there is a somewhat ad-hoc approach to 
managing these assemblages even in more formal spaces such as the US. For 
example, it is evident prior to 2001 that there had been a shift in emergency 
management from a model based on a hierarchy with functions of command and 
control towards a system that was more collaborative and coordinated within the 
USEMA (McGuire and Silvia, 2010; McEntire, 2007; Comfort et al, 2004; Waugh 
and Streib, 2006; Bharosa et al, 2010). However, Waugh and Streib (2006) propose 
that the establishment of the Department of Homeland Security re-introduced the 
command and control system without changing the structures of the collaborative 
system causing conflict as procedures are often contradictory. In Ireland, there is also 
a command and control emphasis within the Framework as lead agencies are pre-
assigned (MEM, 2006). Thus, it is unclear how collaborative emergency 
management systems such as the IEMA or USEMA can be, when they must still 
operate within this powerful versus powerless formal hierarchical system as "no one 
can ever have complete control; it is not possible to fully command attention or to 
compel compliance" (Waugh and Streib, 2006: 138) from a diverse group of 
agencies, as illustrated by the Boston Marathon response. Regardless, a collaborative 
and coordinated system recognises that disasters do not obey geographical or 
jurisdictional boundaries and that the scale of an event often requires the assistance 
and resources of multiple agencies (McGuire and Silvia, 2010).  Thus, there is a need 
to recognise that these systems do not remain in their hierarchical shapes but shift 
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and re-shape from hierarchical to flat, to somewhere in the middle, to complete 
destruction of the formal assemblage based on various “sociospatial, political-
economic and institutional contexts” and power relations (Brenner et al, 2011:233), 
and due to the simplicity of policy and over-arching emergency management 
theories.  
By recognising that the key issue is institutional misalignment 
between policy and agencies, we need to begin exploring ways to create stronger 
connections and more consistent policies and practices. The next chapter is going to 
question whether the smartification of the CMaERA and the adoption of algorithmic 
governance is an appropriate route towards solutions for this issue.  
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Chapter 7: The Data-Driven CMaERA? 
 
7.1 Introduction 
The ‘smart city’ agenda is a neoliberal management technique 
promoting data-driven and technologically innovative forms of governance. In 
Ireland, Dublin in particular and recently Cork, the smart city idea has been a policy 
of placemaking with a focus on solving city issues through technological innovation 
(Smart Dublin, 2018; Cork Smart Gateway, 2018). Boston has not adopted the term 
as they are already successfully engaging with ‘smart’ urban processes without the 
need to be known as a ‘smart city’, which they view as a corporate marketing tool 
overly associated with IBM. This is evident through the success of departments such 
as ‘New Urban Mechanics’ and programs such as ‘Analyze Boston’ and ‘BOS 311’, 
promoting the use of data and real-time local information for managing the city. As a 
result, the Boston part of the USEMA assemblage has already started the process of 
adapting to the technological evolution of the city by beginning to actively engage 
with data. Thus, in comparison to the Irish participants there was much more 
knowledge and acceptance around data analytics despite the fact that I never spoke 
with a data analyst in the US. Therefore, all the US quotes used in this chapter are 
from the staff of relevant agencies who may not have data analysis skills but are 
engaging and learning from the data in a manner that Irish participants are unwilling 
to do are  worried about doing. As a result, this chapter will focus on the possible 
effects of ‘smartification’ on the IEMA as the primary case study while referring to 
the USEMA as a reference piece for contextualisation only.  
Thus, the aim of this chapter is to explore whether the 
smartification of the IEMA is an appropriate method to overcome issues of 
institutionalisation, (in)formalisation and political will and governance, or is 
technology and data just a band-aid for these problems as they are inherently 
political and cultural issues? I pose this question to round off the thesis because of 
the current trend of using technology to solve urban issues and the use of data to 
manage cities. Further, due to the prolific study of urban data analytics and smart 
city ideologies across geographical literature at present (Wiig, 2015; White, 2016; 
Wiig & Wyly, 2016; Barns, 2016, Jordan Jefferson, 2018a/b; Long & Liu, 2016), it 
would be remiss to ignore the potential effect of technology on CMaERAs, 
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particularly because there are numerous agencies involved in emergency services 
which have control rooms both in Ireland, US and elsewhere.  
For instance, in Camden, New Jersey as part of their urban 
regeneration programme, they created a “citywide, multi-instrument surveillance 
network” to work in combination with their “community policing agenda” (Wiig, 
2018:403). The reasoning behind automating policing was to create the idea that 
Camden’s regeneration would result in a safer city and thus, become more attractive. 
Outside of the real-time control room, police services worldwide are utilising 
technologies around “network analysis, GIS, crime mapping, biometrics, 
fingerprints, DNA research, facial recognition, speech recognition, social media 
policing, shotspotter detection system and CCTV” (Faith and Bakir, 2015:1857). 
Drawing on the use of “GIS” and “crime mapping”, Jorden Jefferson (2018b:1) 
explores the implications of “integrating temporal data into GIS-based maps to 
predict when and where future crimes will occur” this is currently being used within 
Chicago Police Department.  
Fire Services are beginning to integrate simulation games and 
virtual reality (VR) technologies into their training (Bell et al, 2015). This allows 
firefighters to experience and train safely within different simulated situations thus, 
ensuring firefighter safety and increased training opportunities before they enter a 
real emergency situation. The beauty of this VR technology is that it can be modified 
for different circumstances e.g. a small chip pan fire to a multi-story apartment block 
explosion. In terms of ambulance services, there is an interesting app on the horizon 
which would allow users to order an ambulance and destination hospital. It would 
also have an emergency button which would automatically assign the nearest 
available ambulance (Marimutha et al, 2018). Obviously, there are critical issues 
around this, with appropriate uses of ambulances and ensuring that  the service is not 
reduced to a taxi-like system, but the emergency button is compelling and could be 
an answer for people hard of hearing, in danger, or unable to speak etc. It is during 
an emergency that this type of app could be useful, particularly if it was linked with 
your location as ambulance services, particularly in Ireland, have issues locating 
certain rural houses as discussed by two paramedics. 
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“Respondent 1: Technology could be improved like we have been told we 
are going to get that, and I think if you ring Domino Pizza now, it will know 
who you are, where you are and your order 
Respondent 2: They can read the caller ID coming  
Respondent 1:We haven't got that  
Interviewer: That is obviously a big issue 
Respondent 1: And we have to get the address of you whereas if you ring 
from the address it should pop up, there is your address […] I think with the 
EIRCODES, everyone has an EIRCODE 
Interviewer: Can you use those EIRCODES?  
Respondent 2: We can on the back of a truck on our phones, but we don't get 
the EIRCODEs as such, but we could use Google 
Respondent 1: But you have to use it yourselves 
Respondent 2: Yeah it's all our own stuff, our own Wi-Fi, we all pay for it.” 
The above highlighted technologies are combined with numerous 
other innovations which emergency services engage with daily including, but not 
limited, to GPS, telecommunications and control room computer-aided dispatch 
(CAD) systems. This indicates that first responders are already integrating into the 
smart city space in interesting ways. However, the integration of technologies is 
unequal as some agencies, cities, states and countries are implementing technology 
at an advanced rate in comparison to other places. Thus, this chapter explores how 
and if the IEMA is becoming smart beginning with a discussion on the benefits of 
smartification and an exploration of two possible approaches that could be 
undertaken by the IEMA to become ‘smart’. Finally, it will question whether a smart 
IEMA is actually the correct solution or just an idealistic proposal.  
7.2 Benefits of Smartification 
At present, CMaERA agencies are engaging with technology such 
as moving hand-written notes to a tablet in the NAS or the use of drones and 
mapping in the Civil Defence (The Journal, 2018) and in the fire service  
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“At present if we go out for a patient it is all handwritten down, the care 
report, that will be all electronic coming at the end of this year so we will all 
have our tablets. The information will go so it will self-populate onto the 
tablet as well and then the practitioner can just fill in the boxes” (Participant 
ID17). 
“Respondent 2:The drone - your allowed use that now in the rain. 
Respondent 1: What the f**k is that going to do, fly up over it and have a look? 
They have a drone and they could use it and say listen its flooded bad down there, 
it's up past the cars before you go in but with the equipment. […] On the computer 
that we have in the control room, you can go down the scales and you can see 
hydrants and stuff like that. I don't know if you can see manholes (later found out 
that you can) and then it depends where the mapping is in the area on the computer. 
That could maybe be more up-to-date, and you could see. You could be in a fire and 
looking for a hydrant and you go down the scales, normally when you get a map you 
just see one scale, we can click it and it will go down scales so we can actually see 
individual houses and their numbers. It gets it down to a scale that you see the 
hydrants on it. Look outside number 36, there is a hydrant”.  
However, in Ireland, this technology is funded and implemented in a siloed 
independent manner and in the US via state and federal funding policies. But what 
are the benefits of modernising systems, staff training and response protocol and 
policy in this way? Firstly, it promotes the use of online platforms to inform 
CMaERA decision making based on readily available data, rather than having to 
wait for all agencies to be represented in the Local Coordination Centre or to be 
connected via phone. An example of such is the Ezone tool which is a module within 
the Health Atlas of Ireland aimed at facilitating coordinated responses to events. The 
Ezone tool is an online system which integrates several datasets from a range of 
public institutions (see table 7.1) which can be used to help responders make quick 
and informed decisions regarding evacuation zones, available resources and the 
effects of weather patterns. The beauty of this system is that it is designed to ensure 
“minimal training and is specifically designed for infrequent use but usually under 
pressure”. This is particularly important as the reduction in training costs provides 
for an easier adaption of the technology into everyday use” (McIntyre, 2013).  
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Table 7.1: Type of databases integrated in the E Zone tool 
Institution Type of dataset/plugin 
Ordnance Survey Ireland  The use of ‘Map Genie’- which allows access to “the 
highest quality” data and shapefiles for mapping in 
Ireland. The OSI also provided access to data and 
shapefiles for county and electoral boundaries.  
An Post Provided access to the ‘GeoDirectory’ which has 
accurate and high-quality data for both “residential 
and non-residential” Irish addresses.  
Central Statistics Office Provided “population data by small area” from the 
2011 census. When this is combined with the data 
from An Post, E Zone is able to provide an estimate 
of population within different zones.  
Irish Rail Provided data on railways, bridges and access.  
HSE Service Directory Provided location and contact details for different 
health centres such as GPs, hospitals and nursing 
homes as well as “emergency response locations and 
Seveso sites”. 
Electric Supply Board Provided information regarding access points and 
contact information.  
Source: McIntyre (2013) 
During an emergency, the Ezone tool can offer information on the “Incident location, 
risk zone, population at risk and response coordination zones” (McIntyre, 2013). The 
Ezone tool is further discussed and explained by ID35: 
“The Ezone tool was originally designed around Seveso sites, these are sites 
that pose a risk. For example, an oil refinery or a place that stores chemicals 
might be a bit dangerous if they leaked, particularly with say Dublin Port, for 
instance, they might be storing things that would go in and out on tankers. It 
originally started as a tool for... let's say there is an incident there, you could 
for example draw, using census data and using GIS tools, you could draw an 
area around the incident and it would give you, using the census data, this is 
roughly the demographics of the area that could be affected by it. So, they 
might decide there are 100 people in this zone, let's evacuate them. Or there 
are 5,000 people there, the panic and chaos of evacuating 5,000 people 
outweighs the risks involved with whatever happened at that incident site.  
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It could also tell you, for example, there are so many hospitals, nursing 
homes, schools and so on that might be within the incident zone. You could 
also take into account weather information. So, you could say there is a wind 
blowing from the west and we are going to say we can draw a plume from the 
incident marker, so you could say directionally speaking, if it was an airborne 
gas or something poisonous, like a gas leak, for instance, you could say the 
wind is blowing this way, these people are more than likely going to be 
affected. There was also the ability to designate an incident zone and then 
have the GIS system work out, using the road network for Ireland, if we 
wanted to do a 5km exclusion zone where would we need to put the barriers? 
Where would we need to put the checkpoints?  
In later revisions, there was the idea that multiple agencies could collaborate 
on the same map, for example, the HSE could define these are certain areas 
for ambulances and so forth. The Gardaí could say these are the checkpoints. 
The idea of a shared inter-agency map that if there was an incident, we could 
plan it out and share our response to it. But we could also do this when there 
is no incident and say this is the scenario. So, this was the idea behind the 
tool.” 
Secondly, the collecting and analysing of data can be potentially 
useful for resource administration, response protocol, triaging, identification of 
trends and patterns and longer-term response planning, as discussed by IDL: 
“I think the first thing I would identify is around the information side of it, so 
data is very important for us, having numbers and being able to have some 
more analysis of those numbers is very important. Particularly if we are 
talking about something like an epidemic or something that is longer term, a 
longer-term response. But even for smaller events, where there might be 
numbers of patients and different levels of acuity of patients and different 
things that we really need to be able to get data on quickly and share data on 
quickly”. (Participant IDL) 
“We do all the crime mapping, we do all the executive summary reports, we 
do all the patterns and trends. Our analysts have portfolios, we have one 
person watching for gangs and gang violence, burglaries, larcenies, car thefts, 
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robberies and they report out and we put all the geo-mapping and everything 
like that, so we do that in my unit”. (Participant IDK) 
Thirdly, the introduction of data analytics and technological 
projects can begin to break down institutional siloes and encourage inter-agency 
coordination, as discussed by participant IDB: 
“So, we are bringing all these people together in the short term around this 
one specific project to provide data and provide feedback on the work that we 
are doing but also to start these conversations among the agencies because 
often a lot of them individually have their own risk management programme 
and they know how to protect their own assets and they do, most are pretty 
advanced”.  
Of course, there are numerous other beneficial factors around 
streamlining talent, resources, quicker decision making, better uses of funding, and 
easier inter-agency coordination and knowledge sharing but the three listed 
incorporate what the participants see as the key advantages of becoming data-driven. 
7.3 Methods of Smartification for the IEMA 
Along these lines, in what ways could the IEMA – as a collective 
and not simply individual agencies – begin to become data-driven and 
technologically efficient? This section will discuss two possible approaches which 
have emerged through the literature review and the empirical studies. Firstly, should 
the IEMA re-organize in similar ways to other assemblages in order to access 
knowledge and technology? Secondly, is technology an appropriate solution for 
creating better inter-agency coordination between IEMA agencies or should the 
focus be on the broader mutually exclusive external factors?  
7.3.1 Approach One-Institutional Re-structuring 
Although the IEMA functions independently and has its own 
history, geography and functions that contribute to how it operates, it did not evolve 
as a silo unlike the agencies located within it. Instead, the coordinating of these 
agencies into the formation of the IEMA developed, from higher scales of 
governance from the city, region and state. Thus, it is argued, that the IEMA, like 
other urban assemblages, are contained within the city assemblage (see Figure 7.1) 
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which is a powerful, albeit covert sovereign “constituted by ‘travels and transfers, 
political struggles, relational connections, and territorial fixities/mobilities’ but 
within a context of multi-dimensional and superimposed cyclical, alternating and 
linear rhythms and diverse temporalities” (McCann and Ward, 2011 in Moore-
Cherry and Bonnin, 2018: 16/17). The city assemblage provides the space for the 
assemblages contained within it to overlap, interact, contradict and dismantle each 
other (McFarlane, 2011b and Dewsbury, 2011) but drifts away from the Brenner et 
al, (2011) argument that assemblages are single entities. Thus, this approach 
questions whether the IEMA should institutionally re-structure and create a bridging 
assemblage within the city in order to access knowledge and technology. This could 
be possible for two reasons.  
Firstly, there are already existing connections and overlapping of 
agencies as seen on Figure 7.1. For instance, Dublin is divided into four siloed Local 
Authorities who all have their own governance techniques. However, Dublin City 
Council is the main governing body for the city part of the county and will be the 
focus of this section due to it being the primary location of the IEMA agency 
headquarters, interview locations, national government and where early adaptions of 
urban technology are occurring. This is not to discount the rest of Dublin or Ireland, 
but to provide a place boundary where the effects of the IEMA and smartification 
can be evaluated. Dublin City Council has responsibility for community services, 
emergency services such as Dublin Fire Brigade (DFB), environmental services, 
housing, roads and transport. Essentially, they govern and ensure the smooth running 
of all city services and are legislated and governed by the state. Further, as dictated 
by the framework and thus, the state, Dublin City Council is an assigned Principal 
Response Agency during times of major emergencies alongside An Garda Síochána 
and the Health Service Executive. The relationships between the Local Authorities, 
the different departments and the IEMA could be strengthened so that the IEMA can 
access the knowledge and resources housed within the wider assemblage.  
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Figure 7.1: Organization of Dublin’s Urban Assemblages 
 
Source: Author 
 
Secondly, there are examples of how other assemblages are 
structured which the IEMA could learn from. One key example is Smart Dublin 
which could also contribute to the strengthening of relationships and lessen the gap 
between the IEMA and where the technology is located within the city assemblage.  
Smart Dublin began as a way to coordinate smart city policy, 
events and to attract investment and funding for Dublin’s Local Authorities. Coletta 
et al, (2017:25) describe the project's:  
“remit is to articulate a smart city narrative and strategy, initiate new projects 
and partnerships and attract funding and inward investment, and promote the 
work of the Dublin LAs (Local Authorities) within and beyond Ireland with 
respect to smart cities”.  
Under Dr John Tierney, the smart city agenda had remarkable 
similarities with Celtic Tiger goals as it was very much a fiscal and economic driven 
agenda. He saw it as both an investment in the economy of Dublin and a path 
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towards recovery and the protection of public services (Tierney, 2013). However, 
Phase 1 was somewhat ad-hoc with Dublin City Council (DCC) being responsive to 
requests from outside companies, such as Intel and IBM, to allow Dublin to take part 
in a form of testbed urbanism. These corporations used Dublin as a petri dish to test 
their smart solutions to issues identified by them, representing the power stripping of 
local government as they attempted to solve city issues through a period of austerity.  
The second phase of the smart city agenda began when Owen 
Keegan replaced Dr Tierney in 2014. DCC was still concerned with economic 
development, but began prioritising broader societal challenges such as, “transport 
congestion, responding to extreme weather events, tidal flooding, improved air 
quality and noise, citizen engagement and energy efficiency” (Keegan, 2015). Phase 
2 saw DCC begin to work with the other three Local Authorities of the Dublin 
Region to form an assemblage of different actors known as Smart Dublin.  
Smart Dublin is made up of a steering committee with 
representatives from different Local Authorities and Maynooth University. This 
committee consists of the Smart Dublin Project Manager from Dublin City Council, 
a Coordinator and Administrative Officer from South Dublin County Council, a 
Coordinator and Digital Strategy Officer from Dún Laoghaire Rathdown County 
Council, a Coordinator and Digital Strategy Manager from Fingal County Council 
and representatives from Maynooth University such as the Principal Investigator of 
the Programmable City Project, Prof. Rob Kitchin.  The steering committee governs 
the Smart Dublin, Smart City and Smart Dockland teams. The Smart Dublin team 
consists of a Regional Data Coordinator, Programme Manager, Project Coordinator 
and Digital Communications Coordinator. The Smart City team consists of a 
Coordinator and Smart City Programme Manager, Smart City Planner, Smart City 
Marketing and Creative Lead and a Smart City Engagement Lead. The Smart City 
team focus on the idea of smart cities both within and outside Dublin and also 
promotes Dublin internationally, while the Smart Dublin team focus specifically on 
Dublin City. Finally, the Smart Docklands team consists of a Programme Manager, 
Innovation and Engagement Lead and a Project Management and Governance Lead 
(Smart Dublin, 2019).  
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As a result, of the formation of the Smart Dublin assemblage it became quite 
proactive in setting its own agenda by choosing the companies and research partners 
to work with to solve issues identified by city officials and citizens (Keegan, 2015).  
Thus, Smart Dublin facilitates the bringing together of agencies, corporations and 
academics and is an example of inter-agency coordination, but their role is mainly 
focused on economic development and start-ups. The parent Local Authorities of 
Smart Dublin are also active PRAs. Yet, there is a clear disconnect between where 
the technology is and the institutions such as the IEMA who need it. Table 7.1 
provides some of the technology currently used by the three main first responder 
agencies in Dublin. It provides insights into the different uses and disconnection 
between the agencies but also between the IEMA and the city particularly in terms of 
data analytics and knowledge.  
Table 7.2: Different digital technologies and data analytics in use within the IEMA 
and Dublin City 
AGS NAS DFB Useful city 
technologies 
Notes 
Emergency Call 
Centre/ 
Control Room 
(some divisions 
have no call 
recording 
facility) 
Emergency Call 
Centre/Control 
Room 
Emergency Call 
Centre/Control 
Room 
Traffic Control 
Room-SCADA. 
Priority light 
changes for 
buses. 
These control 
rooms are 
unconnected, 
and the 
Traffic 
Control Room 
has priority 
light changes 
for buses but 
not for 
emergency 
vehicles 
A modernised 
computer aided 
dispatch (CAD) 
system due in 
2019 
-National 
Computer aided 
dispatch since 
2015 now 
mapped with 
Eircode. 
-Advanced 
Priority Medical 
Dispatch System 
(AMPDS) 
Computer aided 
dispatch 
 These 
platforms are 
unconnected. 
This means 
that each 
agency has no 
way of 
knowing what 
the other 
service is 
sending.  
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Radio 
communications 
(Tetra) 
Radio 
Communications 
(Tetra) 
Radio 
Communications 
(Tetra) 
Radio 
Communications 
(Tetra) 
As these are 
all on the 
same 
platforms 
there is a way 
to set up a 
channel where 
the services 
can speak 
with each 
other. 
However, this 
costs money, 
so it is rarely 
activated. 
Pulse crime 
recording 
database 
(although not all 
stations have 
access) 
Electronic 
Patient Care 
Reports 
   
Situational 
awareness 
technology in 
the control 
room since 
2017 
Situational 
Awareness 
technology in 
control room 
Situational 
Awareness 
assumed but 
unsure 
 This real-time 
information 
allows the 
control room 
to know 
where each 
vehicle is. 
Unfortunately, 
this is also 
unconnected, 
so the other 
agencies have 
no way of 
knowing 
where the 
other service 
is. 
Incident 
Command 
Truck with Wi-
Fi and 
communications 
Incident 
Command Unit 
with Wi-Fi 
Incident 
Command Unit 
with Wi-Fi 
Incident 
Command Unit 
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Data Analysis 
Unit 
Limited data 
analysis 
Limited data 
analysis 
-LoRa Flood 
sensors -Intel 
and Connect 
(TCD)-data is 
not shared with 
emergency 
services in real-
time.  
-Dublinked 
-Dublin 
Dashboard 
-Knowledge 
around data 
analysis 
The use of 
data in the 
IEMA is 
limited and 
yet, there are 
numerous 
examples of 
how it is 
being used in 
the city and 
how it could 
be useful for 
the IEMA 
agencies-even 
if that was just 
to share 
knowledge on 
how to 
effectively use 
the data. 
Limited 
mapping 
capabilities 
Limited 
mapping 
capabilities 
Limited 
mapping 
capabilities 
Mapping 
expertise both 
within Local 
Authorities and 
their partners 
 
Automatic 
Number Plate 
Reading 
(ANPR) 
although not 
every car has it.  
-Air 
Ambulance- 
emergency 
aeromedical 
service  
-Ezone tool 
(underutilised) 
Drones   
CCTV systems     
Virtual Private 
Networks 
    
Email now with 
20mb of storage 
    
Sources: An Garda Síochána (2018), National Ambulance Service (2018), 
Department of Health (2018), Dublin City Council (2018), Fire Service technology 
sourced from interview transcripts. 
 
So, how do we resolve this gap? Is it enough to encourage the 
IEMA to restructure and form a bridging assemblage with the likes of Smart Dublin 
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to encourage a closing of the technological gap? There are barriers to the IEMAs 
ability to do this such as, weak governance, neoliberal priorities as opposed to public 
issues, and a lack of inter-agency collaboration. Why these barriers may affect the 
IEMA from re-structuring and accessing knowledge from the city assemblage is 
evident through how they have affected the organisation and power of Smart Dublin.  
Firstly, Smart Dublin want to achieve the goals that characterize 
smart cities18. However, their motif is to implement disconnected projects that span 
different infrastructures and features of the city, while working towards issues such 
as flooding and transport. Yet, due to their skeleton staff and weak reach within local 
government, they are unable to engage with the real infrastructure that enables the 
city to work daily. Infrastructure such as housing, education and emergency services.  
Secondly, I question, whether their claim to being smart is 
legitimate or are they just the intermediary between the private company and the 
testbed space? Principally, because the claim of being "smart" cannot just be based 
on the implementation of technology in the city (Hollands, 2008) as it is somewhat 
void of meaning as "all cities want to be perceived as "smart", since the corollary 
was [sic] to appear "dumb" (Wiig, 2015:547). Instead, they need to be inclusive of 
the actual infrastructural agencies of the city to achieve the challenges listed on the 
Smart Dublin website (Smart Dublin, 2016b) and they also need to account for other 
societal issues at the precipice of people’s minds such as homelessness. However, 
due to their weak position and projected goals of attracting investment, etc. they are 
more of a neoliberal vehicle for the use of profit-oriented private technologies in the 
city as opposed to being the driver for citizen-led development.  
Thirdly, while Smart Dublin engages with companies and 
academics to build dashboards (Kitchin et al, 2015) and install flood monitoring 
sensors (Smart Dublin, 2016a), agencies within the IEMA are developing their own 
policy to ensure that inter-agency response is as smooth and efficient as possible. 
Yet, there is no direct overlap between the IEMA agencies and Smart Dublin even 
though assemblages have "fuzzy" borders (DeLanda, 2006) and the agencies within 
                                                          
18 Smart Economy; Smart Mobility; Smart Governance; Smart Environment; Smart Living and Smart 
People” (Vanolo, 2013:5, Caragliu et al, 2011, Giffinger et al, 2007, Monfaredzadeh and Beradi, 2015 
and Gaffney and Robinson, 2016) 
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them oscillate positions. Thus, there is a lack of broad thinking of the advantages of 
merging expertise between the IEMA, Smart Dublin and private companies. 
So, is there a way of resolving this clear gap between where the 
technology is and who needs it? No, at least not through Smart Dublin. Smart 
Dublin’s only direct role could be as a mediator to direct the IEMA to the relevant 
people and to push for data to be shared between agencies, especially as it can be a 
leader in this area through its role as a PRA, but these are all tangible. However, 
Smart Dublin could be useful as a model assemblage to help re-structure and re-scale 
the IEMA as the shape that Smart Dublin takes as a coordinated, stream-lined but 
actively inter-agency-based assemblage could be replicated for the IEMA.  
For example, the IEMA could learn from the Smart Dublin 
assemblage by reducing the number of working groups to avoid replication and the 
overuse of resources and by making working groups semi-permanent taskforces with 
a singular aim, with staff and advisors of different scales and jurisdictions. This is 
particularly important as it will allow the sharing of knowledge both vertically and 
horizontally across the assemblage as they will be able to feed upwards to the 
National Steering Groups but also across to the local agencies they work for when 
they return. In a similar way to Smart Dublin, this would help foster inter-agency 
trust, knowledge sharing and begin to dismantle some of the institutional siloes that 
characterize the IEMA.  
Re-structuring the IEMA and encouraging it to work with and learn 
from other assemblages is one possible route to look at how weak coordination can 
be overcome? But it is a politically laden hierarchical approach that asks siloed and 
institutionalised agencies to re-think their relationship with each other and the state 
and it requires trust and a formalization of the system. Further, it illuminates the fact 
that the overall system is controlled by one sovereign regardless of the fact that these 
agencies believe they are their own sovereign authorities who receive guidance from 
the state but can do with it as they will. This would change if permanent working 
groups were able to adapt policy based on after-action reports in a similar manner to 
how Boston changed the role of the OEM post the marathon bombing. However, I 
propose that the IEMA needs reviewing, streamlining and de-siloing in the same 
manner in which Smart Dublin was created, before any real structural change can 
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occur because the IEMA is too informal and culturally institutionally independent 
for this approach to be possible at present.  
Therefore, we need to explore new ways to drive change, re-
structure and break down agency institutionalisation to contribute to a more efficient 
and coordinated IEMA. One possible route is via the adoption of smart technology in 
a smart way, by contributing to the breaking down of silos, encouraging the sharing 
of data between agencies, the development of integrated control rooms and the use of 
linked data so that they can see the bigger picture. A key example is the case of Rio 
de Janiero who brought together all their agencies and can now manage the city in 
real-time and via an integrated manner as briefly introduced in Chapter two.  
The Centro Integrado de Comando e Controle (CICC) operates as 
an emergency call centre and monitors traffic and is the headquarters for the city’s 
security and operational needs. Further, it has “access to 500 CCTV cameras, 150 
transit cameras, GPS and video monitoring” (Gaffney and Robertson, 2016; 18). 
However, although they maintain that they do not retain any data collected (Gaffney 
and Robertson, 2016),  it is more likely that they delete some data such as CCTV and 
the rest is aggregated and anonymised for future analysis on trends and processes to 
help the city to adapt and manage events in a significantly more efficient manner.  
The Centro das Operações do Rio (CRO) is part of the IBM project 
and is based on New York's Operations Centre (Gaffney and Robertson, 2016). It has 
the same functions as the CICC but also includes weather and surveillance. Further, 
they are the ‘First Responder Coordination and Emergency Alert Notification 
bringing together thirty city agencies to respond in real-time to events of any scale 
(Kitchin, 2016b; Kitchin; 2016c; Kitchin 2016d; Gaffney and Robertson, 2016; 
Luque-Ayala and Marvin, 2016 and Brit Lab, 2016).  
For instance, in Figure 7.2, we see a bus broken down and the red 
circle indicates the impacted area. Through a live feed of available resources and 
GPS, they know personal information about the on-scene police such as their 
personal phones battery life (Brit Lab, 2016). 
Figure 7.2: Bus breaks down and impacted area. 
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Source: Brit lab (2016). 
 
In its essence, Rio is an exemplar of  integrated control centres and 
data-driven agencies, but it has not led to institutions being amalgamated. Therefore, 
the assemblage works through shared infrastructure and delivery but via separate 
institutions. As a result,  it is an appropriate example that the IEMA could use to 
gain insights regarding their re-structuring while, Smart Dublin could act as a guide 
due to its similarities to the organisation of Rio’s agencies. However, would the 
application of technologies in a similar way contribute to institutional reform of the 
IEMA or would it only act as a band aid covering the deeper problems?  
7.3.2 Approach Two – Institutional Reform for Meaningful Collaboration 
The IEMA’s history, geography, informality, institutionalisation 
and relationship with the state has influenced its unwillingness to grow, share or 
coordinate with other agencies and their adoption rates of technological processes 
and data analytics reflect this. This could be rectified through the development of 
data rich and data driven agencies within the IEMA which would contribute towards 
institutional reform for the creating of meaningful collaboration by encouraging 
inter-agency trust, knowledge sharing and coordinated procedures and policies, but 
this is a somewhat utopian perspective. In reality, the creation of data driven, and 
technologically driven agencies is restricted by an abundance of barriers which are a) 
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caused by the current informal, institutionalised and siloed IEMA and b) emanating 
from the actual use of data and technology itself.  
To fully understand how these barriers, actually affect and restrict 
the smartification of IEMA agencies and the potential for institutional reform in a 
meaningful way, a detailed examination of the only IEMA agency with a 
professionalised data analysis unit, An Garda Síochána, is discussed. The use of data 
analysis within NAS and DFB will be referred too but at present, they are at an 
earlier stage of implementation and professionalisation and only beginning to face 
the same issues of AGS. Further, the analysis of AGS is positioned alongside 
insights from Boston, particularly BPD, as both are good examples of approach two 
in action. This is due to a longer history of technological growth producing much 
more advanced data driven agencies resulting in institutional reform between 
agencies and the community.  
Garda Síochána Analysis Service  
The Garda Síochána Analysis Service (GSAS) began in 2007 with 
the hiring of civilian personnel, as data analysis was being conducted on an ad hoc 
basis and required professionalisation. This does not suggest that data remains 
uncollected and under analysed by other agencies. The National Ambulance Service 
use data to reveal certain trends and knowledge around response times and turnabout 
times for example,  
“We are continually producing data, but it would be the likes of how many 
emergency calls did we receive in Waterford last night? What was the length 
of time on average between receiving the call and arriving?” (Representative 
of National Ambulance Service). 
The difference is that GSAS, as a professional body, ensures the 
accuracy, quality, ethical use of data and scale of analysis in a way that cannot be 
ensured or completed by the other agencies. For instance, the limited data analysis 
conducted within Dublin Fire Brigade emanates from  
“a business intelligent system. We have as part of our control centre we have 
a level of scrutiny and gathering of information so at any given time I can tell 
you how many flood calls we have from last year and the year before using a 
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business intelligent system. We can drill down into the actual fire reports so 
each response results in what we call a fire report, although the fire report is 
probably a misnomer, it is more of an incident report as there may be no fire. 
So, that level of data is there. There is no great sharing of data” (Participant 
ID13).  
Thus, DFB collects some data through this model, and they are 
able to produce rudimentary reports. However, as this is conducted on an ad hoc 
basis by senior officers, there is a lack of expert knowledge which could contribute 
to the professionalisation of the data analysis. This would result in DFB being able to 
explore different trends, check for and ensure good data practices and essentially be 
able to use the data to inform more operational practices.  
The closest to a professional data unit like GSAS is within the 
NAS who are “continually producing data” and have an informatics department 
whose  
“sole role is to produce this data, there has to be a reason for producing the 
data [sic]. There are quite a number of people within the greater national 
ambulance service and the HSE who want to know how many maternity 
cases did you have last night? What is the relevance of that to anybody? You 
would have to have a good enough reason for asking that question” 
(Participant ID16).  
Although this appears as a close contender with GSAS, its role is 
not to check or interrogate the data, it is simply to take the raw data and answer 
particular questions when asked. It appears to be a basic data entry system with 
limited information available. Data is not analysed unless there is an appropriate 
reason unlike with GSAS who use the data to inform operational and strategic 
decisions and as a tool for collaboration at the local, regional and national scale. Yet, 
the scale of GSAS is small in comparison to the overall size of AGS and its 
operational scales. It has grown slowly due to being “ stop, start because of the 
recessions and the economic crisis, but we have grown to about 45 people now and 
we are actually launching a recruitment campaign tomorrow for another 25.” 
(Participant ID33). So, what barriers are GSAS facing in trying to institutionally 
reform to become a data-driven agency?  
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Barrier one- The Pulse Database 
The Pulse database, which is the main platform for recording 
crime, is outdated:  
“It is a very closed wall system there. They are working within the 
constraints of the Pulse system which I think when it went live it was already 
outdated. So, they are very limited in what they can do there.” (Participant 
ID35) 
This results in three major issues with Pulse. Firstly, it is not 
integrated with the computer aided dispatch system, as a representative of AGS 
explained: 
“The computer system in command control is from 1989 so there is nothing 
smart about that, in fairness it is a good system, but there is no link with our 
Pulse system or anything like that. I mean that would be a start.”  
Therefore, there is the needless replication of data across two 
systems. This links to the second problem of data accessibility. Even though it is 
available in two places, both are outdated and are essentially just data input systems. 
Therefore, how data is merged within datasets and what the user is told about that 
process incites whether the data can be trusted as discussed by ID33:  
“Respondent: The thing with Pulse is it has very much been designed in 
such a way that it is about data entry and record retrieval, but you can only 
retrieve X amount of records, about 50 records is the maximum you can 
retrieve. But even then, you are looking at files on an individual basis which 
means that if you want to aggregate it all up it is useless. So, Pulse for us, it is 
useless, but for an individual officer who just wants to know about you, it 
might be fine because you are retrieving a record of an individual. […] So, 
when we arrived [GSAS] here one of the things we did was try to put in place 
a new infrastructure. So, if you imagine this is the Pulse screen, but then 
there is Pulse data. What is happening is you cannot really interrogate the 
data to the full extent through that screen. That is the problem. So, all we did 
was we created a new repository of data and...  
Interviewer 2: So, you built your own data infrastructure essentially. 
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Respondent: Yes, and onto that, we actually sat our investigative tool which 
is called I2. [see Figure 7.3] […] So, what we did was bring that across, copy 
the Pulse data so we are not working off the live system, that is the other 
thing, so we have a copy of our database there which we are still developing. 
Now that allows us to interrogate the data in a very different way to your 
average guard, which allows us to actually produce all those reports that your 
average guard can't produce”.  
Figure 7.3: Process of re-building data infrastructure 
  
Source: (Participant ID33) 
 
As a result, there is a still a distinction between who the data users 
are in AGS, meaning that aspects of the agency are attempting to be data-driven, 
while other aspects are continuing to police in a traditional manner. The argument 
for this separation is that the average guard is not adequately trained in data 
processing and analytics due to funding and resource restrictions as discussed by 
participants ID27/28 
“It possibly depends on the scale of the emergency or the duration of it, but 
the Garda analysis service is a relatively new section and only probably quite 
recently sufficiently resourced. So, they are allocated to the various regions 
and to the specialist units and to particular major investigations and they are a 
civilian expertise that comes in and can assist with that type of data analytics 
when it comes to volume and crime investigation and analysing mobile 
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phone records and things like that, areas like that. Increasingly relevant and 
increasingly useful but when it comes down to individual districts and crime 
and burglary trends in one particular station that is more of a local level 
analysis and that is about time and capability to do that sometimes. But there 
is potential there. Looking at it in terms of emergency management we could 
potentially see its use in ongoing crisis if it was a zombie apocalypse or 
something like that.” 
This is an adequate explanation as to increase skills, resources, 
plans and training to forward the smartification process would require a substantial 
cash injection and the hiring of externally trained staff. This reason can also be 
replicated across the other CMaERA agencies.  
Thirdly, with Pulse remaining a data entry platform with limited 
scope for evaluating trends and patterns, it is harder to share information between 
agencies. Of course, GSAS can offer assistance, but this means that for a broad range 
of information to be shared outside of AGS, the request first must be escalated up the 
hierarchy which, in the case of a major emergency could prove timely and 
inefficient, as opposed to a system where superintendents could access this data from 
local stations and share immediately with the relevant agency. So, what does barrier 
one mean for institutional reform in a meaningful way?  
An Garda Síochána are being studied because they are the only 
agency in the IEMA which has formally started to become data-driven with the other 
agencies engaging with data in a limited manner. However, as demonstrated above, 
due to all the agencies collecting data and operating on similar but unconnected 
platforms, it is possible to allow for data sharing within the AGS and between other 
agencies, but they do not utilise it 
“Now to say that is not very fair because we do use the same technology, our 
voice communications, our network, the Guards and ourselves and the fire 
service use the same platform, so we could in theory communicate very 
easily with one another.” (Representative of the National Ambulance 
Service) 
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Further, their platforms strike a resemblance to the siloed 
characteristics of the agency itself and by not overhauling the system and creating 
meaningful connections between all AGS platforms, but instead allowing GSAS to 
create their own data infrastructure as an alternative suggests that the 
institutionalisation and historical culture of AGS is not transitioning easily. This is 
combined with the National Ambulance Service who overhauled their CAD system 
in 2015 and moved from sharing a control room with DFB to their own siloed 
control room, thus, within two decisions they missed a chance to attempt to engage 
with other agencies through their new platforms and they removed an inter-agency 
face-to-face communication (National Ambulance Service, 2018). 
“The control room for the whole Dublin area was in Townsend Street and 
that sort of command and control where they take the emergency call and 
they dispatch from there so it would have been in the one control room. DFB 
on one side of the room and us on the other side of the room. Now we have 
moved out and this is the national control centre […]And the control centres 
then, yes there would be a difference because they wouldn't start to know one 
another know so it is only through phone calls” (Participant ID17)  
Thus, as the other agencies are working within similar 
technological boundaries and platforms without the foresight to set up their own 
‘GSAS’, efficient collaboration and coordination cannot be the outcome. Instead, 
these agencies will remain silos with limited potential for real-time inter-agency data 
sharing “because we do tend to fall back into our own small silos, whereas we worry 
about our own end and we just need to be communicative a bit more” (ID17). 
Barrier Two – Data Quality 
Data quality is a major concern as it needs to be high quality, have 
strong metadata and information regarding its veracity, lineage and provenance19 so 
that the analyst can ensure that any findings stemming from the trends are probable, 
have minimum errors and reflect best practice. When the garda entering data does 
not understand these requirements Pulse, and other platforms, very quickly, become 
systems of different 'sites of practice' where the data is shaped in particular ways due 
                                                          
19 Data veracity is how reliable the data is, lineage is where it came from and provenance is how it has 
been used, manipulated or changed overtime.  
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to cultural and political priorities, i.e. a garda wants to upload his/her/their notes on a 
crime while, GSAS want to use the data to notice trends, create reports and influence 
policy. Further, what is missing from GSASs online presence and the interview is an 
explanation of the data’s journey from start to end, through its intersections, 
replications, deletions and mutations in conjunction with a deep exploration into 
why, and in what context the data was shaped. This could help to understand the 
advantages and disadvantages of data analysis within the agency especially as it re-
scales based on priorities, cultures and politics. This issue is particularly notable 
within the NAS and DFB too, who are collecting and analysing the data in a limited 
manner without any clear consideration for the data’s lineage, providence or 
veracity. They ask particular questions of the data without acknowledging any 
potential errors or biases within it by not ensuring that the raw data is collected and 
analysed carefully and done so with expertise. So, what does barrier two mean for 
institutional reform in a meaningful way?  
By black-boxing the journey of the data in this way, it is harder to 
promote the shift towards data-driven decision making both within the agency and 
across the IEMA as there is a lack of understanding on how the data is used and 
shaped (Bates et al, 2016). This is further compounded by the fact that AGS has poor 
data governance making it even harder to encourage Gardaí, even trained Gardaí, to 
fully engage in providing good quality data from the beginning.  
“Now the quality issue is a big one. Once data was actually being entered 
into the system, I don't think people thought about the quality element of it at 
all. And I think the quality issues have really begun to emerge over the last 
few years to a greater extent because of what we do here. All of a sudden, we 
are now churning data at a rate of knots, we are not looking at 10s of records, 
we are looking at 100,000s of records. And a question was asked of us and 
when we go and look at the data, we find that sometimes we can't answer the 
question because of the way the data is structured or the way that the data is 
completed. And so that has led to issues and problems and it is being 
accentuated by the fact that once we started to have a look at it the 
governance, we found that the organisation has poor data governance. So, 
you don't actually have one person responsible for data quality.  
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So, what are we doing about that? […] So there [will be] a chief data officer 
job and the governance has got to be put in there. And then that is where we 
are going to have to look at the business and begin to talk about data quality. 
Because data quality isn't absolute. You don't say this is data quality. What 
you say is, what is it that you want to do with the data? And once you know 
what you want to do with the data that is where you can say this is the shape, 
these are the minimum data quality thresholds” (Participant ID33).  
Barrier Three – Algorithmic Governance and Accountability 
Algorithmic governance refers to the change in how we are 
beginning to manage society through big data which is being collected through a 
number of interconnected technologies and personal devices (Danaher et al, 2017). 
Further, as algorithms, which are a set of instructions to solve an issue, become more 
complex and begin to merge with processes of machine learning and artificial 
intelligence, the algorithm can transform based on the data it analyses (Donadea and 
Almeida, 2016). The development of algorithmic governance has the potential to 
change policing fundamentally, but it is being met with strong resistance in Ireland 
and a sort of pseudo-resistance by Boston Police Department. BPD argued that they 
do not engage with predictive policing, but intelligence led policing as there is 
concern that predictive policing is inherently biased. Even so predictive policing is 
already occurring in police forces in the US such as Chicago PD (Jordon Jefferson, 
2018a; Karppi, 2018) but it is being approached through a critical lens in Ireland as 
discussed by ID33, who has concerns around quality of data, accountability, 
algorithmic decisions and biases along lines of race and income. 
In terms of predictive policing, An Garda Síochána have “issues 
with machine learning which need to be resolved […] before we can go down that 
route.” One of which is the biases that these algorithms produce. ID33 provided a 
recent example from Durham who used artificial intelligence (AI) to determine if 
people should receive bail or not. Instead, it categorised people by address and 
subsequently, class and wealth: 
“So, Durham police used AI recently in order to triage whether people should 
receive police bail or not. It was a system whereby personality, on the basis 
of the algorithm if the person came with a high risk, they wouldn't get police 
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bail, low risk they would get police bail. But as they began to have a look at 
the data points that determined the algorithm, the outcome of the algorithm, 
one of the data points was postcode. So, people in poorer areas seem to have 
high risks, so irrespective of whether you were that person or not, all of a 
sudden you were being punished by your postcode area. And we also have to 
be mindful that within the UK minority ethnic groups are over-represented in 
poorer areas. So, you could actually be having a form of indirect 
discrimination as well. So, all of a sudden, the way that this algorithm was 
working was it actually treating all people equally? So, AI, great to talk about 
delivering value, but it has to do it within the values of the organisation” 
(Participant ID33). 
So, what does barrier three mean for institutional reform in a 
meaningful way? Firstly, it is ensuring that AGS are considering accountability 
within their data and how it could be used to socially or economically segregate 
people as illustrated by ID33 who questions  
“Who is accountable when you are running AI? Is it the programmer? Is it 
the person who made the decision? […] Is it the person who said that this is 
the direction we should go in? If somebody decided on that basis and was 
wrong, who is held to account? And that is an issue that we haven't 
resolved.”  
This refers back to the institutionalisation of policing, which 
historically have ingrained scales of discrimination and if the process of 
accountability is unclear then the algorithm may contain discriminative 
characteristics which could “create a feedback loop” (Participant ID33) because: 
“we have problematic information in our systems, to begin with, and let's be 
honest within many jurisdictions across the world policing has been quite 
repressive towards certain groups and communities. And we have certain 
groups and communities overrepresented in the databases and intelligence 
within certain police forces. And if you are going to sit AI on top of that and 
feed off that data the danger is you are going to actually create a feedback 
loop. So, who has figured out the data quality thresholds in that sense? Who 
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has considered the possibility of perverse outcomes when you start sitting AI 
on top of your data?” (Participant ID33) 
By recognising the often-ingrained discriminatory practices of 
traditional policing and their replication within data, it requires AGS to soften their 
approach to becoming data driven. However, through this decision process there is a 
recognition of toxic cultures within police forces, which need to be overcome before 
algorithmic governance can truly be a beneficial addition to policing rather than a 
tool of segregation. Thus, in terms of algorithmic governance it is not necessarily the 
technology itself which can lead the way towards institutional reform but the 
conversation surrounding its ethics and data accountability contextualised within the 
agencies own history, culture and practices. These conversations force agencies to 
discuss deeper issues such as institutionalisation and toxic cultures so that the legacy 
and veracity of the data can be considered before it is used to inform policing 
decisions.  
However, even if the deeper institutional issues are recognised, 
their applicability and contextualisation within the data is hindered by a lack of 
training and a data culture within AGS and other IEMA agencies as described by 
ID33, 
"if we are actually asking people to make decisions off the back of an 
algorithm, they have got to understand how that algorithm works. You cannot 
be in a position where you are making decisions on the basis of saying the 
computer says yes or the computer says no."  
Officers need to understand the decisions, understand the veracity 
and lineage of the data, the source of the data and its quality and reliability and these 
are not skills which An Garda Síochána have as they are still trying to overcome "the 
organisation[s] poor data governance". 
Boston Police Department is an example of the type of institutional 
reform that can emanate from these types of conversations as participant IDM 
describes an almost soft form of predictive policing by arguing that they use 
intelligence-based policing. However, the difference between intelligence-based 
policing and predictive policing is that they do not use algorithms to target broad 
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areas based on discriminatory data, but by taking into account conversations around 
history, geography, recent crimes and other contested factors as explained by IDM: 
“I wouldn't say we are predictive policing, and I don't even know if I believe 
in predictive policing, we are an intelligence-led policing department, so we 
do highlight patterns and trends. If we have a rash of robberies here, we 
deploy resources, there. So, our deployment decisions are based on data that 
come out that we generate. If there is gang violence... Most of our violence is 
driven by gangs and it is retaliatory in nature. So, if I have a shooting here 
and I identify the victim and I know this victim is a gang member I can 
anticipate where the retaliation is going to be. So, we have a group of officers 
[…] tasked to go out and try to either prevent that, find out some information, 
gather some intelligence so we can try to prevent that retaliation. If we can 
get some information in, okay this kid who was just shot, his brother we 
know just got a gun and we can try to prevent that next shooting. Or we keep 
an eye on these guys if we think they are going to retaliate. So, we are 
intelligence-led. We monitor patterns and trends; we deploy our resources 
accordingly. We have city-wide units that we can take from there and put 
here to help problem solve on certain issues. But the thing with predictive 
policing is that you take out the human component of it. People are 
unpredictable” (Participant IDM). 
Critically though, as described by former Boston Police 
Commissioner Bill Evans, certain areas of Boston have always been discriminated 
against and that Boston does have a history of racial abuse. Thus, based on this short 
description, it is hard to accept that the algorithms used by Boston Regional 
Intelligence Centre (BRIC) do not contain some biases and geographical areas of 
discrimination due to the histories of certain spaces and the institutional knowledge 
passed down generationally which can inform how data is collected and its veracity 
and lineage. To minimise the effects of discriminatory or biased practices within 
their usage of data they approach accountability through CompStat, which as 
explained by IDK is  
“an accountability type of environment, we don't do a confrontational 
CompStat, not like some jurisdictions in the country do, it is not 
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confrontational. Every other week, so we have 11 police districts, so every 
two weeks two districts will be reporting so the captain will come in with his 
staff and it is expected that he will know everything, and we send it to him 
from the BRIC […] So, you will know what your patterns and trends are, you 
should be on top of it, not just for CompStat, honestly, all the captains really 
do stay very involved because just the way our command structure is, the 
superintendent of the captains knows everything that is going on in the city. 
So, if he calls and says what is going on in this rash of robberies you had 
better really know when he calls you.  
So, our captains are really... So, it is an accountability thing and it is to make 
sure, and it is to also highlight best practices. So, if this particular captain is 
having a rash of burglaries and this is what the MO looks like, rear door 
entries, and this captain who is sitting in the audience says, 'I had that a 
couple of weeks ago and this is what we did, we arrested this person, but he 
is out on bail now and he lives...' So, it is to exchange information, highlight 
best practices, some kind of collective problem solving and accountability 
that if there is something going on and the commander's kind of sit in a U and 
we can ask questions of the captain. Did you think about doing this and what 
about this? But usually, it is more of an exchange of information and stuff”. 
This demonstrates good inter-agency coordination and networking 
and could be deemed an interesting method towards encouraging inter-agency 
collaboration. However, even though Ireland is questioning accountability and needs 
to formalise and create better inter-agency coordination, they argued that CompStat 
is a neoliberal process of data analysis and data sharing that is overly linked to 
targets rather than changing cultural standards. Thus, it is just an added layer rather 
than an effective tool of institutional reform. 
“So, for example within CompStat, CompStat is a business process that has 
tight loose principles. So tight in the sense that you have a clear vision and 
create targets to achieve, loose in the sense that you have actually devolved 
responsibility down to commanders, to drive that. But linked into a data-
driven approach. So that is how the commanders want to use it. They want to 
use it to monitor performance, but down on a local level it is that kind of 
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analytical driven approach to try and understand the problem and to put 
solutions in place. And part of that would be identifying problem areas” 
(Participant ID33). 
However, where Boston’s assessment of predictive policing 
demonstrates institutional reform in a meaningful way is when they re-humanise 
policing and the use of data as illustrated: 
“We don't buy it here yet, they haven't proved... You can't take out human 
behaviour. A lot of crime is opportunistic, it is committed by people who are 
not really thinking that hard about it, it is a crime of opportunity. They walk 
by, they see this car, this car is unlocked, they see shopping bags in the back 
and that is what they do. So predictive policing, for them to say the odds are 
that you will have another car break here, we kind of already know that 
because that is where all our car breaks are so why are you telling me?” 
(Participant IDK). 
Or, how Bill Evans described the importance of community 
policing in managing crime. He argued that creating relationships with all 
communities was essential for the gathering and sharing of information after crimes, 
for building trust between communities and the police and that by organising the 
Boston Police Department ice cream van and flashlight walks and other community-
focused events it meant that the police were now seen as guardians rather than 
warriors of the community. He furthered this by promising to meet with relevant 
community leaders post a police shooting of a member of their community to ensure 
open lines of communication and an adequate explanation as to why this action was 
taken.  
This type of policing does not rely on predictive policing instead it 
relies on the human interactions and relationships in a positive way but as IDK 
explained, in an almost Agambien way, humans have a providential will and no 
algorithm can predict that. It’s human nature to be opportunistic and predictive 
policing, even combined with the type of community policing described, can never 
really overcome this.  
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“A lot of crime is opportunistic, it is committed by people who are not really 
thinking that hard about it, it is a crime of opportunity. They walk by, they 
see this car, this car is unlocked, they see shopping bags in the back and that 
is what they do. So predictive policing, for them to say the odds are that you 
will have another car break here, we kind of already know that because that is 
where all our car breaks are so why are you telling me?” (Participant IDK). 
Barrier Four – Resistance to Change: Control Rooms 
Barrier four, shifts the focus away from AGS towards the wider 
IEMA through a discussion on outdated coordination centres/control rooms which 
should not be confused with the emergency call centres. These control rooms are 
activated during emergencies in Local Coordination Centres where information is 
shared via phone and is inputted on four whiteboards (see Figure 7.4), as described 
by ID05 
“Well, we use the same thing for managing a system, we use a system called 
Information Management and we use that so that people can break down 
large chunks of information and analyse it and make evidence-based 
decisions on that. That is, it there, it is still on the boards. It is a system on 
four boards that all agencies are trained on now and it is a very effective tool. 
We tried it electronically, but it just didn't work”. 
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Figure 7.4: Four whiteboards in a Local Coordination Centre 
 
Source (Author) 
 
This is compared to the BRIC from BPD who have their own 
dashboard that provides specific sensitive information, like law enforcement 
sensitive, that can't be seen by everyone. The BRIC control room uses digital 
platforms connected to city cameras, sensors and other technologies to ensure the 
quick sharing of information and a more efficient, uniformed response during an 
event. Data analysis is a key aspect of this control room as “we send out all the 
statistics that have occurred within your last ten week reporting period, because we 
report every ten weeks” (Participant IDK).  
In Ireland, as there is a lack of a digital platform for the 
management of data or the sharing of information there is no need for a data analyst 
during emergencies further discouraging agencies from the professionalisation of 
their data management as described by ID33.  
“Interviewer 1: So, you wouldn't be in the National Coordination Centre, say 
during Hurricane Ophelia or something. 
Respondent: No. 
Interviewer 1: You wouldn't have an analyst represented there? 
Respondent: Not that I am aware of.” 
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This is furthered by a lack of insight into the need for a digital 
platform such as WebEOC20, knowledge of the Ezone tool or the need for a data 
analysist as described in a conversation with ID26: 
“Absolutely, national incident coordination, that is what I am telling you, we 
have one, and we have a bloody good one here and if we can get people to 
understand that, we give a lot of our time trying to persuade people that that 
is what is here. And as I said to you the piece about it is our four-board 
system is really at the core of this and the challenge to people with 
technology is to take what is an excellent four board system, it needs this, it 
needs a black marker and you could run Ireland here.  
And that is what we have done here and that is all you need if you use that 
system, but it is much more about in your mind really, that this is what we 
are trying to do. And we have done what you are talking about, we have done 
it at a national level. Christ, there is a big flooding down there, we need to 
move this, or we need to... What can we do here? And the great thing about 
having everyone around the table, when people hear the stuff going on, 
without me going around saying has anyone anything else to say? People put 
their hand up and say we actually have stuff here we can do this, or we can 
do that. And the other piece about that is for me the nightmare is someone 
else saying, oh you give us this or you do that. That just doesn't work in 
reality, that is a recipe for rows. A big part of coordination... […] A bit part 
of the experience for me of coordination is managing rows, rows between 
services, rows between agencies, very understandable, you do get a serious 
situation.”  
So, what does barrier four mean for institutional reform in a 
meaningful way? The language in the above quote is suggestive of resistance to 
change. The experience of the participant is that the four-board system works, that 
technology will not improve that or inter-agency coordination as the crux of efficient 
coordination is managing people. This is accurate as demonstrated during the Boston 
                                                          
20 As described in chapter 5, the WebEOC is an online emergency operations centre and crisis 
management system which supports the sharing of real time information between agencies with 
regards to resources and other response mechanisms.  
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Marathon Bombing as the Unified Command Centre could not manage all the police 
officers who arrived, and it descended into chaos. However, a platform such as 
WebEOC allows for a smooth transition of knowledge and information, it provides a 
permanent record, creates data for analysis and its description by IDG is reflective of 
a digital four boards: 
“Some of them are [connected] and some of them are, they have different 
boards, one might track only shelters, one webpage of this application, only 
shelters and another one tracks all events listed by transportation agencies 
and there is a way that those two things could be melded together, or you 
could say Boston has a WebEOC shelter board and the state has a WebEOC 
shelter board, but they are not displaying the same information even though 
they could”.  
Thus, the WebEOC creates a seamless flow of information from 
senior officials (in the control room) all the way to operational staff. They can 
interact with their staff on the ground, with other agencies in the EOC and follow 
inter-agency developments through the WebEOC. Although there is the equivalent 
of an EOC in terms of Local Coordination Centres, the flow of information between 
and within agencies relies on the upward sharing of information from the ground via 
phone and there is a lack of interest or understanding in the benefit of a system such 
as WebEOC or even the utilization of the Ezone tool. This, with the lack of a data 
analysis in control rooms during events, illustrates the resistance to change within 
the IEMA which does not exist at the same scale in the USEMA. The positives of a 
digital platform such as “If everyone is trying to use the same tools so we can have 
the same operating picture” (Participant IDG) should outweigh the fears and 
reluctance to change. Instead, this resistance to change demonstrates a lack of 
awareness around the need to progress and modernise and can only hinder true 
institutional reform both technologically and culturally. 
Barrier Five – Resistance to Change: Inter-Agency Data Sharing 
The reluctance to share data, emanates from the same fears and 
resistance to change as barrier four illustrated. Participant ID33 argues that these 
fears are based on a lack of knowledge and legacy as "I don't think within Ireland we 
have a culture of sharing data." However, this is not uniquely an Irish issue, as data 
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sharing between agencies in both Ireland and the US is restrictive with concerns 
around privacy, misuse and institutional protection. But, in Ireland, it was more 
concerning that emergency response agencies seemed to collect data but not assign 
any importance to such or any analytical insights because: 
“All the data we would have here is locked down, is inaccessible, we cannot 
download it, but we can view it and obviously, people could photograph it if 
they want or something like that and that is one of the reasons, we don't let 
mobile phones in the room” (Participant ID16).  
While, Participant ID35 argues that “Some agencies feel that they 
have ownership, complete and total ownership of the dataset and releasing it or 
anything like that for collaboration feels like we are giving away the farm as it were. 
They no longer have control over this data.” Further, how data is shared and 
organised is often overly difficult, bureaucratic or numerous agencies have different 
parts of the dataset:  
“I would really, really agree with that. For the Ezone tool we had for 
example, data on the schools around Ireland so if an incident happened, we 
would know it is this school, they have X number of people on their roll, this 
is the roll number and so forth. Sometimes it is very hard to find complete 
datasets. If you went looking for a list of all schools in Ireland there maybe is 
a couple of different agencies you would have to go to, no one seems to have 
master lists of things. And in other cases, for example, the ESB Networks, 
that took six months of legal back and forth to get power line information just 
to put it on the map to stop the helicopters crashing into power lines. The big 
problem there, the big issue that they had was it was the HSE requesting it 
and they had to make sure in legal terms that the HSE would not use census 
data or other data to start comparing health conditions with location or 
proximity with power lines” (Participant ID35). 
This form of data protection21 is a key concern in Ireland which is 
also hindering their ability to share data as explained by ID33:  
                                                          
21 It is interesting to note that even though the IEMA agencies are reluctant to engage in data-driven 
methods they are recognising that they are collecting huge amounts of data that need to be protected 
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“So, there was a range of problems, so you could actually share information 
on that, on that basis. Now within an Irish context I think there is a greater 
concern about the whole issues around data and data protection and so you 
can't share, it has been impossible to share data at an individual level. 
Although we can get individual data but only as part of the investigative 
process and not a big batch of people's individual data. So, I can ask about 
your records in terms of your accounts if we are investigating you, but what I 
can't ask for is everybody's accounts within that particular area. So, at an 
individual level, it has been difficult to share that data. At an aggregate level, 
we can share data. […] I am actually an advocate of data and data protection 
and I can see the real importance of it but at another level, I think we have 
gone too far, and we have a very firm data protection commissioner here who 
probably enforce the rules quite strictly.” (Participant ID33). 
However, ID31 explains, that regardless of the parameters set 
regarding the ethical use of data, the PRAs should be able to adequately share data, 
even vulnerable and identifiable data, if it is for the common good especially as data 
protection is already being breached. Thus, ID31 argues for a system that would 
allow for the data to be shared but the access tracked and audited. 
“There is a data commissioner there which is going to impose restrictions or 
protocols on the agencies and through the government in any event. I have no 
issue, I think from a major emergency or from a big event situation I think 
the three agencies need to be syncing and have available data. I think they are 
all professional agencies, they have their own internal protocols of secrecy 
and of data restrictions and who it can be passed onto. For a major 
emergency, I would have absolutely no hesitation saying we should share 
that information. It should be available as I said from the one call coming in, 
to recording that we share that information.  
So, I don't see an issue because information is fine, but information is time 
critical in the emergency response area. I fully accept there are safety issues 
                                                          
by law. Thus, individual agencies have prepared their own data protection plans under the ‘General 
Data Protection Regulation’ (GDPR) which are easily accessed via their web pages.  
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and sensitive issues and there is restricted information, but we are probably 
the HSE/Guards really would be the two agencies involved in the sensitive 
type information. From the point of view of criminal activity or from a sexual 
type, the HSE are dealing with child issues and other sensitive issues. Fire 
not so much because they are really going to the site. I wouldn't see having a 
common system each would have access to maybe on a tiered level that 
obviously going up the ranks to the senior responder has better access. And if 
you have a footprint inside in the system then if it is released it can be looked 
at to see who accessed information. You can see from where social welfare 
have had issues of people looking up at their accounts and the Guards have 
had issues with the Pulse system, so it is actually out there. But there are 
possibilities of restricting it. There are possibilities of looking down the road 
if someone breaches it, so I would have no issue. I think from a major 
emergency point of view it doesn't make sense not to share some key 
information” (Participant ID31). 
There is a lot of work that needs to be done on data protection 
across all agencies, not just the IEMA, and until these agencies begin to fully engage 
in data analytics and data sharing, substantial inter-agency data protection protocol 
will not occur. So, what does barrier five mean for institutional reform in a 
meaningful way?  
Although the Framework and some IEMA agencies have been 
working for decades to break down the siloed legacies and build inter-agency 
relationships, the advent of big data and algorithmic governance is putting the 
spotlight on an aspect of their agencies which has retained its independent silo 
characteristic. However, as ID35 argues:  
“this is changing, the attitudes to that are changing. There is the open 
government data which is making brilliant strides and more and more 
agencies are now thinking we can actually do this, it makes sense, there is a 
collaboration there. But there is a lot of older style thinking, depending on the 
efforts they might have gone to collect this data they just simply wouldn't 
think of giving it away for free”. 
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He centres his argument on the growth of open data which will be 
supported by projects such as Building the City Dashboard, by GSAS and because 
inter-agency data sharing is beginning to occur in Cork as evident by Participant 
(ID32) who sees the benefit of such for the development of inter-agency 
coordination: 
“But because of the inter-agency training down here and the amount of 
training that we do there is good data sharing, even technology at 
conferences. (Participant ID32)  
It is these small changes which will encourage the IEMA to slowly 
become data-driven due to the emergence of open-data and ubiquitous technology, 
However, its institutional reform will be hindered unless the key barriers of 
institutionalisation, weak governance and informal practices are overcome. 
Otherwise, the shift toward a smarter IEMA will only further illuminate and embed 
these problems. 
7.4 Conclusion: The smarter IEMA?  
So, what does all this mean for the IEMA? Should it undergo 
smartification to become data-driven? Is it really the solution? Will it, 
fundamentally, re-shape the assemblage? 
The answers to these questions are still highly complex, but I argue 
that the IEMA needs to undergo some form of smartification to be able to function in 
line with greater society. However, the IEMA actually has more serious issues 
around toxic cultures, institutionalisation, awkward power dynamics, and it is too 
informal to encourage strong inter-agency coordination. Therefore, both approaches 
offer methods for increasing inter-agency coordination, but are restricted by a 
reluctance to change. Thus, the smartification of emergency management 
assemblages is a slow burner and somewhat idealistic as they face the same issues 
which have held back or created toxic institutional cultures in the past, meaning that 
it is not really a solution as much as it is a band aid: 
“I think before we even get there it is the culture of the organisation. You 
actually have to try and shift people's ways of thinking. When you start 
shifting people's ways of thinking, that is when they will absorb and take on a 
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data-driven approach. So that is where you have to spend a bit of time sitting, 
listening, understanding what their dilemmas, what their problems, what their 
issues are. And then feed information, tailor that information to their 
problems. And so, show that the analysis that we produce has utility for them 
and that they can apply it. And once they see positive outcomes beginning to 
emerge from that, it moves their thinking from saying my gut tells me to do 
this, to actually the analysts, I know now that they know so I am going to go 
to the analysts. So, the first and foremost is to get your end users on board, to 
change their way of thinking about analysis, because you could actually have 
the most stupendous dashboards, they can be beautiful, they can be amazing, 
you can do 101 things with them but if they are sat out there while business is 
over here..." (Participant ID33) 
However, by only homing in on the cultural aspect of the agency, 
as a separate process of becoming a data-driven organisation, illustrates a narrow 
path which lacks scope by disregarding the need to contextualise other information 
including experience. These agencies operate through path dependent protocols, they 
have decades of institutional memory so, changing how they inherently police or 
respond to an event is a major task and it can only succeed by truly understanding 
the informalities, tensions and legacies of the agency through careful observation of 
inter-agency operations, training and officer experience.  
If the IEMA becomes data-driven this, would fundamentally, re-
shape the assemblage as the sharing of information would be quicker and more 
efficient while, the use of platforms and integrated control rooms may become more 
of the norm, resulting in a flatter assemblage with less need to oscillate towards a 
hierarchical position as decisions and responsibilities would be very clear and non-
debatable in this scenario.  
I recommend that the IEMA need to observe the benefits of the 
USESMA’s adoption of data-driven techniques and technologically based tools such 
as WebEOC and more generally, the benefits of dashboards, integrated control 
rooms and inter-agency data sharing in order to help reduce resistance to change and 
potentially weaken the silos as agencies begin working together on technological 
projects and data sharing initiatives. However, this would require stronger, more 
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persistent political will and governance to break these siloed institutions and to lobby 
for a re-structuring that moves the IEMA from being highly informal to becoming 
formal with aspects of informality. Further, this should lead to wider thinking on 
how the IEMA can become more inter-connected with other urban agencies as the 
importance of this growth is described by IDA; 
“And so, I am not engaged in the direct emergency response work, the goal is 
by doing this work and our focus that we have, that we are able to help 
improve the way that that happens. So, a lot of the data that I am collecting is 
for decision making around what are the best approaches. […] Yeah so, they 
have a pretty good relationship and mainly the relationship comes out of a 
process like sharing other information with stakeholders. I think the 
challenge is there isn't a repository of where all those people are in Boston, 
we are assuming it is the same way, but there are sources to give that data. 
And so being able to figure out how to leverage that for good decision 
making to do wellness checks on folks, particularly if they are electricity 
dependent”. (Participant IDA) 
In summary, technology is not the solution for creating better inter-
agency coordination or changing how the assemblage may re-shape between policy 
and activation. Instead, it is part of the solution alongside the restructuring of the 
IEMA, with a focus on talent and the effective use of resources within working 
groups. But neither of these approaches will be effective until the institutional silos 
of the IEMA and all CMaERAs are broken down as this is a critical step forward in 
the creation of a true CMaERA. 
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Chapter 8: Conclusion    
 
8.1 Introduction 
This concluding chapter, discusses the findings and contributions 
of this thesis as a whole, including its meaning and implications for hazard studies, 
assemblage theory, the emergency management discipline and the IEMA and 
USEMA. It begins with a brief summary of the position and contribution of this 
research to Geography and the research design including revisiting the aims, 
objectives and research questions. It then synthesises the key findings and identifies 
three wider contributions to hazard studies, assemblage theory and the effects of 
urban processes on assemblage oscillation. Finally, it ends by identifying multiple 
future research avenues and a final summation of the thesis.  
8.2 Summary of the Research  
Despite the enormous work which has been conducted on hazards, 
disaster management, risk and vulnerabilities, there are significant gaps with respect 
to understanding coordinated and managed response to events. As geographers, we 
should begin to look beyond socio-economic vulnerabilities and risk and question 
the politics of different spaces and places and how their response networks form, 
operate and are controlled. We need to understand how CMaERAs are shaped, how 
policy is created and how it is operationally used alongside our traditional 
understanding of the vulnerabilities and risk.  
However, we do still need to continue approaching hazard studies 
through social vulnerability, the effectiveness of engineering projects, the role and 
influence of the risk society and the development of resiliency but this should be 
done in conjunction with all elements of hazard management. The above approaches 
deal with hazard prediction, preparedness, mitigation and management but apart 
from resiliency, the discipline does not engage with the recovery aspect effectively. 
Even though resilience studies look at community and government preparedness and 
lessons learned, there are limited geographical studies on the emergency services 
which are key for recovery both in the immediate aftermath and longer term. 
Therefore, I set an agenda for the geographical study of emergency management and 
coordination in terms of a focus on the recovery element of an event resulting in one 
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key research aim. It aimed to understand how CMaERA organise, re-shape and are 
influenced by broader factors such as urban and state governance, history, 
geography, (in)formalisation and institutionalisation and whether these are affected 
when the CMaERA begins engaging with data analytics and governing via 
algorithms. This aim was broken down into four workable objectives informing the 
research question.  
Objective 1: Describe the emergency management systems of Ireland (Dublin and 
Cork) and the United States (Boston, Massachusetts) in terms of their policy 
(Chapters 4-5). 
Objective 2: Evaluate why CMaERA agencies may oscillate away from the 
designated policy shape into different real-time response shapes, as a reaction to the 
type of the event, (in)formal relations and power dynamics. (Chapters 4-6)  
Objective 3: Explore some of the cultural and political reasons these systems can 
fail, such as inter-agency tensions, formalisation, weak governance, geographical 
exclusion, institutional resistance, training and funding (Chapter 6-7). 
Objective 4: Assess the relationship between CMaERAs and technology, data 
analytics and algorithmic governance to better understand the impact of them on the 
evolution of CMaERAs (Chapter 7).  
The main research question was: 
How do the variety of actors, actants and technologies involved in emergency 
management contextualised within their particular histories, cultures and 
geographies, assemble and organise?   
8.3 Key Findings 
Providing a narrative and close examination of the different 
structures of the IEMA and USEMA, proved essential for uncovering the reasons 
why CMaERA oscillate away from policy-based shapes to real-time activated 
shapes, but it also helped to provide a perspective in which to study the potential 
effects of ‘smartification’ on CMaERAs. Thus, Objective 1 was examined between 
Chapters 4 and 5 and the research reported in these chapters found, that US 
emergency management policy produces a system which is a highly formalised, legal 
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and an unyielding system, which retains its power by controlling funding streams 
within legislation. Beneficially, the more formalised system ensures that methods 
and institutional knowledges, pre-determined resources, assistance and funding 
streams are all in situ and ready to be activated quickly. However, impervious 
formalisation also results in very weak informal networks which hinder the growth 
of inter-agency trust and collaboration.  
Meanwhile, in Ireland, the policy is much more informal due to it 
being supplanted on top of historic loose networks, meaning that the system is not 
framed by any legal frameworks or undercut by funding streams. However, because 
of the looser more fluid system, the IEMA is able to be more flexible and adaptive in 
the face of major events but processes of decision-making, access to funding and 
declarations of emergencies are much more difficult to obtain than in the US.  
By comparing the CMaERAs in line with their policy description 
and their re-shaping during activation, the reasons why a CMaERA may oscillate 
between policy and activation as described across Chapters 4 to 7 and explored 
under Objective 2 became visible. The flexibility and fluidness of CMaERAs is not 
adequately reflected when studied via only one ontological understanding as, the 
empirical case studies demonstrated that hierarchical and flat ontologies do not 
adequately represent CMaERAs as they neglect to account for contextual factors that 
affect how assemblages are shaped in policy and re-shaped during activation. Thus, 
this thesis proposed a middle-based ontology which offered a deeper understanding 
of the internal and external factors that shape and encourage oscillation of a 
CMaERA.  
For instance, the USEMA has a superficial flattening and 
decentralisation of power networks at both the local and regional scale, where each 
scale has authority over their own agencies, structures, organisations, processes and 
leadership. However, at the federal scale the system oscillates away from the flatter, 
organisation (Foucault, 1977/1978) of the local and regional scale, to a more 
hierarchical position with one ultimate sovereign (Agamben, 1998; 2005; 2011). 
Local agencies provide information to the state and it is the state governor which will 
request federal help if needed (this is often done in communication with the local 
scale, but it is not necessary). If federal help is awarded, then FEMA and other 
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federal agencies such as the FBI or DHS take over responsibility from local and state 
agencies. Of course, there are exceptions to the rule, as was seen during stage 3 of 
the Boston Marathon Operation, where the FBI allowed Bill Evans of BPD to 
continue in his leadership role. However, this is an exception not the rule as the 
stringent federally enforced hierarchy is linked to funding. This means that even as 
local and state agencies operate independently at their scale, in order to ensure they 
will be entitled to funding if a major event occurs, they concede authority to federal 
policy and their directives. Thus, the USEMA is superficially flat with no ultimate 
sovereign power in a Foucauldian sense but realistically hierarchical due to the 
reliance that the local and regional scales have on the federal scale coercing them 
into implementing federal guidelines and procedures.  
Meanwhile, the informality of the IEMA creates a structure which 
is mainly decentralised and rhizomatic with an attempt to place a more formal 
hierarchal structure over it via policy. The formation of policy such as the 
Framework, which aims to formalise the system does not actually deal with any of 
the significantly entrenched problems of the IEMA agencies and their willingness to 
actively coordinate and embrace change. By ignoring contextual issues such as an 
agency’s history, geography, institutionalisation and state relations, agencies forge 
their own paths and procedures as they internalise state policy and activate it in 
agency appropriate ways.  
The effects of this can be seen due to the fact that Irish emergency 
management policy is unlegislated, resulting in each agency retaining their right to 
internalise policy as they wish. There are no legal or funding ramifications for 
ignoring or changing policy in line with their culture and this reflects the 
stubbornness and resistance to change that was characterised by a lot of the 
participants. Thus, the IEMA is a superficial hierarchical system that actually 
operates in a flatter decentralised way. Yet, in a similar way, to the US, the IEMA 
has an ultimate sovereign (An Taoiseach) providing the illusion of a formal 
structure. The informality of the IEMA encourages agencies to make clear public 
declarations without the Taoiseach’s approval i.e Met Éireann weather alerts. 
Therefore, there is a blurring of informal and formal practices in Ireland which is not 
evident due to the formalised inter-jurisdictional and hierarchical scale in the US. 
This creates difficulty around ascertaining the role of a sovereign, as simultaneously 
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there is one ultimate sovereign and multiple embodied sovereigns (Foucault versus 
Agamben) in place. This affects how the assemblage re-shapes during different 
events supporting the theoretical idea that assemblages cannot just fit neatly into one 
ontological position but instead are messy, transitioning, and difficult entities to fully 
understand.  
At this point, it is obvious that the two assemblages are structured 
differently but both still oscillate between policy and activated shapes. So, Objective 
3 questioned why. Clearly, the (in)formalisation of the CMaERA is a contributing 
factor to how it oscillates, but there are other factors that deserve attention also. 
Firstly, an abundance of issues around path-dependency and agency histories refer to 
the evolution of emergency service agencies as historically independent from one 
another. As a push for inter-agency and inter-jurisdictional coordination has come to 
the forefront of effective emergency management since the 1970s, agency cultures 
and institutional cultures have created tensions around how decisions are made, and 
policy is created. This combined with weak governance, either from the state or 
within agencies, resulted in geographical exclusion in policy writing (Ireland) or 
clear inter-scalar and inter-jurisdictional boundaries around funding (USA). Further, 
as political priorities have changed, particularly during the shift from welfarism to 
neoliberal entrepreneurial practices, funding and training resources for public 
services became tighter, reducing the capacity of these agencies and affecting the 
relationship between agencies and governments as seen with the NAS and DCC. All 
of these factors, and more, encourage the CMaERA to be designed one way and 
activated in other ways as they produce different levels of trust, priorities, power 
dynamics and histories which in turn affect how the assemblage may re-shape.  
Of course, not all agencies are resisting change or allowing these 
problems to constrain their ambition and future growth. For instance, the Office of 
Emergency Management in Boston and the inter-agency office in Cork have 
emerged as pinnacles of success in positively interacting and working with other 
agencies while others are still participating but in a weaker more protective and 
reserved manner. This results in inefficient coordinated responses but as the OEM 
quoted “as one agency shows the benefits more will follow with time”.  
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Finally, Objective 4, primarily focused on the IEMAs (potential) 
relationship with technology, data analytics and algorithmic governance as examined 
in the previous chapter. The clear finding was that the broad issues which are 
inherent to CMaERA are so deep that technology will not be the solution, but it can 
act as a driver towards change. However, the IEMA needs a structural overhaul 
before it will be fully effective as a CMaERA or can embrace the benefits of 
platforms such as WebEOC, inter-agency data sharing and more integrated control 
rooms.  
But in what way can technology drive some change with regards to 
the IEMA? I found that the resistance to technological change resulted in the IEMA 
being reluctant to accept the benefits of systems such as WebEOC or the usefulness 
of sharing data. In the US, they have control rooms known as Emergency Operation 
Centres (EOC) which have key personnel from each agency22, representing and 
working with their agency, with other agencies and updating the WebEOC. The 
WebEOC creates a seamless flow of information from senior officials (in the control 
room) all the way to operational staff. They can interact with their staff on the 
ground, with other agencies in the EOC and follow inter-agency developments 
through the WebEOC. In comparison, Ireland has the equivalent of an EOC in terms 
of Local Coordination Centres, but the flow of information between and within 
agencies, relies on the upward sharing of information from the ground via phone. 
Thus, it became apparent that the slowness of inter-agency information sharing and 
the resulting slow decision making, and response processes frustrates both 
operational staff and the public. If there was a platform that forced agencies to begin 
to share real-time information it, potentially, could begin to break down some of the 
institutional barriers and create a more formal procedure. So, are technological fixes 
and methods of data analytics, appropriate ways of creating strong inter-agency 
coordination within CMaERAs or are they just band-aids covering deeper political 
and cultural issues? 
                                                          
22 Depending on the scale that the EOC represents it may consist of local/state/federal police services, 
fire departments, emergency medical services, FEMA, Department of Homeland Security, Defense 
Forces, Public Health, relevant government departments, Mayors office, Governor’s office, Red 
Cross, National Guard amongst a medley of other agencies.  
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Technological fixes and methods of data analytics are appropriate 
drivers for helping to fix some of the deeper political and cultural issues, but they are 
not the entire solution. Firstly, the IEMA will become data-driven. These agencies 
are already collecting data and conducting minor analysis on it. Regardless of the 
resistance of the IEMA towards data analytics, the embeddedness of ubiquitous 
technologies and the development of algorithmic governance will be a disruptive 
force for the agencies of the IEMA forcing them, at some point, to reconsider their 
stance and to begin to become data-driven. The processes of data analytics will re-
shape the assemblage. It will change the power dynamics between agencies and will 
be a key facet in how the assemblage oscillates between vertical and flat positions. 
At present the siloed data infrastructure allows for some limited sharing positioning 
the agencies in a hierarchy, but as open data and dashboards prevail, the power will 
change, and these agencies will operate on a flat plane. Aggregated data and trends 
will be easily sourced; although the hierarchy will remain in terms of raw data due to 
the sensitive nature of it which will be highly regulated under data protection.   
Secondly, the use of WebEOC positions the agencies in the US in a 
flat position, as information and requests can be shared in real-time and it is a tool of 
coordination, not power. Any agency with access can speak and be heard, the 
hierarchy resumes when you position the agencies without access, such as NOAH or 
other community-led or voluntary groups. 
If Ireland adopted a digital platform the shape of the assemblage 
could oscillate away from a forced hierarchical shape towards a flatter shape. By 
using the four-board system described in Chapter 8, there are still archaic hierarchies 
in place, as the information is shared to the senior officer on the ground then up to 
the Local Coordination Centre and then placed on the board and shared with the 
other agencies. Whereas, a digital platform allows for immediate real-time 
information that can be recorded and stored and observed by those not in the Local 
Coordination Centre.  
Thirdly, algorithmic governance and in particular, data analytics 
will change the shape of the assemblage and it will cause them to oscillate in new 
ways as the use of data creates new power dynamics and responsibilities. However, 
until the culture changes and it becomes a standard to be as data driven as in the US, 
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the re-shaping will remain hypothetical and based on what has occurred previously 
due to other cultural tensions both in policy and during an event. Thus, the 
smartification of the IEMA is not an appropriate method for overcoming issues of 
institutionalisation, (in)formalisation and political will and governance but instead, it 
will play a critical role in the future of these agencies and potentially, could be a 
contributing factor to solving aspects of the above issues.  
8.4 Wider Contributions 
This thesis contributes to wider academic knowledge in three ways.  
8.4.1 Contribution One: Expansion of the term ‘Vulnerability’ within Hazard 
Studies 
                The concept of ‘vulnerability’ is contextualised in terms of a 
disciplines philosophy and theory (Wisner, 2009). For instance, in ‘Hazard Studies’ 
it is conceptualised in terms of the scale of trauma and destruction after an event or 
in ‘Climate Change’ it is used to explain the exposure and risk  of global warming to 
Earth and society. What all disciplines agree upon is that the scale of an individual or 
communities vulnerability is directly correlated with their social capital.  
Therefore, the overarching conceptualisation and discourse of vulnerability is in 
relation to the social production of wealth, disempowerment, political representation, 
ethnicity, race and gender amongst numerous other categories. These risk factors for 
increased vulnerability are normally identified during pre-disaster phases of planning 
and mitigation. However, when governance networks do not operate properly 
because of friction a new idea of vulnerability develops as management processes 
are ineffective and often discriminatory in terms of language, undocumented 
migrants and geography.  
It is the complex and often contradictory governance of CMaERAs operating at 
different response scales (local, regional and national) and between each response 
scale that results in inadequate inter-agency coordination and contributes to slower 
and less efficient response indicating a need to reconsider what vulnerability means 
post-event, as assemblage theory maps vulnerabilities and identifies where the 
CMaERA is failing and succeeding. When this is combined with an analysis of the 
vulnerabilities developed post event through the CMaERA, it becomes apparent that 
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its definition and use needs to be expanded beyond a disaster i.e. the identification of 
vulnerabilities that develop post-event due to the CMaERAs performance. 
8.4.2 Contribution Two: The Development of Embodied Assemblages 
By recognising the need for the expansion of the definition of 
vulnerability, it directed the research to continually look at the categories within 
assemblage theory. Thus, throughout the body of this thesis, I have loosely referred 
to the idea that assemblages are in and of the world and cannot adequately be 
abstracted from reality. Assemblage theory has a tendency to polarise ontologies 
between flat and hierarchical positions both in policy, but especially in practice. 
Embodied assemblages refer to the continuing oscillation of assemblages and their 
entities into new shapes due to different factors such as history, culture and 
geography. Therefore, I propose a middle ontology with no ultimate sovereign but 
multiple scales of powerful leaders as power is distributed in unequal and unstable 
ways. In this way, assemblages are always embodied, and the real ontology is in 
recognising that an assemblage is a fluid and flexible entity which may be shaped 
flat or hierarchical in policy and in reality, may oscillate between these positions 
based upon various reasons, places and times.  
For instance, during normal conditions, CMaERA tend to be flatter 
even though policy would suggest they retain their hierarchical positions. However, 
as resources are more restricted, inter-agency sharing ensues and trust is developed 
as agency personnel tend to work or communicate with the same people. However, 
during a crisis, emergency management tends to become more hierarchical with the 
sudden re-centralisation of power to the national stage and the attendance of the 
‘ultimate sovereign', An Taoiseach and the President of the United States. At face 
value, this suggests that they now have ultimate control and decision making but in 
reality, they are public figureheads who make announcements based on the 
experience of the multiple agencies and embodied leaders who operate on a daily 
basis. It is for this reason, that I do not recognise one ‘ultimate sovereign’ but 
multiple scales of powerful leaders because, even as a figurehead, they are operating 
in line with the advice of others. It is this idea that contributed to the evolution of a 
family of concepts emanating from the empirical work and briefly illustrated in 
Chapter 2. In particular, imagined assemblages emanated out of the discussion of 
sovereignty and the role of state leaders during major emergencies.  
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An ‘imagined assemblage’ is a term I have coined to reflect the 
natural human characteristic to self-discipline in line with societal values. Foucault 
(1980) discusses this idea under the concept of biopower where “power manifests 
itself in the form of daily practices and routines through which individuals engage in 
self-surveillance and self-discipline, and thereby subjugate themselves” (Pylypa, 
1998: 21). Merging the concept of biopower with assemblage theory contextualised 
within emergency management practices, results in the production of imagined 
assemblages. Imagined assemblages form when responsibility and dominance are re-
imagined as someone else's based on perceived power and hierarchy. This perception 
stems from how societal order is produced and maintained by the formation of 
"docile bodies" through churches, schools, family and government (Foucault, 
1980a:139 and Pylypa, 1998). In practice, this occurs when there is a presumed sense 
of dominance and submissive power relations which, may or may not, actually exist 
in that space. A powerful person can change how the hierarchy works as people 
reflect on their role and tend to re-position and subjugate themselves towards the 
perceived power in the room. Imagined assemblages bend policy and reality to form 
this quasi-perception of truth and knowledge which contributes to a distinction in 
absolute power and that power is everywhere, to instead view power as something 
that splinters and bounces and contributes to the oscillation from policy assemblage 
to imagined assemblage to the activated assemblage. 
The concept of splintering and bouncing are the next set of factors 
which emanated from the empirical studies in line with imagined assemblages. The 
idea of splintered or splintering power builds on Graham and Marvin’s (2001) idea 
of splintering urbanisms and combines it with Foucault’s idea that power is 
decentralised and everywhere. Graham and Marvin (2001) define splintering 
urbanism as the ability for infrastructures and technology to create fragmentation 
throughout the city often resulting in the polarisation of urban spaces. Foucault’s 
idea of power is everywhere, meaning that power is yielded by many institutions in 
different ways, suggests that power is episodic in nature rather than continuous 
resulting in decentralised but pervasive power which neither wholly stems from 
structure (assemblage) or agency (individuals/groups) but from a combination of 
both. This episodic nature of power creates the networks that reposition assemblages 
and agencies from flat to middle to vertical as the power becomes fragmented in a 
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similar manner to the urban. In the case of the IEMA, we see splintering power as 
the assemblage re-shapes by sharing power and responsibility with auxiliary services 
such as the Defence Forces, the Coast Guard and the Civil Defence and other 
voluntaries. In policy, these agencies are invited in by either a Local Authority, an 
Garda Síochána or the Health Service Executive (HSE) before they can activate. 
However, once activated they are often given numerous different roles of 
responsibility from the lead agency. It is in this regard that top-level power begins to 
be splintered on the ground with normally powerless agencies now benefitting from 
the decentralisation and pervasiveness of power. 
However, this power still creates polarisation as the lead agency 
and the national scale are always the sovereign with ultimate responsibility and 
power. Thus, Agamben's idea of the ‘King rules but does not govern' is essential for 
understanding splintering power. Auxiliary services may be encouraged to assert 
some power during an emergency, but they are never the rulers or final decision 
makers.  
A consequence of splintering power is that power bounces. 
CMaERA policy creates epicentres of power in the form of coordination and control 
centres. As the power is decentralised across agencies, and away from the epicentre 
it dissolves and re-emerges in local spaces with new regimes of power supported by 
local knowledge and informal networks. Bouncing power is less about structure and 
agency and more about the informalisation of emergency response even in highly 
formal systems like the USEMA as power tends to bounce between first responders 
with a working history together and is a critical part of inter-agency coordination. 
This family of concepts contributes to our understanding of power as more 
complicated, elusive and mobile than argued in assemblage literature. They represent 
the bridge between codified power and actually existing power which may or may 
not align with policy.  
Thus, CMaERAs force you to consider a middle ground within 
assemblage theory as you cannot adequately and earnestly study assemblages as 
merely hierarchical or flat as this nullifies and ignores the deep complexities of 
urban and social assemblages and the reasons why they oscillate. This contribution 
to assemblage theory offers future researchers a set of analytical tools to study 
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assemblage theory in a more enlightened and informed way as it encourages the 
ontology to be less about a position and more about embodied context.  
8.4.3 Contribution Three: Urban factors Affecting Assemblage Oscillation 
National agencies refract through cities as policy and decision 
making contribute to the efficacy of how CMaERAs are often developed and 
practised within urban environments. However, the efficacy and different 
morphology of assemblage, change over time due to different factors, and history 
does not automatically lead to change, so what is taking a pre-emptive rule in 
structuring how these CMaERAs oscillate?  
To approach this question, in line with the above contributions and 
as a result of early research findings, the two anchor bodies of literature were 
crosscut with three secondary works of literature; Urbanisation, Neoliberalisation 
and Smartification, see Figure 8.1. These pieces of literature were carefully selected 
as they emanated strongly from the empirical research. However, these are not the 
only urban processes that affect how assemblages oscillate. Others include, 
resilience, financialization, population growth and a medley of other processes, 
which simply did not fit within the scope of this thesis based on the general 
empirical findings.  
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Figure 8.1: Bodies of Literature 
 
Source: Author 
 
The selected bodies of literature were studied in terms of two basic 
questions; firstly, does urbanisation and neoliberal policy affect how oscillation 
occurs in assemblages and influence how they operate within urban spaces? 
Secondly, in cities that are both neoliberal and smart, how does this influence how 
assemblages are shaped and oscillate?  
Urbanisation aggravates assemblages and makes governance 
networks more complicated, while also making the job of CMaERAs and their 
oscillation much more difficult. Urbanisation results in the re-planning of hazardous 
zones such as floodplains for residential and commercial building as evident by New 
Orleans and Irish planning regulations. There is a much wider and entrenched 
division of wealth with poorer areas often residing in much more hazardous spaces 
as discussed by Pulido (2017) in terms of environmental racism.  
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Further, urbanisation is bolstered by neoliberal policies which 
further increases the wealth gap and leads to austerity conditions where public 
services, such as CMaERA, are being continually affected by resource cuts, recruit 
and training cuts and salary cuts. However, the biggest impact that neoliberal policy 
is having on CMaERA is the privatisation of agencies and/or parts of services. For 
instance, in the United States, private ambulance services work alongside public 
agencies but in some cities such as Quincy, MA, they are the only ambulance 
service. This creates vulnerability in the response stage as only certain sects of the 
population will have adequate healthcare insurance covering ambulance transport. 
Meanwhile, the poorer citizens must choose between the potential cost of an 
ambulance or whether they can make it to a hospital on their own. As was recently 
discovered during the California fires of November 2018, private firefighters were 
hired by the wealthiest of the community to protect their houses and land, while 
public firefighters and prisoners from the Californian Judicial System responded 
elsewhere (National Union of Public and General Employees, 2018). Thus, there is a 
clear divide in how wealth also helps during and post an event to minimise 
vulnerabilities. This privatisation of first responders is, at the moment, reserved for 
certain states, cities and towns in the US with Ireland not currently engaging in this 
element of privatisation.  
However, neoliberal policies affect IEMA in different ways with 
households unable to attain flood insurance due to certain zones placed around 
houses, and the government taking the rhetoric that they cannot interfere with the 
market. Therefore, they engage by using state funds to help the recovery processes. 
This is a uniquely Irish form of neoliberalism as coined by Kitchin et al (2012). 
Neoliberal policies accentuate the voice of companies and the wealthy and silence 
the voices of the poorest and most vulnerable in our society and this translates into 
how CMaERA oscillate, as when funds and staff are restricted then they are more 
likely to be flatter to ensure adequate resources between the agencies. However, 
under neoliberal policy and urbanisation, there tends to be more tension between 
parent departments and agencies making communication much more difficult. For 
instance, neoliberal policy tends to create more target driven structures which makes 
jobs much harder particularly for emergency services, as it only increases the 
pressures these agencies and their staff are under. This is further compounded when 
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salaries do not meet the job requirements, incentives are minimised, job losses occur 
and when recruitment ceases or is limited. These issues affect the efficacy of 
CMaERAs as they must operate within new but tighter constraints while also aiming 
to achieve particular targets or response times.  
Smartification of urban spaces should have rectified these issues 
and made the city safer and more equitable according to its key visions but, as 
discussed in, Chapters 2 and 7, it has created more urban polarisation. Essentially, 
the blueprint for the smart city is utopian and as of yet, it has not fully percolated 
into the urban fabric and particularly not into CMaERA agencies in any meaningful 
way. However, it has resulted in re-defining the role and type of governance being 
enacted on urban spaces. There is a shift between discipline-based governance and 
control-based governance whereby, the use of big data and algorithms are shaping 
how cities and people are managed. In light of this, CMaERAs are beginning to 
engage with data analytics, some more than others, and I propose that this "data 
revolution" (Kitchin, 2014c) could influence the practices and processes of 
CMaERA overtime. Thus, I propose that the current trajectory of smart city research 
as critical and citizen-led needs to also examine the effects of smart policy and data 
analytics on public services. As CMaERA continues to be influenced by 
urbanisation, neoliberal policies and the smartification of the city, it will continue to 
oscillate between hierarchal and flat positions, but data analytics will disrupt these 
oscillations and potentially change how they are organised and re-shaped between 
policy and activation in ways that cannot be fully understood at present. 
8.5 What Lessons Should Stakeholders Draw From The Research? 
There are seven key lessons that emergency management 
stakeholders the IEMA, USEMA or any other CMaERA could draw from this 
research. 
1. In order to create a balance that allows for efficient inter-agency response, 
supported by quick accurate sharing of information, the US could weaken its 
formalised and militaristic structures, while Ireland could increase them. I 
suggest that by weakening the formalised procedures it could allow for more 
informal relationships to develop. This may result in greater inter-agency 
trust and collaboration in the US. By formalising the IEMA procedures, 
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institutional silos may begin to breakdown, as agencies will be required to 
internalise policy as it is written, while collaborating and coordinating with 
other agencies in a more efficient manner.  
2. The negative public connotations that surround data collection and analysis, 
especially regarding data and police forces, should be marketed in a more 
positive manner. For instance, public demonstrations on how data can be a 
method of hazard prediction in local areas should be conducted, unsensitive 
data should be open and included on various dashboards, citizens should be 
able to easily access any data held on them or their property and the methods 
for collecting and analysing data should be transparent, fair and open to 
investigation. In both the US and Ireland, these provisions should be included 
in key policy and legislation and open to the public to read. This would 
encourage trust to build between the public and emergency services, 
particularly the police and the building of excellent community policing 
relationships as demonstrated by BPD. If trust is built between these services 
and communities then when a major event occurs, it is easier to collaborate 
and work with the community and gather sensitive information which may 
help in the recovery process.  
3. Ireland needs to consider legislating emergency management policy and 
connecting funding to same to ensure that the key principles of emergency 
management are upheld, namely: preparedness, mitigation, preparation, 
response and recovery. At present, there is no defined funding source for 
response and recovery in Ireland. Instead, it is conducted on an ad hoc basis, 
with limited information during a crisis as to whether Local Authority and/or 
emergency services extenuating expenses will be reimbursed. Further, by not 
legislating emergency management policy, each agency is within its right to 
engage or disengage from different policy documents. This can create 
difficult inter-agency relationships, tensions, repetitive work, power battles 
amongst other detractions from a successful response. As a new Framework 
is in development, there is an opportunity to place it before the Dáil and 
Senate and request for its implementation into legislation. In this regard, it 
would force agencies to break down their institutional silos, follow the 
described roles and responsibilities, remove inter-agency tensions (to a 
certain extent personality will always be at play), encourage inter-agency 
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collaboration and could also create a mechanism for response similar to, but 
not as extreme, as the US i.e. following the legislated protocol could result in 
more defined funding streams. 
4. Ireland should recognise the considerable number of working groups and 
national steering groups that develop emergency management policy and 
procedure as they all appear to do similar work, and this process could be 
made more efficient. Resources and brain power could be inputted into the 
system in a better, more efficient manner if the overall system was more 
streamlined and talents and resources were adequately utilized. If staff was 
seconded from key agencies to work on a particular project within a set time 
frame rather than having several working groups with the same 
representatives, then talent could be harnessed, new ideas may emerge, and 
knowledge sharing networks could be broader. This would occur because 
talent would be better utilized, there would be more inter-agency 
communication across different scales rather than just from the same middle 
to upper officers and knowledge would be shared upwards to the national 
steering group but naturally outwards to their relevant agency upon their 
return.  
5. Both systems should consider the position of each agency within the 
emergency management assemblage. There should be a reflection on whether 
each agency is situated and networked properly, whether the power dynamics 
are overpowering or over weak, and whether the importance of some 
agencies need to be re-evaluated. For instance, Ireland should consider 
promoting the Coastguard from an auxiliary service to a Principle Response 
Agency as they are the main response agency for coastal crises. This would 
shift their position higher up the hierarchy of emergency management. 
Meanwhile, the US should reconsider the position of immigration voluntary 
services in response situations, as they have the community relationships and 
language to engage with frightened legal and undocumented migrants whose 
first language is not English. Having these voluntary organisations work 
alongside the first responders can help the emergency services share 
messages, gain information and respond to emergencies more efficiently.  
6. The growth in data analytics is producing a shift in how the city is governed 
and how policy needs to be written. It should reflect the changing 
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technological standards of the city and the strategies in place to create a smart 
city and encourage greater inter-agency collaboration and coordination 
through the aid of technology such as linked control rooms and data sets. It 
would be at this point that a de-siloing would become evident, not just on an 
operational level, but on a material and strategical level. This, of course, has 
downsides as highlighted by the research participants who were concerned 
with issues of privacy, security, control creep and data deluge. 
7. By recognizing that the techniques of governance are shifting there should be 
a will within local government to engage with CMaERA in so far unseen 
ways. A city is smart because it uses its limited resources in unique and 
innovative ways that produce efficient and positive results for the city and its 
citizens. A city is not smart just because it is branded as such and has 
implemented elements of innovative technology. For example, ‘Smart 
Dublin’ and Boston’s ‘Office of the Chief Innovation Officer and the States 
Mass IT, as well as Metro Boston, which covers numerous municipalities, 
could be mediators in helping CMaERA engage with knowledgeable actors 
who may be able to help these agencies to connect up with urban real-time 
information such as traffic and water levels etc. Again, this could be made 
possible through a platform such as WebEOC and the promotion of inter-
agency data sharing.  
Promoting and normalizing inter-agency data sharing would 
quicken the response and coordination of activities between the Principal Response 
Agencies and "other" agencies in times of crisis. This growth in data sharing could 
also evolve into the development of inter-linked control rooms. The majority of 
participants have argued against the one-size fits all control room as developed in 
Rio de Janeiro (Gaffney & Robertson, 2016) but indicate that “control centres should 
be in one room” (Representative of emergency service) as there is value in 
connected, but independent, control rooms as it could create a more resilient and 
inter-connected system that could facilitate better response and coordination in times 
of crisis. Simply, they see the value in a “combined control room for fire, ambulance, 
police, so it’s a total multi-agency control centre like which exists in Europe” 
(Participant ID13). However, they do not want to give up their independence. Thus, 
they want a control room that can harness inter-agency relationships such as those 
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that developed when the NAS shared a control room with DFB (as described in 
Chapter 7) but they do not want to all work from the same integrated technologies. I 
propose that their reluctance to limit inter-agency control room integration is because 
of the external factors of institutionalisation, political will and governance and 
(in)formalisation discussed in Chapter 6. They are siloed, resistant to change and 
have their own cultures which they wish to maintain.  
8.6 Future Research Avenues 
This thesis has opened the door to numerous new research avenues 
particularly for those interested in taking their skillset and applying it to a new 
theme. I propose ten potential foci of future research stemming from the thesis 
analysis: 
1. An evaluation of CMaERA in Coordinated Market Economies in developing 
and underdeveloped countries with a focus on indigenous knowledge versus 
their interaction with western influence and ‘help’. Much research is placed 
on the western developed world which benefits from long histories of 
emergency management, but local knowledge is often neglected. Further, 
some of the poorest regions on our earth experience the deadliest disasters 
mainly because of increased social vulnerabilities (Boyle, 2015) but response 
is often a combination of local emergency management practices and 
indigenous knowledge and experience. Thus, it would be interesting to 
explore the response to flooding in a developed, developing and undeveloped 
country and note the differences in response networks based on different 
types of experiences, knowledges and priorities. 
2. If there is a language barrier between key response agencies, media outlets 
and migrants this creates a vulnerability which can result in the hazard 
becoming even more disastrous for this sect of the population. This is 
combined with other social vulnerabilities that migrant communities tend to 
face in urban spaces such as lack of resources, representation, healthcare, 
education and safe housing. Language differences should never create 
vulnerability, it should never result in adequate information not being shared 
and obtained by these communities both before, during and after an event. 
Therefore, what procedures and mechanisms need to be put in place to ensure 
that every urban dweller will receive and understand what is going on and 
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where is safe? This would also need to be combined with a conversation on 
undocumented migrants who may fear presenting at evacuation centres. 
Policy needs to be put in place to offer protections to these people for 
instance, to re-utilise a term by Agamben (2005) in a positive way, 
evacuation centres should be ‘spaces of exception’. Evacuation centres 
should be allowed to care for everyone, ID them to ensure the safety of 
everyone, but that information should not be shared with police services.  
3. How will cross-border emergency management be re-shaped in Ireland post 
Brexit? At the moment, there are cross-border policies which allow 
emergency services but, particularly the Police Service Northern Ireland and 
An Garda Síochána, to cross the border during active duty. There are also 
communities whose closest emergency service or hospital is across the 
border. In the event of Brexit and a hard border or no Irish back stop, it will 
be more difficult to negotiate cross border emergency management services 
and communities could face longer waits for emergency help and/or travel to 
hospital. Cross border emergency management research was completed by 
Murphy et al (2016) and McClelland and O’Keefe (2014) and could be used 
as the framework to analysis any major disruptions and changes to service 
post Brexit.  
4. How will emergency management evolve under the ‘Trump effect’ in the 
US? The full consequences of the Trump presidency requires these questions 
to be examined over a long period of time exploring funding streams, 
immigrants (legal and undocumented), policies etc. combined with various 
in-depth questions. These could include; 
• Whether presidential declarations for major emergencies are issued to ‘safe’ 
cities23?  
• How do police practices and cultures change?  
• Is there an evident increase or decrease in gun crime, terrorism (domestic or 
international) and epidemics etc.?  
• How are the emergency services supported in responding to increased levels 
of hatred and violence?  
                                                          
23 Safe cities refer to US cities which are willing to ignore federal policy and protect undocumented 
and legal migrants 
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• How do inter-jurisdictional relationships survive under scrutiny from the 
Presidential office?  
• Will there be considerable differences in response to major events due to 
location, culture, wealth, ethnicity etc. as was seen in the response to Puerto 
Rico versus Hawaii in 2017/2018?  
• How will emergency management policy change at the federal scale? 
• How will the deletion and removal of climate change data, funding and the 
assertion that climate change does not exist contribute to major emergencies 
in the US and the efficiency of response under these more intense and 
extreme circumstances?  
5. A longitudinal study on the adoption rate of technology and data sharing in 
the IEMA noting how it affects the shape and if it contributes to reducing 
some of the key issues mentioned in this thesis. As the IEMA agencies begin 
to adopt technology and become data-driven, it will be interesting to explore 
if these technological adaptations affect their cultures, institutionalisation, 
informalisation, inter-agency coordination and collaboration. Further, does it 
change how the public engage with the IEMA through social media and 
emergency apps?  
6. How will the development of wearable technology and ‘Internet of Things’ 
change how emergency services are able to respond to people? Will they be 
able to use these technologies to locate you, read your vitals, get a history, 
learn of any existing conditions and as a method of identification? This could 
be a radical transformation in early medical care, in search and rescue 
operations and in the identification of criminals.  
7. As emergency services become more data-driven, how are they going to 
work to protect the data and the privacy of the individual? What are the 
ethical requirements of collecting or using data on an individual? These 
questions are already being explored with regard to predictive policing but if 
point six were to happen or just with the data they collect in general, what 
processes do they need to undertake to protect the individual? General Data 
Protection Rules (GDPR) will go a long way to protect a person but a certain 
times, certain data will need to be shared outside the agency, so what 
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mechanisms are put in place to do this? For example, one issue was raised by 
participant ID06.  
“You could live in a neighbourhood and you want to move people to 
designated rest centres and again there is a coordination, you need to know 
who is going in there. You need to be looking at it. If you have family and 
children, we need to know who else lives in the area, are they on the sex 
offenders register before we put them in”. 
8. A deeper exploration into the benefits of a fully integrated control room 
versus one room with all the control rooms. This would include an 
examination of several control rooms across the world to evaluate what 
works best under what circumstances, cultures, economies and social set-ups.  
9. A mapping of all governance networks in Ireland to understand where they 
diverge, and merge i.e. do the governance regions of AGS match those of the 
HSE? This could help to illustrate why there is a misalignment between 
agencies and government departments and that often datasets or information 
are spread across different agencies. 
10. Emergency Management as a discipline needs to re-structure around 
theoretical and conceptual work as opposed to around practice. There needs 
to be a more in-depth exploration as to what the discipline of emergency 
management can offer the academy and how it can integrate more fluidly 
with other disciplines rather than simply using their theories. It needs to 
develop a philosophical foundation and define several approaches or schools 
of thought on how to study emergency management. However, this needs to 
be done in conjunction with its role in, informing emergency management 
practice as that is an important cornerstone of the discipline and emergency 
management protocol worldwide.  
8.7 Final Summation 
So, in the end what does this thesis tell us about the variety of 
actors, actants and technologies involved in emergency management assemblages 
and how they are shaped by particular histories, cultures and geographies? 
CMaERAs are complex, multi-faceted, institutionalised networks of agencies, 
people, processes, technologies, histories, geographies and cultures and all of these 
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different elements affect how strong its inter-agency coordination, response and 
influence is. However, the beauty of a CMaERA is that it is fluid and flexible, it can 
expand, retract and re-shape to ensure the best possible response based on contextual 
and situational awareness. By trying to frame this idea, I was faced with a lack of 
theoretical rigour within the emergency management discipline, which resulted in an 
interesting merging of philosophies, theories and disciplines.  
By adopting assemblage theory and applying it to the two 
CMaERAs (IEMA and USEMA), conceptualised within Foucauldian and Agambien 
understanding of power and sovereignty, this thesis offers a theoretical and 
philosophical framework to study emergency services and their interactions and 
power dynamics while keeping in sight their histories, cultures and current situations 
i.e. the influence of technology and data practices. It was the use of a modified 
assemblage theory that provided this space. By removing the ontological boundaries 
but recognising that structures still exist, it became apparent that this helped to frame 
how CMaERAs operate and re-shape from policy to activation. CMaERAs do not 
remain within a hierarchical or flat position instead they move to ensure that 
response is adequate and efficient. However, these movements are influenced both 
by the situation, inter-agency trust, previous working relationships but also from 
external factors such as the institutionalisation and siloed manner of agencies, 
whether they are formal or informal, their relationship with the government but also 
human nature. These broad factors affect inter-agency coordination and collaboration 
and idealistic proposals suggest that technology can solve issues like this but it’s not 
a solution. It can be an aid, it can contribute to the bringing together of agencies, but 
it will not solve these embedded factors. To foster true coordination and to create a 
true Coordinated Management and Emergency Response Assemblage (CMaERA), 
there needs to be an overhaul of how each agency is structured and reliant on their 
independence. This is a momentous task that will occur over time as small changes 
are enacted but technology is not the solution.  
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Appendices 
 
Appendix 1: Sample Interview Questions 
Questions for Emergency Services 
 
1. Would you define your relationships with other agencies as formal? 
2. How effective is inter-agency coordination between the different principal 
responders and also with other agencies?  Has this changed in relation to 
increasing flood risk? 
3. How has the historical organisation of An Garda Síochána changed and how 
does it affect today’s organisation?  
4. How do the different institutions of a CMaERS communicate during an 
emergency? 
5. Is the current system robust (fit for purpose)?  
6. How did austerity budgets affect your ability to serve and protect 
communities, particularly during major emergencies such as flooding?  
7. How does your control room work? How are calls graded and dispatched?  Is 
there an inter-agency aspect to your control room?  
8. Have you heard of the Smart City dialogue being put forward by Dublin City 
Council?  What role do you have in this? How do you see technological 
changes in the fabric of the city changing how you respond to events such as 
flooding?  
9. What innovative practices or technologies have you, are you or hoping to 
implement to help during major events? 
10. How do you collect, analyse and disseminate data related to emergency 
management?  
11. Discuss the  historical organisation of the National Ambulance Service?  
12. How do you work with Dublin Fire Brigades Ambulance Service? You 
recently moved out of their station, how has this affected your relationship? 
13. How do the different institutions of a CMaERS communicate during an 
emergency? 
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14. How have you seen the system change overtime, as flooding becomes more 
of an issue, and activation of the system is more frequent? 
15. What do you see as the cracks or fault lines in the current organisation of the 
system?  
16. Do you have a say in policy or a chance to provide feedback? 
17. How do you collect, analyse and disseminate data related to emergency 
management? 
18. What is the general procedure for the fire department in the case of a flood or 
any other major incident? 
19. The fire department is part of the local authority how does this work 
regarding governance of the city and/or emergencies in the city?  Do you 
believe the fire department should be a principal response agency?  
20. You have a close relationship with civil defence?  Can you expand on that? 
21. Do you think Boston has a Coordinated Management and Emergency 
Response system (CMaERS)?  
a. If so, how does a CRO benefit or contribute to it and where do you sit? 
b. What other organisations and institutions are in it?  
c. What is its aim? 
d. How is it funded?  Is the CMaERS funded in total, or are the individual 
members funded? 
e. How is it governed and designed? 
f. How does it actually operate and work? 
g. Does it drive public policy or does public policy drive them? 
 
Other sample questions used for different agencies 
 
1. Do you have any staff, forecasters etc, sitting within other organisations such 
as local authorities, OEM, AGS, control centres - would you see this as an 
effective role? 
2. TUCSON automated 18 stations allowing for real time quality weather 
observation data.  How do you ensure the quality of this data and the 
resilience of the system?  These feeds feed into your IT operations correct?  
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Does any other agency have access to this preliminary data?  You share it 
with Dublinked, you have an app, do you see this as a positive move towards 
creating a more weather resilient city? Could the app contain more specific 
flood warnings or Dublinked? 
3. How much lag time is there before you alert the authorities of a storm or 
emergency?  Who do you alert? 
4. Do you use probabilistic tools in your forecasting?  Do these help to ensure 
the resiliency of multiple models solutions which often have a level of 
uncertainty? 
5. I have a quote from Andy Revkin stating that policymakers must prioritise 
weather infrastructure at the same level as national security (because they are 
actually related". Would you agree? 
6. Can you take me through the Task force on emergency planning, the Office 
of Emergency planning and the National Steering group on Major Emergency 
Management?  Trying to work out the governing structures, who has ultimate 
power/responsibility, how they interconnect and work together.  
7. How effective is inter-agency coordination across the scales from local to 
national? 
8. What do you think of the concept of Coordinated Management and 
Emergency Response Systems? (An assemblage of coordinated agencies, 
including but going beyond, the Principal Response Agencies and first 
responders and using technology and data as a way to create this). 
9. Discuss the Common Emergency Communication  and Information System. 
What it is, how it came about, groups involved, what it does and Ireland's 
role? 
10. So, after exploring how the system is organised, where would you locate 
power in the Emergency Management System at different scales? 
11. There are a number of control centres in Dublin usually manned by 
individual agencies, in the case of a national event are all these data streams 
accessible form the National Emergency Coordination Centre? During an 
event in Dublin City, is the NECC used by DCC as a local coordination 
centre?   Who is in charge? Does leadership change depending on the crisis 
or level of emergency? 
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12. Is there an agency in this system, solely responsible for the collection and 
sharing of data between the different members? 
a. How do they do this on an everyday basis? 
b. How do they do this before, during and after a flood event? 
13. Is there good communication and interaction between different departments 
across Boston and across jurisdictional boundaries in terms of planning and 
responding to climate change and climate induced crises?  
14. What do you see as the biggest climate risk for Boston? Is flooding a high-
risk event for Boston? 
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Appendix 2: Ethics letter of approval 
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Appendix 3: Informed Consent form 
 
Consent Form 
Urban Resilience: Flooding and the role of Coordinated Management and 
Emergency response Systems. 
Aoife Delaney, NIRSA, Maynooth University 
 
Material gathered during this research will be treated as confidential and securely 
stored on encrypted devices and treated following the security and anonymity 
protocols of the Irish Qualitative Data Archive.  You have the right to access any of 
your interview materials (tapes, transcripts and notes) at any time. 
Please answer each statement below concerning the collection of the research data. 
1. I have read and understood Consent to Participate in Research Form. Yes  
No  
2. I have been given the opportunity to ask questions about the study. Yes  
No  
3. I have had my questions answered satisfactorily. Yes  
No  
4. I understand that I can withdraw from the study at any time without 
having to give an explanation. 
Yes  
No  
5. I agree to the interview being audiotaped and to its contents being 
used for research purposes. 
Yes  
No  
 
Below, are sets of statements that give you, the interviewee, a series of options about 
how you wish your interview to be used.  Please answer each statement. 
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6. I agree that excerpts from the interview can be used in papers, 
reports and books published for academic and educational purposes 
Yes 
No  
7. I agree to being identified in this interview and in any subsequent 
publications or use 
Yes 
No  
  
IF YOU ANSWERED “YES” TO Q.7, GO TO Q.9; IF “NO” PLEASE ALSO 
ANSWER Q.8 
8. Where used my name must be removed and my comments made 
unattributable. 
Yes    
No  
9. I agree to the interview notes/transcripts (in line with the 
conditions outlined above) being archived and used by other bona 
fide researchers. 
Yes    
No  
10. I agree to my audio files (in line with the conditions outlined 
above) being archived and used by other bona fide researchers, 
excluding IPR, corporate strategies and other commercially 
sensitive information. 
Yes    
No  
 
Name (printed) 
________________________________________________________ 
 
Signature ______________________________________ Date ________________ 
 
Your contribution is greatly appreciated.  Feel free to contact us if you have any 
further questions. 
Aoife Delaney Phone: 086 - 7362257 Email: Aoife.delaney.2011@mumail.ie 
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If during your participation in this study you feel the information and 
guidelines that you were given have been neglected or disregarded in any way, or if 
you are unhappy about the process, please contact the Secretary of the Maynooth 
University Ethics Committee at research.ethics@nuim.ie or +353 (0)1 708 6019. 
Please be assured that your concerns will be dealt with in a sensitive manner. 
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Appendix 4: Information sheet24 
 
 
INFORMATION SHEET 
 
Emergency Management Assemblages and the Smart City 
 
Aoife Delaney 
National Institute for Spatial and Regional Analysis (NIRSA), MUSSI, 
Maynooth University 
 
Date: 10/19/2017 
 
Dear  ,  
 
You are asked to participate in an interview on the theme of understanding smart 
cities which is being conducted as part of a large European Research Council funded 
project entitled the Programmable City. 
You were selected as a key informant in this research project because you are 
considered a key stakeholder and expert on emergency response, coordination and 
use of technology.   If you volunteer to participate in this research, you will be asked 
a short series of questions about Boston, Massachusetts and the USA in general.   
                                                          
24 Anything highlighted was changed per participant to ensure the information was relevant to their 
position and expertise.  
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These interviews may be recorded, transcribed or notes may be taken by hand or on a 
computer. In total, the interviews should take approximately one hour.  Further, 
follow-up calls or meetings may be required to clarify information or to acquire 
recommended documents.  These communications will be brief.  You will be 
allowed to view the notes and quotes of the interview and any other documents 
produced as a result of this interview.  You may also decide to have the information 
you provide attributed or not in publications.   
The nature of the questions is not personal or confidential and should pose no risks 
or discomfort to you.  You will not be remunerated by the researcher for your 
participation as you are participating as a volunteer. 
Your participation in the interview will assist individuals and organizations 
interested in this topic to develop a better understanding of smart cities and 
emergency management and their development and the results will be part of a case 
study to inform academic publications.   
You will be asked if any material should or should not be directly attributed to you.  
Any information that is obtained in connection with this study is not considered 
personal or confidential.  However, if information gathered during these interviews 
is to be disseminated beyond the researcher, your name will not be disclosed while 
the role and the name of your institution may be identified, unless otherwise 
specified.  The researcher will keep this consent form confidential and any other 
documents related to this research will simply refer to you by your role and 
institution.  
In the event that your name requires disclosure this will only be done with your 
permission or as required by law.  With regard to the latter, it must be recognized 
that, in some circumstances, confidentiality of research data and records may be 
overridden by courts in the event of litigation or in the course of investigation by 
lawful authority. In such circumstances Maynooth University will take all reasonable 
steps within law to ensure that confidentiality is maintained to the greatest possible 
extent. 
Any data gathered during the course of these interviews will be stored on encrypted 
CD, data keys, laptops and folders on a server.  File names will include dates and an 
assigned number for you only.  These will be shared with the other researchers on 
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the project.  Once the research project is complete the recordings will be deposited in 
the Irish Qualitative Data Archive (IQDA) and made accessible to future researchers. 
Data made available to the IQDA will only be allowed with consent of the 
interviewees.   
If you do not wish for your content to be deposited within the IQDA, the data will be 
retained securely by the researcher for a minimum of 10 years as stipulated in the 
MU Research Integrity Policy. It will remain stored as outlined above, and after 10 
years all the transcripts, electronic notes and meta data will be destroyed using 
appropriate tools to delete and overwrite the content.  Any hard copies of transcripts 
or notes will be destroyed immediately after completion of the Viva and termination 
of the project,  using confidential shredding as approved by the University.   
Should the discussion move on to propriety IPR, corporate strategies and other 
commercially sensitive information, that information will not be disclosed nor 
deposited in the IQDA. 
If you volunteer to be in this study, you may withdraw up until April 2018 without 
consequences of any kind.  Should you decide to withdraw you may decide at that 
time if I may use the information you have provided or you may request that it be 
destroyed.  You may also refuse to answer any questions you don’t want to answer 
and still remain in the study. The researcher may withdraw you from this research if 
circumstances arise which warrant doing so. 
This research was reviewed and received ethics clearance by the Maynooth 
University Social Research Ethics Sub-Committee. If you have any questions or 
concerns about the research, please feel free to contact: 
Secretary of the National University of Ireland Maynooth  
Ethics Committee  
research.ethics@nuim.ie  
or +353 (0)1 708 6019 
 
Name and signature of researcher 
________________________________________  Date ______________ 
303 
 
CONSENT  
I understand the procedures described above.  My questions have been 
answered to my satisfaction, and I agree to participate in this study.  I have 
been given a copy of this form. 
________________________________________ 
Name and signature of Key Informant 
________________________________________  Date ______________ 
 
Appendix 5: Interview Code sheet 
 
1. Interagency- red 
2. Coordination - blue 
3. Technology- yellow 
4. urban governance - green 
5. Conflict/tension - purple 
6. Data - brown 
7. neoliberal politics - orange 
8. case study - pink 
9. geographies of scale – navy 
10. networks and power - crimson 
11. citizens – peach 
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Appendix 6: Garda application25 
An Garda Síochána Protocol for External Research 
 
This document is intended to formalise the relationship between An Garda Síochána 
and any researcher (Garda member, student, academic institution, practitioner or 
agency) carrying out research into or on behalf of An Garda Síochána. 
On completion of the research, we ask the researcher to submit to An Garda 
Síochána a summary report of the research findings for internal publication. 
This document is to be completed for external research either funded or not by An 
Garda Síochána. This includes any individual, academic institution or agency 
requesting the assistance of An Garda Síochána data, personnel or resources. 
 Contact Details 
Name Aoife Delaney 
Org / Uni / Dept National Institute of Regional and Spatial Analysis and 
Geography Department of Maynooth University. 
Address 21 Ard Evan Grove, Monasterevin, Co. Kildare 
E-mail AOIFE.DELANEY.2011@mumail.ie 
Phone 0867362257 
 
Part 1: Research Agenda 
 
1) 
Research 
Aim and 
Design 
Please give details of the research aim, methodology and design. 
a) What is the aim of the research? 
The thesis will focus upon the modus operandi of the Coordinated 
Management and Emergency Response System (CMaERS) of 
Dublin, Ireland and Boston, Massachusetts.  CMaERS are an 
organisational system in which all the relevant agencies of a city 
(Emergency Services, Local Authorities, Insurance Firms, 
communities, charities, the Defence Forces, engineers, Civil 
                                                          
25 I was required to send this application in for every interview with a member of AGS. However, I 
was only required to make small edits and highlight them.  I have included my last edition.  
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Defence, the Government, etc) come together in a local coordination 
centre and compile their expertise and data  in order to respond to a 
crisis (such as flooding) in a timely and efficient manner. 
The aim of the research is to map out the CMaERS in both Dublin 
and Boston in terms of how the system is organised and run in 
practice with respect to flooding response.  Secondly, it will examine 
the fault lines or potential breakages in the system.  
These will be explored through a comprehensive study that brings 
past events, the present and potential future changes into discussion 
with each other.  Firstly, to map out the CMaERS of Ireland, this 
research will explore the historical and legacy governance structures 
of individual agencies that often act as barriers to change and inter-
agency coordination.  Simply, it’s a genealogy of how each 
emergency response agency or Principal Response Agency (PRA) 
were organised and what is presently sustaining them (Past to 
Present).   
Secondly, the research will explore how resilient the CMaERS 
system is and its individual agencies are, under pressure from a crisis 
such as a major flood event.  Where does the system crack or what 
fault lines arise because of institutional tensions, lack of technology 
and other resources, policy exclusion etc. (Present). 
Finally, how will CMaER agencies work with the new Smart City 
dialogue being put forward by Smart Dublin? What potential does 
the CMaERS have with new technology and sensor systems being 
funded through the smart city?  Is the Smart City likely to transform 
how the CMaERS operates and are governed? (Present to future). 
There are three key objectives to this research: 
1. Illuminate the organisational structure of a CMaERS.  (Who 
is involved? Its hierarchical structure. Who is in charge? 
Who has ultimate responsibility? Who gets what funding and 
resources?) 
2. Explore a CMaERS interaction with smart city 
solutions/goals and ascertain whether this relationship is 
effective in creating resilience in both cities. (How do they 
work in practice? Are they effective? What shapes their 
deployment?) 
3. Situate the role of a CMaERS towards flooding within wider 
societal and institutional structures that develop and 
implement public policy. (Where do they fit in society? Do 
they only appear when a crisis occurs? Who governs them? 
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How do they aeffect society?  Do they change institutional 
structures?) 
The research question is:  
How are the Coordinated Management and Emergency Response 
Systems of Dublin and Boston organised and what cracks appear 
within the system and its individual organisations with regards to the 
emergency response of flooding?  
The sub questions of this research are: 
What are the aims and objectives of a CMaERS? 
Who is protected through a CMaERS? 
How are CMaERS governed and designed? 
How do CMaERS actually work and operate?  
How do CMaERS drive public policy and how does public policy 
drive CMaERS? 
How do the different agencies of a CMaERS share information and 
communicate? 
How do CMaERS interact and respond to smart city solutions? 
b) What methodology do you intend to use? 
 
This research is divided across two cities: Dublin and Boston.  
Dublin is the primary location with Boston being the secondary 
location.  The data gathered from Boston will be used to support, 
compare and contrast the findings of Dublin.  The goal in both cities 
is to establish what type of CMaERS they have in place, the 
technology in place to deal with flood challenges, how public policy 
is developed and implemented in the city, the key agencies of the 
CMaERS and their organisation and governance.  
The key methodological strategy for this research involves two main 
methods:  semi-structured interviews and Discourse Analysis (DA).  
1. A discourse analysis (DA) will be used to illuminate the 
narrative surrounding the often contested notions of risk, 
resilience and the smart city from a variety of positions 
including the academic, institutional, city and corporate 
perspectives. Further, these varying perspectives may be 
impacted due to different cultures, societal values and 
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governance between Dublin and Boston.  A DA will help to 
identify these narratives and develop an understanding of 
how each city responds to a flood, how their CMaERS are 
organised and governed.    
2. Semi-structured interviews will be conducted simultaneously 
to the DA.  A variety of participants and stakeholders will be 
interviewed in the chosen cities, one of which is An Garda 
Síochána. The interviews will be compared to the results of 
the DA to identify any similarities and differences between 
the publically available information and the interviews.  
However, there is potential for the DA to influence the line 
of questioning.  
The interviews will be semi-structured, thus, there will be 5-10 set 
questions, in order to allow for more of a conversational interview to 
emerge.  Each interview will last between 45 and 60 minutes and 
where possible will be conducted face to face or alternatively, over 
Skype or the phone.  Any follow up interviews will be kept to a 
maximum of 30 minutes.   
The issues to be explored in the interviews differ between 
participants: representatives of  the CMaERS (including An Garda 
Síochána) will be asked about their role in the group, the overall 
aims and objectives of the CMaERS, how data is shared between 
agencies, funding for CMaERS,  how CMaERS are activated, the 
procedure for responding to a flooding incident, whether they are 
aware of any smart city solutions to flooding and how they are 
affecting/influencing the effectiveness of CMaERS.  Further,  Garda 
participants will be asked about ROCSAFE, ETHANE, 
technological aspects of emergency response and the 999/112 
system and multi-agency response to crises such as flood events.  
The interviews will be coded using MAXQDA and used to 
illuminate the data by placing a narrative around the affects of 
flooding and the notion of resilience.  It will also be used to illustrate 
the role of CMaERS, their evolution, governance and design and 
how they have changed each city’s approach to flooding.   
All data will be anonymised. Each transcript will be coded with the 
spreadsheet of participant names and codes kept on a separate 
encrypted hard drive from the transcripts.  Thus, only the researcher 
will know which interview belongs to which participants.  All 
transcribing and analysis for An Garda Síochána will be done solely 
by the researcher.  
In the case that confidentiality cannot be ensured i.e due to the 
weight of a job title or easily made connections due to the 
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information revealed, this will be clearly discussed with the 
participant and all measures will be taken to ensure the participant is 
comfortable and happy to continue.   
All participants will be required to read and sign an informed 
consent form along with an information sheet that will be sent to 
them as soon as they agree to the interview.  During the 
confirmation email, the consent form and information sheet will be 
sent again.  On the day of the interview, the researcher will also 
bring along the form and will go through it with the participant 
ensuring they are aware of the study and the potential outcomes.  
This will be especially important in cases where confidentiality 
cannot be ensured.  
All participants will be asked for permission to record the interview 
and all will have continuous access to their transcripts and can pull 
out of the process right up until the end of the fieldwork i.e May 
2018. Further, An Garda Síochána will be given the opportunity to 
view any subsequent publications stemming from this data and 
overall thesis to provide feedback and clarification but not veto the 
argument, thus, all quotes will be published anonymously.  
The data will be retained securely by the researcher for a minimum 
of 10 years as stipulated in the MU Research Integrity Policy. The 
data pertaining to such interviews, including electronic notes and 
meta data will be stored on an encrypted hard drive for that period.  
The key containing the codes matching the data to the relevant 
participant will also be stored on a different encrypted hard drive 
located elsewhere.  Any hard copies of the transcripts will be 
destroyed immediately after completion of the Viva and termination 
of the project, using confidential shredding as approved by the 
University.  After the ten years, all the transcripts, electronic notes 
and meta data will be destroyed using appropriate tools to delete and 
overwrite the content. This will be overseen by the project PI and 
executed by the technical support team within NIRSA.  
c) What sample of participants is required & how will they 
be recruited? (Please state no. of interviews, interviewee 
type and detailed method of accessing them) 
 
It is anticipated that about 4-10 interviews will be conducted with 
An Garda Síochána ranging from the strategic to operational level 
and control room staff.  
Participants from Garda headquarters will be formally approached 
by the researcher if permission for the research is granted.  
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Alternatively, Gardaí from various stations around Dublin City, will 
be approached on the recommendation of the Garda Research 
Review Board.  It has proven effective to begin the interview 
process with a Chief Officer or someone high in the ranks, of the 
equivalent emergency service, with knowledge or experience of 
working in Local Coordination Centres and amongst other agencies 
such as, Dublin Fire Brigade, HSE, The Red Cross during flooding 
or other emergency events.  Through this, they can usually identify, 
who in the middle and lower ranks would be most suitable to talk 
with.  It is interesting to interview different ranking members due to 
their different experiences of the real world operation of the 
Framework for Major Emergency Management.   
Further, due to the nature of the research, interviewing someone 
from the Dublin Control room regarding dispatch and the overall 
999/112 system during a major emergency is necessary.  It is also 
important to speak with someone with knowledge of how you 
collect, analyse, disseminate and use data regarding major 
emergencies only.   
Participation is on a one-time contract. However, as the research 
evolves, subject to any potential development or extenuating 
circumstance, participants (principallyonly higher ranking members 
will be contacted again for clarification or comment, either by e-mail 
or through a brief follow-up interview. And, as mentioned 
elsewhere, meeting with the Garda Archivist would be advantageous 
in order to explore the development and growth of the agency and 
how it affects its current position in emergency management.  
Finally, I had the privilege to listen to three very interesting 
presentations by An Garda Síochána at the recent Major Emergency 
Management (MEM) Conference. These were in relation to 
ROCSAFE, ETHANE and multi-agency response. They are all in 
line with the research aims and  thus, interviews conducted around 
these topics would be excellent additions to the research project.   
Update: It was suggested during one of my interviews with one of 
the participants that I should meet with Garda Sara Parsons from the 
Garda Analysis Unit. I would be interested in meeting with her in 
order to evaluate how data is collected, aggregated and analysed.  
This is particularly important as my research has progressed towards 
studying the shift in urban governance towards forms of anticaptory 
and algorithmic.  Thus, the importance of understanding how An 
Garda Síochána collect and use data will help me figure out the 
(dis)connection between the operation of emergency services and 
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city management this may touch on the idea of predictive policing 
which is being used widely in the US. Further, Boston Police 
Department provided me with very interesting information regarding 
their use and collection of data and it would be an interesting 
comparison of the two agencies where potential lessons could be 
learned for both agencies.  Finally, if you grant me this final 
interview my supervisor Prof. Rob Kitchin will be attending in a 
supervisory capacity for me.   
2) 
AGS 
Contributi
ons 
required 
for 
research? 
Please give details of the any An Garda Síochána contributions 
required of the research. 
a) An Garda Síochána  Sponsor / Contact 
• In relation to ROCSAFE and ETHANE, Superintendent 
Finbarr O'Sullivan and in relation to multi-agency 
response, Superintendent Andrew Hawkshaw.  Both 
presented at the MEM conference.  
• Garda Archivist 
• Control room personnel 
• Information and communication and emergency 
management teams.  
• Garda Data Analysis Unit-suggested person was Garda 
Sara Parsons 
b) Access to An Garda Síochána  Data (Please specify 
whether aggregated or personal data is required) 
 
(This highlighted section is not re-written it was in original 
application but I feel it should be highlighted here). As 
explained in section 1.C, this research requires an interview 
with a person who has knowledge regarding how data is 
collected, analysed and disseminated with particular attention 
to data around emergency management.  Any data that 
reflects private property or is of a personal nature is not 
necessarily required but if available aggregated would 
suffice. This data could range from 999/112 calls during a 
major flood event and the specific reasons beyond general 
flooding i.e elderly person, traffic management, burglary or 
assault and also by general geographic region i.e Dublin 
Docklands rather than a specific address.   All this data 
would be used to try and understand the different types of 
calls that all the emergency services get during a flood 
emergency and how they coordinate these responses.  
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Other interesting data would be the different jobs or roles 
that officers had during the flood event and the number of 
Gardaí on site in affected areas and elsewhere in the city 
during the event.  This could also include protracted hours of 
Gardai due to the event.  
Further, to aid the DA part of the methodology, any policy 
documents (related to emergency management) not readily 
available online, that could be provided to me, would be an 
excellent source of data for this research. 
c) Access to An Garda Síochána staff (Rank, roles, unit, 
responsibility, quantity) 
For a comprehensive study, representatives of the following offices 
or ranks would be ideal. 
• A representative of the Office of the Deputy Commissioner 
of Strategy and Change Management –to discuss changes to 
training in light of previous flood events; 
• A representative of the Office of the Deputy Commissioner 
of Operations- to discuss how the service operates during an 
emergency in relation to traffic, support services, crime, data 
collection and dissemination and coordination with other 
agencies; 
• The Executive Director of Information and Communication 
or a representative – to discuss communication, data 
collection and technology in use by operational and higher 
ranked Garda; 
• Deputy or Assistant Commissioner or Chief Superintendent 
•  Sergeant;   
• Gardaí and a Community Garda;  
• Garda trainers with knowledge of emergency management 
and/or flooding; and 
• Garda Archivist in the Garda Museum. 
• Superintendent Finbarr O'Sullivan -ROCSAFE, ETHANE 
and any other information that could be provided on the 
technological aspects of emergency management and the 
999/112 system.  
• Superintendent Andrew Hawkshaw - multi-agency response 
to crisis.  
• Garda Sara Parsons- Garda Analysis Unit 
d) Access to An Garda Síochána IT systems (Specific 
equipment, software or specialist techniques) 
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Access to the Control Room in Dublin City to observe how calls 
are taken and dispatched.  This is in order to compare and 
contrast with other emergency services and explore both 
strengths and weaknesses of these systems.  
e) Access to An Garda Síochána sites 
The Control Room and relevant stations or Headquarters 
where interviews can take place.  
Is your research funded by the An Garda  
Síochána  
No 
f) If it is not An Garda Síochána funded, please specify who 
is the funding body 
This research is funded by the European Research Council, 
through the Programmable City project at Maynooth 
University (grant: ERC-2012-AdG 323636-SOFTCITY). 
The Principal Investigator is Prof. Rob Kitchin of Maynooth 
University. 
g) Any other contributions 
 
 
3) 
Timescale
s and 
Deliverabl
es 
Please give details of any timescales or milestones required of the 
research. (Please include details of your access to An Garda 
Síochána resources; security clearance; data collection and analysis; 
final reporting, publication etc) 
Access to An Garda Síochána members, the Control Room and 
any relevant data would occur between December 2016  and 
May 2018 (originally was late August and June 2017) depending 
on participants availability. The interviews will be transcribed 
between immediately.  They will be sent to each participant to be 
proof read and edited at will.  Analysis will begin after 
immediately.  Submission of the PhD will be October 31st 2018. 
Conference presentations, journal articles and blog posts will be 
published from 2018 onwards using data from these interviews 
and others. As stated in section 1, all quotes will be anonymous 
and An Garda Síochána will be given the opportunity to view the 
articles and provide feedback and clarification but not to veto the 
argument.  
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4) 
Corporate 
& 
Strategic 
Context 
Please give details of the corporate context of the research and 
its scope with respect to internal or external stakeholders. 
a) How does the proposal meet An Garda Síochána strategic 
priorities? 
The mission of An Garda Síochána is to work with communities 
in order to protect and serve them.  This protection is extended to 
victims of emergency situations, which include crises that occur 
due to natural hazards such as flood events.  Therefore, this 
research will work towards illuminating the role of the Gardaí 
during an event and highlighting the past work that Gardaí have 
done trying to protect and serve their communities.  Further, it 
will offer potential insights into how An Garda Síochána can 
continue offering a high level of protection during flood events 
(and other incidents as an All-Hazards approach will be 
considered) taking into account changing economic, 
technological and societal environments.  
The Strategic priorities of An Garda Síochána from 2013-2015 
(the most up to date information that could be located at present) 
outline 4 key goals for the service, each of which relate to this 
research in different ways.   
The former Commissioner Martin Callinan spoke about 
organisational change that would occur between 2013 and 2015.  
Organisational change is never an easy or straightforward action 
but with the changing nature of society, technology and the 
economy, it is essential in order to provide an effective service.  
Part of this research will explore how separate emergency 
service agencies have changed over time due to changing 
environments. This will be used to illuminate how power and 
responsibility is organised and understood within the agency 
themselves and between agencies, thus, exploring how different 
agencies coordinate, in harmonious and contested ways during a 
major incident.  This will offer insights for An Garda Síochána 
regarding emergency management and potential technological 
change that contribute to organisational change and inter-agency 
coordination. 
*The following information was accessed online and is cited as 
(An Garda Síochána, 2013).  The Reference can be found below 
this section.  
“Goal 1: Securing Our Nation” – This goal makes one think of 
manmade or terrorist related incidents, which are critical to the 
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protection of the public and serving members but it also extends 
to natural hazards such as, flooding.  Marshall Shepard (2015) 
stated that policymakers must prioritise weather infrastructure at 
the same level as national security (because they are actually 
related).  This argument presents natural hazards as a risk of the 
same level as terrorism or other security risks.  It highlights the 
fact that national security is about protecting state interests and 
the people of the state.  A natural hazard is under-reported 
(unless it actually occurs) and often portrayed as far-fetched but 
they can have as much of an effect on national security as 
cybercrime, hacking or terrorist attacks. Thus, this research can 
provide insights into how An Garda Síochána can extend their 
strategic priorities to clearly include both manmade and natural 
hazards.  The strategy discusses “enhanced level of readiness for 
major emergencies”, this research will meet this criteria by 
exploring how the police service works with other emergency 
agencies, NGOs and other stakeholders. How as an overall 
system can the Gardaí ensure their readiness for major 
emergencies that include flooding (one of the highest risks 
Ireland faces) but also other risks, that are not necessarily within 
the Gardaí’s area of expertise such as, epidemics but 
simultaneously, be prepared for crises that the Gardaí ultimately 
are held responsible for such as terrorism, hacking, aggravated 
protests etc.   
“Goal 2: Proactive Policing Operations” – This particular goal is 
not directly or obviously linked to this research but the strategy 
discusses how the Gardaí “will work with partners to try and 
prevent and reduce the threat of crime”.  During an emergency of 
any kind but particularly flooding, houses and shops are more 
vulnerable to theft as people leave them unattended, while 
seeking shelter or medical attention.  Further, stressed, anxious 
and scared people may become violent towards emergency 
service personnel, volunteers, medical staff, county councils or 
others.  This research will highlight the important role the Gardaí 
play in creating a safe space in an unsafe environment for all 
involved. This needs to be portrayed and made clear amongst 
coordination efforts with other agencies and in future policy 
directives related to emergency management of natural hazards 
where there is no particular person or organisation responsible 
for the event.  In cases of natural hazards, the Garda response 
should be one of creating safe spaces and reducing potential 
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crime rather than one of catching the people responsible for the 
overall event as with  a terrorist attack.   
Further, due to sensitive information the Gardaí need to be 
proactive in sharing information and data with agencies running 
shelters and the HSE regarding known criminals who may be a 
risk to members of the population. They, regardless of their past 
convictions, are entitled to being safe during an emergency, but 
this needs to be coordinated in a way that doesn’t result in mass 
fear or the chance for the person to re-offend during a situation 
where it is easy to lose track of one person. From what I can 
understand, this is already in action but this research has 
potential to highlight how technology and innovative practices 
can create a more collaborative and coordinated approach to a 
situation of this nature.  
“Goal 3: Ensuring Safe Communities”- This is critical to 
emergency management especially, in communities prone to 
flooding.  Having spoken, informally, to members of the public, 
over the last number of years during austerity, the presence of 
Gardaí has reduced and most see the Gardaí as a negative 
authority figure.  This goal, from what I can understand, attempts 
to bring Gardaí back into the community and to encourage 
relationships to form between serving Guards and the 
community. This is a key tool to develop views of the Gardaí as 
a positive authority figure, one which seeks to” protect and 
serve” not catch a person out.  This goal also allows for 
Community Guards to recognise who may be vulnerable in 
certain situations.  This research is a proponent of coordinated 
action between emergency agencies but recognises that sharing 
of information regarding individuals in a community can be slow 
to access and important information, sometimes critical 
information, is lost due to the Data Protection Act i.e the reason 
for a person’s vulnerability is not shared, which can restrict a 
person’s ability to help them.  An example would be someone 
who suffers from severe anxiety, the HSE may be aware of their 
situation but the Gardaí who might have to help this person may 
not be aware of the situation.  However, community policing has 
the potential for those guards to work with public health nurses 
and the HSE, homes for the elderly and schools get to know who 
is vulnerable in that community and build trust, so if an incident 
occurs, help with knowledge can be delivered efficiently. This 
research will attempt to explore that aspect of coordination 
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between agencies to help an individual as it simultaneously helps 
the masses.  
“Goal 4: Delivering a Professional Service”- This goal is about 
understanding the resources the Gardaí have and how this has 
potential to change. It also discusses how the Gardaí can be 
made a more efficient and accountable service. As this research 
is looking at technological conditions of emergency services as a 
way of exploring how coordination between agencies can be 
secured even as the organisation of agencies change, the research 
has the potential to provide insights into what technological 
changes are needed, where the systems strengths and weaknesses 
are and how these can contribute to better coordination between 
agencies while also keeping in mind budget restrictions.  
*An Garda Síochána (2013) Strategy Statement 2013-2015 
[Online], Available at:  
http://www.garda.ie/Documents/User/Garda%20Strategy%20Sta
tement%202013%20 
English.pdf. (Accessed 9th June 2016). 
*Shepherd, M. (2015) Some Perspective on European vs 
American Weather Models after Hurricane Jocquin. [Online].  
Available at: 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/marshallshepherd/2015/10/03/europ
ean-model-vs-american-model-post-joaquin-debate-likely-but-
some-perspective/#322bfeed152c (Accessed 21 July 2016).  
b) What are the expected benefits of the research? 
The expected benefits of this research are: 
1. Explore the Framework for Managing Major Emergencies 
from the perspective of the Emergency services and other 
related agencies. 
2. Provide a voice to all ranks of the service regarding 
emergency response in Ireland. 
3. Provide information regarding possible technological and 
innovative changes from analysing other countries uses of 
technology. 
4. Provide a comparison between Boston Police Department 
and An Garda Síochána approaches to emergency 
management, community policing, uses of technology, inter-
agency coordination and innovative aspects of the police 
forces.   
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5. Illuminate how the Gardaí can create more networks between 
other agencies; relationships that occur at all ranks.  
6. Offer recommendations for future frameworks and individual 
emergency response agencies.  
7. Offer a more coherent understanding of how smart 
technology and data analytics are shaping emergency 
services. 
c) Who are the likely audiences for the products of the 
research? 
The likely audience are twofold.  Firstly, academic audiences 
will be engaged with through publication in books, journal 
articles and through conference presentations.  Thus, this 
research has the ability to transcend the borders of Ireland and be 
read and explored by academics across the world especially, as it 
is a comparative study between Dublin and Boston.  Secondly, 
members of all the agencies who participated within in this 
research.  Each will receive a synopsis of the research with key 
recommendations from the research sometime in late 2018 or 
early 2019. These agencies include emergency service, local 
authorities, insurance firms and other NGOs.  
This research also has potential to move into the public domain 
through blog posts.  I have my own blog, which I hope to write 
excerpts of my research on but there are a number of other blogs 
I also hope to write for mainly, the Maynooth University 
Geography Department and The Programmable City blogs.  All 
three of these mainly reach an academic audience but have 
potential to be shared across social media platforms.  
d) Any internal / external stakeholders, units, agencies or 
institutions involved? 
All the participants of my research are stakeholders as the 
research illuminates their work practices, organisations and 
technological uses but for ethical reasons they cannot be named 
in this document.  Other external institutions are Maynooth 
University where the research is conducted and the European 
Research Council who fund the research. 
5) 
Next Steps 
Would you be happy to present your findings to an An Garda 
Síochána-wide audience in an academic seminar? 
 
 
 
X Yes No 
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Completed by:  Aoife Delaney    Date: 21 July 
2016 
Part 2: Meeting the AGS requirements 
(To be read and agreed by the Researcher) 
o To assure anonymity and confidentiality, when handling data or other 
information provided by An Garda Síochána I / we will ensure the 
requirements of the Data Protection Act are maintained. 
o I / we will acknowledge An Garda Síochána as a source of information in 
any final report. 
o I / we will acknowledge those that carried out any original analysis / 
research or collection of data and declare they have no responsibility for 
further analysis or interpretation of it. 
o I / we will submit a summary report detailing the aims, methods, findings 
and implications for policing to An Garda Síochána. 
o I / we understand that I / we may be invited to present the research findings 
before an internal An Garda Síochána audience in an academic seminar. 
o I / we will give access to the data / information only to persons directly 
associated with the project. The data will not be used in connection with 
any other analysis except that outlined in this document. 
o I / we will maintain a list of all persons who handle the data / information 
provided. 
o I / we will consult with the An Garda Síochána regarding any media interest 
in this project. 
o I/ we will establish whether security clearance is required to undertake the 
proposed research, and complete any necessary applications relating to 
this. 
 
Name (Block capitals) Signature Date 
1:AOIFE DELANEY Aoife Delaney 21 July 2016 
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2:ROB KITCHIN 
 
22 July 2016 
3:   
4:   
5:   
6:   
 
Appendix 7: A map of Massachusetts towns and cities 
 
Appendix 8: List of MAESF’s 
Massachusetts Emergency Support Function (MAESF) Annexes:  
• MAESF 1: Transportation   
• MAESF 2: Communications 
• MAESF 3: Public Works and Engineering  
• MAESF 4: Firefighting  
• MAESF 5: Business and Industry  
• MAESF 6: Mass Care, Emergency Assistance, Housing, and Human Services 
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• MAESF 7: Volunteers and Donations  
• MAESF 8: Public Health and Medical Services  
• MAESF 9: Search and Rescue  
• MAESF 10: Hazardous Materials and Environmental Protection 
• MAESF 11: Agriculture, Animals, and Natural Resources  
• MAESF 12: Energy  
• MAESF 13: Public Safety and Security  
• MAESF 14: Recovery  
• MAESF 15: Public Information and External Affairs  
• MAESF 16: Military Support 
Appendix 9: Invitation and notes from former BPD Commissioner Bill Evans 
Lecture. 
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